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Abstract
This thesis is about the assessment of the fair character of public policies whose distribu-
tive impacts are well understood. Because of the diversity of existing judgments on this
matter, the relevance of such assessments is a crucial question. This work rests upon the
theory of fair allocations and the empirical study of fairness judgments. After present-
ing each of these approaches and discussing how they could contribute to form practical
policy recommendations in three short chapters, three contributions to the literature are
presented. All are motivated by the so-called NIMBY (“Not In My Back-Yard”) problem,
in which a group of communities faces the opportunity of implementing an economically
beneficial project that is locally undesirable (e.g. a wastewater treatment plant, a landfill,
a wind park, etc).
In the first article, I consider the problem of allocating a single, indivisible project and
sharing its benefit among communities with an equal right on it but featuring different
provision costs. The differences in these costs may arise from variations in building, oper-
ation and maintenance costs for the project but also from differences in the communities’
compensation requirements for hosting the project. In this setting, I characterise three
allocation rules that correspond to three prominent cooperative solution concepts: the
welfare egalitarian solution, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The principles invoked
involve Pareto efficiency, Anonymity, No envy, and axioms of solidarity or reward related
to the communities’ provision costs. The results clarify how considerations over the na-
ture of the costs could influence fair allocations. The analysis is then extended to settings
with asymmetric information and to setting with costs of several kinds. In each extension,
I propose and motivate a fair solution. The results of a survey motivated by this analysis
are eventually presented.
In the second article, I study individual fairness judgments and preferences for the alloca-
tion of an indivisible task and its benefit among two individuals with a different willingness
to perform it. My approach relates results from the theory of fair allocations with the em-
pirical observation of fairness judgments and preferences. I first present and motivate four
contrasted allocation rules as possible rules of judgment. For some of the participants,
a questionnaire was proposed before they knew about their situation. Among the four
rules of judgment proposed, the welfare egalitarian allocation rule is the most preferred
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allocation rule as stated by the participants. Yet, I also observe support for principles
that are not compatible with this rule: an important proportion of respondents deem fair
to give nothing to someone who would not be willing to perform the task, and another
substantial proportion deem fair to split the benefit of the task equally when both partic-
ipants feature the same compensation requirement. In the experiment, participants had
the opportunity to perform a task for pay. However, for any two of them, a single task was
available. As required by the Pareto principle, it was allocated to the participant with
the lower compensation requirement. In this situation, the stated normative expectations
of the task performer are found to be higher, the greater the discrepancy between the
compensation requirements. This does not extend to individual distributive preferences
as revealed by the offers in a dictator setting. I also find that the task performers who
took the questionnaire would deem the equal split fair less often. Overall, few respondents
are consistent with any of the four rules proposed.
In the third article, jointly written with Stefan Ambec, we consider the decentralised
provision of a global public good with local externalities in a spatially explicit model.
Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs
to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine
cooperative games associated with this so-called NIMBY problem. We derive and discuss
conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven by the temptation to
exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate the results in different
spatial settings. These results clarify how property rights can affect cooperation and shed
further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.
Keywords: social choice, justice, fairness, equity, justification, reflective equilibrium, ax-
iomatic analysis, theory of fair allocations, cooperative games, core, empirical social
choice, economic experiment, NIMBY, pollution, waste, resource allocation.
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Résumé
Cette thèse porte sur l’évaluation du caractère équitable de politiques publiques dont les
impacts distributifs sont bien compris. Du fait de la diversité des jugements existants
en la matière, la question de la pertinence de telles évaluations est cruciale. Ce travail
s’appuie sur la théorie des allocations justes et l’étude empirique des jugements en matière
d’équité. Après avoir présenté ce en quoi consistent ces deux approches et en quoi elles
peuvent contribuer à la formation de recommandations pratiques en matière de politiques
publiques, trois contributions à la littérature sont présentées. Toutes sont motivées par
les problèmes, parfois qualifiés de “NIMBY” (“Not In My Back-Yard"), dans lesquels un
groupe de communautés a la possibilité d’entreprendre un projet bénéfique sur le plan
économique mais qui reste indésirable d’un point de vue local (par exemple, une station
d’épuration, un centre d’enfouissement technique, un parc éolien, etc.).
Dans le premier article, je considère le problème de l’allocation d’un unique projet indivis-
ible et des bénéfices associés entre des communautés a priori toutes aussi légitimes pour
l’accueillir mais présentant différents coûts de mise en œuvre. Les différences dans ces
coûts peuvent résulter de variations dans les coûts de construction, de fonctionnement et
de maintenance du projet en leur sein mais aussi de différences dans leurs exigences de com-
pensation pour accueillir le projet. Dans ce cadre, je caractérise trois règles d’allocation
qui correspondent à trois concepts majeurs de la théorie des jeux coopératifs : la règle
d’allocation égalitaire, le nucléole et la valeur de Shapley. Les principes invoqués compren-
nent l’efficacité au sens de Pareto, l’anonymité, l’absence d’envie, ainsi que des principes
de compensation ou de récompense relatifs aux coûts de mise en œuvre des communautés.
Ces résultats clarifient comment des considérations portant sur la nature des différents
coûts peuvent amener à recommander des allocations différentes. L’analyse est ensuite
étendue à des situations d’asymétrie d’information et à des situations avec des coûts de
différente nature. Dans chacune de ces extensions, je propose et motive une solution
équitable. Enfin, les résultats d’une enquête motivée par cette analyse sont présentés.
Dans le deuxième article, j’étudie les jugements et les préférences en matière d’équité
pour l’allocation d’une tâche indivisible et de ses bénéfices entre deux personnes a priori
aussi légitimes l’une que l’autre pour l’entreprendre mais différemment disposées à la
réaliser. L’approche proposée met en relation des résultats de la théorie des allocations
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justes et l’observation empirique des jugements et des préférences en matière d’équité.
Je commence par présenter et motiver quatre règles d’allocation contrastées comme des
règles de jugement possibles. Pour certains participants, un questionnaire était proposé
avant qu’ils ne connaissent leur propre situation. Parmi les quatre règles proposées, les
participants adhèrent en majorité au partage égalitaire du bien-être. Cependant, j’observe
par ailleurs un support pour des principes qui ne sont pas compatibles avec cette règle :
une proportion importante des participants estiment juste de ne rien allouer à quelqu’un
qui n’aurait pas souhaité entreprendre la tâche, et une autre proportion substantielle
estime juste de partager le bénéfice de la tâche également lorsque les deux participants ont
les mêmes exigences de compensation. Dans le contexte de l’expérience, les participants
avaient l’opportunité de réaliser la tâche contre rémunération. Cependant, pour chaque
paire de participants, une seule tâche était disponible. Comme requis par le principe de
Pareto, cette tâche était allouée au participant dont l’exigence de compensation était la
plus basse. Dans cette situation, j’observe que les attentes normatives des participants
amenés à faire la tâche sont d’autant plus importantes lorsque la différence entre les
exigences de compensation des deux participants est élevée. Cette observation ne s’étend
pas aux préférences révélées par les offres dans le jeu du dictateur. J’observe aussi que
les participants ayant répondu au questionnaire sont moins nombreux à retenir le partage
égal. D’une manière générale, peu de participants sont cohérents avec une seule des quatre
règles d’allocation proposées.
Dans le troisième article, coécrit avec Stefan Ambec, nous considérons la fourniture dé-
centralisée d’un bien public global présentant des externalités locales dans un modèle
spatial explicite. Des communautés décident de la localisation d’une infrastructure qui
bénéficie à tous mais présente des coûts pour la communauté d’accueil et ses voisins. Ces
coûts peuvent être partagés par des transferts. Nous nous intéressons aux jeux coopératifs
induits par ces situations qualifiées de problème “NIMBY”. Nous obtenons et discutons
des conditions pour que des solutions du cœur du jeu existent. Ces conditions découlent
de la tentation d’exclure les groupes de communautés au voisinage de toute localisation
potentielle. Nous illustrons ces résultats dans différents contextes spatialisés. Ces ré-
sultats permettent de clarifier comment l’allocation des droits de propriété peut affecter
la coopération et apportent un éclairage supplémentaire sur une limite du théorème de
Coase.
Keywords: choix social, justice, équité, justification, équilibre réfléchi, analyse axioma-
tique, théorie des allocations justes, jeu coopératif, cœur, choix social empirique,
expérience économique, NIMBY, pollution, déchets, allocation des ressources.
iv
Remerciements
C’est avant tout à Stefan Ambec, mon directeur de thèse, que j’adresse mes remerciements
pour avoir accepté de me suivre et me conseiller tout au long de ce travail. C’est en grande
partie grâce à sa disponibilité, ses conseils et son soutien que j’ai pu mener ce travail à
bien.
Plus généralement, je tiens à remercier l’ensemble de l’équipe du Laboratoire d’économie
des ressources naturelles et l’ensemble de la communauté de l’école d’économie de Toulouse
et du récent institut d’études avancées. L’enthousiasme et le dynamisme de ces équipes
contribuent à créer une atmosphère de recherche stimulante dont j’ai grandement bénéficié.
Je souhaite en particulier remercier Henrik Andersson, Loïc Batté, Charlotte Cavaillé,
Sylvain Chabé-Ferret, Astrid Hopfensitz, Shagun Khare, Thibaut Laurent, Michel Le
Breton, Yves Le Yaouanq, César Mantilla, Christoph Rheinberger, François Salanié, Peter
Schwardman, Nicolas Treich, Karine Van der Straeten, Boris Van Leuwen et Takuro
Yamashita pour des discussions et conseils qui m’ont été précieux dans l’avancement de
ce travail.
Parmi ces personnes, il en est à qui je souhaite exprimer une gratitude toute particulière.
C’est le cas de Michel Le Breton, pour ses conseils avisés et son suivi tout au long de ce
travail. Son enthousiasme communicatif pour les problèmes de partage équitable et les
questions de choix social m’a été précieux pour avancer. Je tiens par ailleurs à remercier
Astrid Hopfensitz pour son soutien et ses conseils sur le projet d’expérience. En plus
d’être pour moi un grand plaisir, les nombreux échanges que nous avons pu avoir ont
largement contribué à ma réflexion.
Concernant la réalisation de l’expérience, je tiens aussi à remercier Stéphane Robin pour
avoir pris le temps de me fournir de précieux conseils sur le protocole de l’expérience et
Stéphane Cézéra pour son appui essentiel dans la mise en œuvre de ce projet.
Du côté de l’école doctorale, il doit être rare de trouver une section de remerciements sans
mention d’Aude Schloesing. Cette thèse ne fait pas exception, même si cette mention
risque malheureusement de se raréfier à l’avenir. Je lui souhaite une très bonne retraite.
Ces remerciements ne seraient pas complets si j’omettais de remercier les personnes ayant
accepté de participer au suivi de ce travail. Je suis reconnaissant aux membres du comité
v
Remerciements
de pilotage, Mathieu Glachant, Michel Le Breton et Alban Thomas pour leur participation
en début de projet. Je tiens aussi à remercercier les membres du jury, Dominique Bureau,
Marc Fleurbaey, Michel Le Breton et Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, pour avoir accepté de
prendre part à l’évaluation de ce travail.
Je tiens par ailleurs à remercier le corps des ingénieurs des ponts, des eaux et des forêts
pour avoir rendu ce travail possible. Je remercie les membres du bureau de la commis-
sion de formation doctorale des IPEF pour l’animation de la formation doctorale, et en
particulier Cyril Kao et Alexandre Pery pour leur suivi tout au long de ce projet.
Je souhaite aussi manifester ma reconnaissance à ceux que j’ai eu le plaisir de fréquenter
au quotidien durant ma thèse. A Ananya et Tuba, aux côtés de qui j’ai pris grand plaisir
à travailler, à Alissa, pour son organisation du groupe de lecture de philosophie politique,
à eux et à tous les autres, merci.
Je tiens enfin à remercier ma famille et mes amis pour leur soutien précieux.
vi
Contents
Abstract i
Résumé iii
Remerciements v
Contents vii
List of Figures xiii
List of Tables xv
Introduction 1
Part 1 - Presentation of the approach 11
1 Observing individual judgments 13
1.1 Stated judgments of outside observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2 Revealed judgments of outside observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.1 Quasi-spectator experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.2.2 Tacit coordination games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.3 Revealed judgments of stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.1 The dictator game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.3.2 The ultimatum game and bargaining environments . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.3 Individual decision-making behind the veil of ignorance . . . . . . . 25
1.3.4 Other experimental protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Ways forward for the empirical social choice program . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
CONTENTS
2 Reflecting about fairness 33
2.1 The theory of fair allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1.1 Domains as representations of the situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.1.2 Allocation rules as representations of fairness judgments . . . . . . 37
2.1.3 Axioms as a representation of equity principles . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.1.4 Characterisations and impossibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.2 The construction of reasoned judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3 Application to the context of locally undesirable land uses 47
3.1 Representations of the problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.1 Generic facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.1.2 Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.2 Proposal for considered judgments in reflective equilibrium . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.1 A first line of reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.2.2 Accounting for private information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2.3 Accounting for costs of different kinds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.4 Accounting for differences in wealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.2.5 Accounting for externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.3 Observed individual judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Part 2 - Articles 63
4 Fair allocation rules for sharing the cost of a locally undesirable facility 65
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.1 The domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 Allocation rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.1 Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2.2 Three allocation rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.3 Axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.1 No envy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3.2 Cost Solidarity or Cost Reward? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
viii
CONTENTS
4.3.3 Welfare bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.1 Implications of No envy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.2 Characterisation of the welfare egalitarian allocation rule . . . . . . 82
4.4.3 Characterisation of the nucleolus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.4.4 Characterisation of the Shapley value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.1 Accounting for private information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.5.2 An extension to additive composite costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 An illustrative survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendices 103
4.A Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.B Derivation of the nucleolus on E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.C Derivation of the Shapley value on E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.D Proof of Lemma 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.E Proof of Proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.F Proof of Proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.F.1 Characterisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.F.2 Independence of the axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.G Proof of Proposition 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.G.1 Characterisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.G.2 Independence of the axioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.H Proof of Proposition 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.I Proof of Proposition 4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.J Proof of Proposition 4.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.K Proof of Proposition 4.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.L Proof of Corollary 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.M Presentation of the survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.M.1 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
ix
CONTENTS
4.M.2 The vignettes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.M.3 Outline of the survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.N Detailed screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5 Fairness judgments for the allocation of an indivisible task and its benefit 123
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.1 Allocation rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.1.1 Presentation of the situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
5.1.2 Reasoning about fair allocation rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.2 Experimental design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2.1 Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2.2 Proceeding of the experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.2.3 Normative reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
5.2.4 Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
5.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
5.3.2 Fairness judgments in the questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
5.3.3 Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Appendices 157
5.A Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.B Experimental conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
5.C Detailed screens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.C.1 Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.C.2 Screenshots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
5.D Matching process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
6 Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility183
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
6.1 The NIMBY problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
x
CONTENTS
6.2 Existence of core allocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
6.2.1 The NIMBY game without cooperative externalities . . . . . . . . . 192
6.2.2 The NIMBY game with cooperative externalities . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.3 Illustrations on explicit spatial structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.3.1 Uniform NIMBY problems on graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.3.2 A tentative assessment on real geographies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
Appendices 209
6.A Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.B Proof of Proposition 6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
6.C Proof of Proposition 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
6.D Discarding Assumption 2 in Proposition 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213
6.E Proof of Corollary 6.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
6.F Proof of Corollary 6.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.G Proof of Corollary 6.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
6.H Proof of Proposition 6.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
6.I Proof of Corollary 6.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.J Codes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.J.1 NIMBY problems of graphs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
6.J.2 NIMBY problem on a French administrative unit . . . . . . . . . . 224
Conclusion 227
Bibliography 231
Index 241
xi

List of Figures
0.1 Three contrasted perspectives on a democratic political community . . . . 5
2.1 Frontiers of the theory of fair allocations in the reflective equilibrium pro-
cedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.1 A representation of the situation E0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.2 Comparisons performed to characterise the welfare egalitarian allocation
rule. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 Comparisons performed to characterise the nucleolus. . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Comparisons performed to characterise the Shapley value. . . . . . . . . . 85
4.5 Logical relations among axioms for anonymous, individually rational and
efficient allocation rules satisfying No envy among equals on E . . . . . . 86
4.6 A representation of the situation E+0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
4.7 Average compensation chosen for the host in four different cases. . . . . . 96
4.8 Percentage of respondents deeming each of the different allocations pro-
posed (respectively) “unfair”, “fair”, “neither fair, nor unfair” or “without
opinion” in the situation E1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.9 Percentage of respondents chosing each allocation as “the fairest” in the
situation E1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.1 Allocation to the task performer recommended by each allocation rule for
each particular case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.1 Proceeding of the experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.1 Proportion of respondents judging each allocation rule as “fair” against
“unfair” (on the left) and proportion of respondents judging each rule as
the “fairest” (on the right) in each treatment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
xiii
LIST OF FIGURES
5.2 Distribution of the allocation recommended for the task performer in each
case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.3 Average allocation to the task performer in each of the particular cases
by treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.4 Average allocation to the task performer in each of the particular cases
according to the order of the two parts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.5 Proportion of respondents judging each allocation rule as “fair” (against
“unfair”) (on the left) and proportion of respondents choosing each allo-
cation rule as “the fairest” (on the right) according to the order of the
two parts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.6 Average stated normative expectations by treatment and role. . . . . . . . 147
5.7 Average guess of the stated normative expectations of another participant
in the opposite role by treatment and role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
5.8 Cumulative distribution functions of stated normative expectations for
task performers (on the left) and others (on the right). . . . . . . . . . . . 148
5.9 Average offer by treatment and role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.10 Cumulative distribution function of offers from task performers (on the
left) and others (on the right). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
5.11 Allocation to the task performer in the situation (6, 14) recommended in
the final questionnaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
5.B.1 Experimental room and an individual station. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
6.1 Distribution of the costs at an optimal location in the uniform linear case. 190
6.1 A graph with 6 communities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
6.2 Critical value of δ for different graphs with different number of communi-
ties. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
6.3 Critical values for different graphs with 6 communities. . . . . . . . . . . 205
6.4 Municipalities composing Haute-Garonne. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
6.G.1 Initial patterns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
6.G.2 Iterative pattern. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
xiv
List of Tables
0.1 Implications of different perspectives on a democratic political community
on the basis of social judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 Overview of existing methods for the observation of individual fairness
judgments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2 Domains considered in this thesis and in the literature for the analysis of
the NIMBY problem. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.1 Properties of the three allocation rules characterised on E . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Fraction of the repondents choosing each location for the facility in the
different problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
4.3 Adhesion to the different principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.4 Relationship between the adhesion to the principles and the allocation to
the host for the respondents who choose A as the host. . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Relationship between a strong adhesion to the principles and the alloca-
tion to the host for the respondents who choose A as the host. . . . . . . 99
4.6 Characteristics of the communities in a general context. . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.1 Properties of the four allocation rules considered. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.1 Descriptive statistics of the compensation requirements in the pairs. . . . 139
5.2 Classification of respondents according to their answers to the particular
cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.3 Effect of the compensation requirements on declared normative expectations.148
5.4 Determinants of the stated fair wage in the questionnaire and the chosen
wage for participants in the reasoning treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.A.1 Descriptive statistics of individual and situational characteristics across
the treatments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
xv

Introduction
“When the pressure of public
opinion seems to force the
participants to the obviously fair
or reasonable solution, we may
exaggerate the pressure or at
least misunderstand the way it
works on participants unless we
give credit to its power to
coordinate the participants’
expectations.”
(Thomas Schelling, 1960, The
strategy of conflict)
“Being designed to reconcile by
reason, justification proceeds
from what all parties to the
discussion hold in common.
Ideally, to justify a conception of
justice to someone is to give him
a proof of its principles from
premises that we both accept,
these principles having in turn
consequences that match our
considered judgments.”
(John Rawls, 1971, A Theory of
Justice)
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Introduction
As such, it does not cost anything to say that public decisionmakers should act on behalf
of the common good, the public interest, the social welfare or - as will sound familiar to the
French citizens - l’intérêt général. Nobody would oppose either that justice, equity and
fairness are essential requirements of public decisions.1 Yet, how all these notions operate
in trading-off competing interests and conciliating conflicting values in practice is far from
consensual. This is precisely here, when defining a fair social objective and deriving its
practical implications, that the hard part begins. In this thesis, I seek to propose a
method for assessing the relative fairness of different policy options with well-understood
distributive impacts. Such an assement may be called a social judgment.
In this introduction, the objective is to make explicit what this endeavour requires. I begin
by reminding how the classical Arrow theorem establishes that no natural solution exists to
the problem of formulating a social judgment out of the diverse individual values that may
exist in society. My conclusion therefore is that we cannot avoid being more specific about
the nature of the political community concerned by the policies under scrutiny. The two
introductory quotes are intended to convey the main intuition for this. As suggested by
the first quote by Thomas Schelling, the most natural solution is to prevail in some policy
environments. In these instances, a social judgment based on an elaborate justification is
most likely to be disparaged by the stakeholder as a counterproductive move away from
a settlement. On the contrary, the perspective proposed by Rawls suggests that in other
environments, a seemingly natural solution may not resist a justification in favour of an
alternative option. Following Sugden (2013), I then propose three contrasted perspectives
on the democratic political community. I argue that the relevant methods for motivating
a social judgment differ radically in each of these perspectives. I eventually present the
outline of this thesis, in which I chose to focus on the methods that are relevant to the
deliberative perspective on the democratic political community.
On the need to cope with ethical arguments
The social choice approach is an attempt to provide a compelling rational argument
about how a single social objective could be formed out out the diverse, conflicting, and
supposedly unalterable individual values that may exist in society in a fair way. It formally
reflects on the fair terms of aggregating these conflicting (ordinal) views over all the feasible
policy options into one consistent ordering over these options, which we may call a social
judgment. These fair terms essentially consist of four requirements: the universal domain
1In this thesis, the terms justice, equity and fairness may next be used indifferently. They denote the
reasons, or norms that should guide the adjudication of the conflicting interests or values that exist
in society.
2
condition2, non-dictatorship3, the Pareto principle4, and an independence condition5. The
Arrow theorem establishes that no aggregation rule meets all these criteria (Arrow, 1951).
This means that any attempt to formulate a social judgment over alternative policy
options on the basis of the diverse views of the citizens would have to deviate from
this framework or to concede on at least one of the former principles.
As an instance, the theory of fair allocations is one such approach that proposed to
characterize fair allocations rules in specific contexts out of additional intuitively appealing
fairness principles that are compatible with the Pareto principle. It clarifies the logical
articulation of these principles along with the necessary trade-offs that exist between
them in order to form a well-defined judgment. As emphasised by Fleurbaey et al (2005),
this approach most significantly rests upon a relaxation of the independence condition
in the Arrowian framework. In this thesis, I will hypothesize that individual values are
suceptible of change and I will argue that another significant departure of the theory of fair
allocations from the Arrovian framework lies in the different interpretation attached to
this particular approach. Indeed, the theory of fair allocations rests upon a representation
of individual welfare that is most often interpreted as preferences or tastes, and rarely in
terms of individual values. In doing so, the question of conciliating the conflicting value
judgments behind the choice of principles is explicitly kept external to the theory. In a
way, such an approach returns the question of how to conciliate individual values to the
public arena and paves the way for many different perspectives on this problem, maybe
recognizing that such a process would have to rely on some form of ethical argument, the
validity of which could always be questionned.
Three perspectives on a democratic political community
In order to avoid an intricate and unavoidably fragile meta-ethical exercise, I shall follow
Rawls (1993) in viewing this problem as primarily political and presume the existence of
a unanimously shared sense of the political community in the policy context at hand. I
shall first presume that this political community should be democratic in the sense that,
not only the welfare, but also the judgments of all the people who have interests at stakes
are the relevant judgments to consider in the formation of a social judgment.6 This is
2The universal domain condition states that no restriction should be placed a priori on individual
judgments.
3Non-dictatorship, requires that no individual shall be able to impose her own view over all pairs of
alternatives regardless of other’s judgments.
4The Pareto principle requires that if everyone prefers one alternative over another one, with some
expressing a strict preference, then the social ordering shall strictly favor the former alternative.
5This independence condition requires that for any change in the profile of individual judgments that
leaves all individual preferences over a given pair of alternatives unchanged, the social ordering over
these two alternatives should remain the same.
6As one may note, the notion of “legitimate interests” may prove so broad that this mere requirement
can be considered as meaningless. I leave undefined the question about what legitimate interests are.
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not sufficient for our purpose and I further propose three contrasted conceptions of a
democratic political community. They are presented on Figure 0.1. As will be developed
afterwards, each of these perspectives requires motivating a social judgment about the
fairness of different policy arrangements on drastically different bases.
The three perspectives on the democratic political community proposed differ according
to two dimensions, which may be respectively related with a theory of society and a theory
of human nature. The first dimension may be called the extent of the public sphere. The
public sphere denotes the public arenas in which all potentially relevant stakeholders may
express their argument publicly. Its extent may vary according to the willingness of the
citizens to get involved in political activities or according to the transaction costs involved
in public decision making. At some extreme, the citizens may be willing to entrust a single
individual or a small group. At another extreme, large panels of stakeholders would
directly and systematically get involved in public decision-making. In the first, narrow
conception of the public sphere, the fair character of a given policy would result from the
conception of the public interest of a given, often elected, individual or community. We
may call it the delegative perspective on the democratic political community.
The second dimension is the strength of the sense of justice of the people. By the sense
of justice, I mean both a general capacity of the people to form and revise their own
impartial judgments over different policy options and their intrinsic motivation to develop
and exercise it. It may also require some degree of tolerance or open-mindedness toward
other’s values and arguments. At one extreme, still, this sense of justice may remain
anecdotal and the citizens primarily motivated by their own self-interest. Only to a lesser
extent, the citizens may follow their own moral views or their perceptions of the social
norms. We shall call it the bargaining perspective on the democratic political community.
In this perspective, the relevant bases for social choice are the reasons that are deemed
valid by the stakeholders themselves for the allocation of mutual advantage. It remains
pessimistic on the possibility of trading-off the conflicting interests in society and presumes
the acceptance of the actual situation as a status quo. This makes it a pragmatic and
conservative view of politics that corresponds to the contractarian perspective depicted
in Sugden (2013).
Finally, individual citizens may both feature a developed sense of justice and have access
to a wide public sphere.7 This creates the conditions for public reasoning and deliberation.
7Amartya Sen explicitly favored this perspective to the two others when he said, in his presidential
address to the one-hundred seven-th meeting of the American Economic Association:
“we have to go beyond looking only for the best reflection of given individual preferences,
or the most acceptable procedures for choices based on those preferences. We need to depart
both from the assumption of given preferences (as in traditional social choice theory) and
from the presumption that people are narrowly self-interested homo economicus (as in
traditional public choice theory)”
(Amartya Sen, 1995)
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In this perspective, the relevant basis for social fairness judgments are the reasons that
any citizen would accept, given their own reasonable conception of the good and their
understanding of shared values. This perspective, which rests upon the influence of public
discussions on individual values and political behavior, may be called the deliberative
perspective to the democratic community. This corresponds to the liberal social order
depicted in Rawls (1993) or Sen (2009).
Bargaining 
perspective 
D
e
le
g
a
ti
v
e
 
p
e
rs
p
e
ct
iv
e
 
Extent of the 
public sphere 
E
x
te
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 s
e
n
se
 o
f 
ju
st
ic
e
 o
f 
th
e
 p
e
rs
o
n
s 
Figure 0.1: Three contrasted perspectives on a democratic political community
Figure 0.1 presents these three contrasted perspectives of a democratic political commu-
nity. These cases may not be mutually exclusive but rather reflect different sides of a
same, complex reality. Still, they are crucial for our discussion as each of these perspec-
tives would ground a social fairness judgment on drastically different bases, as we shall
go on to examine.
Implications in terms of analysis
The motivation of a social judgment will differ in the different perspectives adopted ac-
cording to several dimensions. First, each of these perspectives would recognize different
legitimate beholders. On top of this, they would rely on judgments of a different nature.
Furthermore, they would impose different constraints on the judgments observed for being
worth motivating a social judgment. Last, they will grant a different role to reasoning.
The following discussion focuses on these differences. It is summarized in Table 0.1.
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In the delegative perspective, social judgments are to result from the moral values of
legitimate delegates which may rest upon a conception of the public interest. While some
degree of internal consistency may be expected from them, the democratic legitimacy of
the delegates is sufficient to establish the validity of a judgment. In this context, the
social judgments would stem from the given, supposedly well-defined, conception of the
public interest of a given group or person. Normative reasoning may be required or not,
depending on the delegates. The role of the analysis is then to assist these delegates in
forming their own reasoned judgments over available policy options, and given their own
conception of the public interest. Most often, knowledge about individual preferences
will constitute a necessary ingredient for the assessment of policies in this perspective.
Knowledge about the citizens’ values would still matters to the extent that the delegate
are held accountable and may be concerned about justifying of their choices.
In the bargaining perspective, the relevant fairness judgments are the judgments of the
actual stakeholders. Surprisingly, fairness considerations are not irrelevant though. In
this perspective, they are relevant to the extent that they allow to overcome coordination
failures and to avoid costly sanctioning behavior in bargaining. In this context, fairness
beliefs mainly consist of a notion of salience resulting from shared associations and existing
conventions and, to a lower extent, existing social norms and deeply felt individual fairness
ideals. A particularity in this perspective is that the actual stakeholders may not find
in their own interest to reveal their true perception of a fair bargain so that the actual
content of fairness would have to stem from indirect evidence about their perceptions of
salience and social norms. Furthermore, it is clear that an individual who would find the
most salient possibility in her own interest would seek to avoid any further discussion
and reasoning, so this particular perspective precludes ethical reasoning regardless of the
extent of the public sphere. The role of the analysis is then to alleviate the coordination
failures and mitigate potential wasteful sanctioning behaviors. In this line, the analysis
shall provide a convincing evidence that a given option is the one that is the most natural
and acceptable candidate for coordinating.
Finally, the deliberative perspective accepts the view of any citizen as a relevant basis
under the provision of some degree of competence. First, the citizen may adhere to rea-
sonable values which allow for discussion with other members of society. Second, the
citizen should be informed and able to justify their positions. What further makes the
validity of a claim for fairness is its certification by an ideal form of public reasoning,
notably requiring two features: the first is logical coherence as it is a necessary condition
for any form of reasoning; the second is impartiality, in a sense that will be discussed
later on, as it is a necessary requirement to make the content of an argument acceptable
for all. This draws the ideal of a judgment that is formed in conditions of impartiality
through interpersonal deliberations. The outcome of such hypothetical deliberations de-
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termines the requirement of fairness. The eventual social judgment rests upon a plausible
overlapping consensus, which is a judgment that all citizens may eventually find coherent
with their own individual values. As Rawls and Sen admit it, there is no guarantee that
such a consensus would always exist. Still, this may constitute the most compelling basis
for a common judgment among citizens with different values and interests.8 The role of
the analysis in this context is to ease the deliberation and favor the identification of an
overlapping consensus.
The implications of these different perspectives in terms of analysis are summarized in
Table 0.1. In the first part of this thesis, I will develop more at length the type of
analysis most suited to the deliberative perspective and seek to explore the potential of
public reasoning to increase understanding and consensus among the citizens. In this
line, Chapter 1 illustrates how different methods for the observation of individual fairness
judgments may be more or less relevant in each of the three perspectives proposed, focusing
on the deliberative one. Chapter 2 then details what is meant by normative reasoning
and how analysis may contribute to propose some schemes of justification.
Delegative
perspective
Bargaining
perspective
Deliberative
perspective
Relevant judges Legitimate delegate Actual stakeholders
Any reasonable and
informed citizen
Condition of
validity of
observed
judgments
Accuracy in
reflecting the values
of the delegate
Accuracy in
reflecting the
perception of the
actual stakeholders
Conditions of
impartiality
Nature of the
beliefs at the
origin of the
social fairness
judgment
Moral values of the
delegate (which may
include a vision of
the general interest)
Consciously shared
knowledge and
modes of inference,
social norms
An overlapping
consensus
Role for
normative
reasoning
Dependent on the
delegate
Weak Important
Table 0.1: Implications of different perspectives on a democratic political community on
the basis of social judgments
8In the case no reasonable consensus emerges out of deliberations, the aggregation of existing views
through voting procedures may eventually be required.
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Content of this thesis
This thesis is organised into two parts. The first part presents and motivates the approach
taken. It consists of three short chapters that are intended to be accessible for a wide
audience. It motivates the approach taken and relates it to different branches of the
existing research. The second part presents three contributions to the literature. It
consists of three research articles that can be read independently from the rest of the
thesis.
In the first chapter, I review the main empirical approaches for the observation of individ-
ual fairness judgments. These approaches are distinguished according to their relevance
in light of the three perspectives proposed previously. I focus more particularly on the
deliberative perspective. This drives our focus on contributions that seek to relate the
observation of fairness judgments with the theories of fair allocations. Noting the focus
on spontaneous intuitive judgments, I then discuss the possibilities of an empirical study
of reasoned judgments. An example of a survey motivated by this approach is proposed
at the end of Chapter 4, and an experiment is presented in Chapter 5.
In the second chapter, I consider the problem of motivating a fair social objective out
of reasoning. I present the theories of fair allocations and discuss their potential role in
the formation of reflected judgments. From a precise formulation of principles in a given
environment, these theories are helpful to characterize the logical conflicts between norms,
to stress the need for prioritisation and to propose ways to conciliate between competing
norms. An example of this approach is proposed in Chapter 4. I further argue that the
articulation of these theories in a broader framework can help identify new justifications
as candidate for an overlapping consensus, which is illustrated in chapter 3.
The third chapter finally illustrates how the overall approach can contribute to the for-
mulation and justification of fair policy proposals in a deliberative perspective. This
chapter draws from some of the results presented in the three chapters of the second
part. I concentrate on the problem of locating locally undesirable land uses. This con-
text is particularly interesting as it is archetypical of a conflict between general interest
and the particular interests of communities. While the qualification NIMBY (“Not In
My Back-Yard") is often used as a disparaging qualification of the communities’ refusal
for hosting the project, we may wonder how a notion of a general interest could prevail
against particular interests.
The second part presents the three articles that compose this thesis.
In the first article, I consider the problem of allocating an indivisible project and sharing
its benefit among communities with an equal right on it but different provision costs. The
differences in these costs may arise from variations in building, operation and mainte-
nance costs for the project but also from differences in the communities’ compensation
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requirements for hosting the project. In this setting, I characterise three allocation rules
that correspond to three prominent cooperative solution concepts: the welfare egalitar-
ian solution, the nucleolus and the Shapley value. The principles invoked involve Pareto
efficiency, Anonymity, No envy, and axioms of solidarity or reward related to the commu-
nities’ provision costs. The results clarify how considerations over the nature of the costs
could influence fair allocations. The analysis is then extended to settings with asymmetric
information and to setting with costs of several kinds. In each extension, I propose and
motivate a fair solution. The results of a survey motivated by this analysis are eventually
presented.
In the second article, I study individual fairness judgments and preferences for the alloca-
tion of an indivisible task and its benefit among two individuals with a different willingness
to perform it. My approach relates results from the theory of fair allocations with the em-
pirical observation of fairness judgments and preferences. I first present and motivate four
contrasted allocation rules as possible rules of judgment. For some of the participants,
a questionnaire was proposed before they knew about their situation. Among the four
rules of judgment proposed, the welfare egalitarian allocation rule is the most preferred
allocation rule as stated by the participants. Yet, I also observe support for principles
that are not compatible with this rule: an important proportion of respondents deem fair
to give nothing to someone who would not be willing to perform the task, and another
substantial proportion deem fair to split the benefit of the task equally when both partic-
ipants feature the same compensation requirement. In the experiment, participants had
the opportunity to perform a task for pay. However, for any two of them, a single task was
available. As required by the Pareto principle, it was allocated to the participant with
the lower compensation requirement. In this situation, the stated normative expectations
of the task performer are found to be higher, the greater the discrepancy between the
compensation requirements. This does not extend to individual distributive preferences
as revealed by the offers in a dictator setting. I also find that the task performers who
took the questionnaire would deem the equal split fair less often. Overall, few respondents
are consistent with any of the four rules proposed.
In the third article, jointly written with Stefan Ambec, we consider the decentralised
provision of a global public good with local externalities in a spatially explicit model.
Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits everyone but exhibits costs
to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through transfers. We examine coop-
erative games associated with this so-called NIMBY (“Not In My Back-Yard") problem.
We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist. These conditions are driven
by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any potential location. We illustrate
the results in different spatial settings. These results clarify how property rights can affect
cooperation and shed further light on a limitation of the Coase theorem.
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Part 1 - Presentation of the approach

Chapter 1
Observing individual judgments
The empirical social choice program
“It is the ordering according to
values which takes into account
all the desires of the individual,
including the highly important
socializing desires, and which is
primarily relevant for the
achievement of a social
maximum.”
(Kenneth J. Arrow, 1951, Social
choice and individual values)
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Chapter 1 Observing individual judgments
Introduction
The common democratic nature of the three background theories proposed in the in-
troduction makes empirical knowledge about the actual judgments that exist in society
crucial to the formation of a social fairness judgment. In this line, Yaari and Bar-Hillel
(1984) sustained that “the evidence with which the theory [of distributive justice] must
be confronted consists of observed ethical judgments or moral intuitions”. This initiated
a line of research that has been pursued until now and was reviewed by Konow (2003)
and, most recently, by Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012). Following these latter, we may
call it the empirical social choice program.
While initially focused on questionnaire studies, we shall construe this program more gen-
erally as the observation of the fairness judgments that exist in society with an intention
to test existing theories of justice and motivate a social judgment. Existing attempts in
this line actually extend to a large set of methods. Still, all these approaches are likely
to differ significantly in their results and interpretations. The objective of this chapter is
to contrast the main empirical approaches to the observation of individual fairness judg-
ments regarding rules and allocations and discuss how they may be suited to motivate a
social fairness judgment according to the different perspectives on the democratic political
community developed earlier.
For each of these approaches, I will discuss its potential to reflect the richness of actual
policymaking environments, and to collect observations at a reasonable cost. On top of
these practical features, I shall also pay specific attention to the interpretation of the
judgments observed. Indeed, even for a same individual, we may expect the judgments
observed to differ according to at least four important dimensions.
A first distinction is related to the difference made in the social sciences between moral
and social norms and the related behaviours (Falk and Fischbacher, 2001 ; Bicchieri, 2006 ;
Elster, 2009). In this dual perspective, individual judgments could result from two distinct
sets of beliefs. Individual moral norms is the first one. They manifest as an unconditional
preference for some allocation, which may be called a distributive preference. The beliefs
underlying such distributive preferences constitute individual moral judgments. The sec-
ond source would result from a common understanding of a set of valid reasons, in a word,
from the existence of social norms1, which requires allocating in a given way in a given
1According to Bicchieri’s (2006) definition, a social norm is a behavioural rule R for situations of type
S in a population P such that there exists a sufficiently large subset of P such that for any individual
i in this subset:
• Contingency hypothesis: i knows that a rule R applies to situations of type S
• Conditional preferences: i prefers to conform to R in situations of type S provided
– Empirical expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P will conform to R in
situations of type S
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context. At the individual level, they will manifest as a preference for some allocation,
conditionally on being observed by others, and on the expectation of their disapproving
norm-breaching.2 In this context, the beliefs regarding fairness stem from mutual expec-
tations regarding appropriate allocations. These may be called normative expectations.
There is a priori little reason to think that the two sets of individual beliefs would always
be identical. On the contrary, the previous discussion suggests that individual judgments
may differ depending on whether they relate to one’s own moral doctrine, or one’s per-
ception of public reasons. I shall therefore make clear whether the nature of the observed
fairness judgments are normative expectations or moral judgments.3
A second distinction is related to the difference between intuitive and reasoned judgments.
Accounts for observed judgments all rely on some conception akin to the dual process
theory of human cognition, which contrasts a rationalist and an intuitionist mode of
forming one’s own beliefs and decisions. In the first mode, moral judgments primarily
result from a rational deliberation out of explicit norms. In the second mode, moral
judgments are the direct results of heuristics. The social intuitionist model of Haidt (2001)
constitutes a recent exposition and an extension of this view to normative expectations. In
this work, the heuristic route is proposed as the main determinant of moral judgments and
justifications are seen as the result of an ex-post rationalizing process. On the contrary,
it also seems reasonable to expect individual judgments to evolve with reasoning and the
consideration of other’s perspective and arguments. For now, all what has to be said is
that I shall make clear how the judgments observed may have been affected by reasoning.
I will present what is precisely meant by reasoning on these matters in the next chapter.
A third distinction relates to the likely considerations that underlie the observed judg-
ments and, more specifically, to their degree of impartiality. Justice concerns are not the
sole motives behind one’s actions and statements, and surely not the most compelling.
Self-interest and some forms of altruism both have been considered to tarnish judgments
with partial considerations. Be it by deliberations behind a veil of ignorance as proposed
by John Rawls or by using the figure of an impartial spectator as proposed by Adam
Smith (1759), a major and common feature of theories of justice is that self-interested
considerations - and their instrumental corollaries - shall play no part in it. As these ideal
conditions could never be fully realized in the different conditions considered, I shall be
clear about the role of partial considerations in accounting for the observations. In partic-
– Normative expectations: i believes that a sufficiently large subset of P expects her to conform
to R in situations of type S (and may sanction non-compliance)
2Beyond a mere disapproval, strong reciprocity may also be part of the picture. Strong reciprocal
preferences feature a willingness to incur a cost for sanctioning norm-breaching. Strong reciprocity
belongs to the behavioral traits that are thought to sustain norm-obedience.
3It may be tempting to push the claim that social norms form the most accurate information for the
assessment of public policies. It remains that some social norms may be deemed fundamentally unfair,
and one may prefer to argue in such situation by directly appealing to one’s moral sentiment.
15
Chapter 1 Observing individual judgments
ular, I shall pay attention to a potential self-serving bias, by which one may, consciously
or not, find more attractive the criteria that bend toward her own interests.
Finally, a last and more subtle, distinction is about the difference between one’s judgment
over allocations and one’s choice of an allocation in conditions of impartiality. The reasons
behind such a difference may not seem clear. Yet, there is some evidence that stated
moral judgments may significantly differ from the actual choice of an impartial observer
(see e.g. Gold et al, 2015) This possibility was suspected by Miller (1992) who stressed the
“danger of what may be called ’Sunday-best’ beliefs, that is, the views that people think
they ought to hold according to some imbibed theory as opposed to the operational beliefs
that would guide them in a practical situation”. We may therefore deem that whether
a given judgment holds actual consequences is also a relevant feature of the situation on
which a judgment is observed.
In this chapter, I start by presenting and discussing the questionnaire studies, which
is the seminal and still mainstream approach in the empirical social choice literature.
Then, I review the methods that propose to observe the incentivized expression of the
fairness judgments of an outside observer. Next, I review the experimental methods that
directly observe the judgements and choices of stakeholders. I eventually suggest research
directions that may enrich the empirical social choice program.
1.1 Stated judgments of outside observers
In their reflection about how to share the costs of irrigation ditches, Aadland and Kolpin
(1998) confronted their choice of equity principles with the view expressed by the ranchers
in a direct phone survey. This is definitely the most natural way to start with, and this
was also the approach taken by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) in their seminal work. Even
now, most of the empirical social choice approach still rests upon questionnaire studies.
In a typical questionnaire, the respondents are proposed a set of vignettes. A vignette
denotes a description of a hypothetical situation upon which the respondents are invited
to express a judgment. The respondent may be invited to express different sorts of judg-
ments, sometimes in the same study. Most often, what is being judged are allocations,
described in quantitative terms. The respondents may be asked how fair is a given allo-
cation on a Likert scale (e.g. Kahneman , 1986), to rank different allocations according
to their relative fairness, or to propose the fairest distribution in a list. Sometimes, “fair”
may be substituted with other formulations such as “just” (e.g. Yaari and Bar-Hillel,
1984) or “acceptable” (e.g. Kahneman, 1986). Sometimes, hypothetical decisions are
asked instead of attitudes (e.g. Herrero et al, 2010). Most often, the respondents express
their judgments in a particular situations and, only in rare instances, the respondents
16
1.1 Stated judgments of outside observers
are invited to express judgments regarding allocation rules (e.g. Herrero et al, 2010) or
fairness principles (e.g. Schokkaert et al, 2007).
The seminal work of Yarri and Bar-Hillel (1984) constitutes the archetype of the ap-
proach. In their study, the authors surveyed university applicants about how a just
allocation should be performed in a hypothetical situation. By varying some details of
the situation, they evidence that respondents express significantly different judgments in
formally identical situations depending on whether the persons differ according to their
needs, their tastes or their beliefs. They further note that none of the prominent alloca-
tion rules existing in the axiomatic literature fully accounts for this observation. Many
subsequent studies have kept challenging existing axiomatic results through the assess-
ment of spontaneous judgments and further suggested axioms for the development of the
theory. These studies mostly adopt a quasi-experimental design in which vignettes are
varied randomly between the respondents. Within designs, that compare the answers of
a same respondent to different versions of a vignette are much less frequent. Ideas in this
line can be found in studies assessing the individual consistency between one’s adhesion
to axioms and to allocation rules. For instance, Amiel and Cowell (1999) challenged the
existing characterisation of inequality indices on the basis of such an empirical material.
The originality of their approach is that they also tried to assess the consistency of an-
swers. They brought evidence that the existing axioms were remote from the actual views
expressed by the respondents, which motivated the proposal of axioms more in line with
these views in subsequent work (e.g. Ebert, 2009).
Let us now turn to the interpretation of these observations. As judgments are expressed
in isolation, they may be interpreted in terms of moral norms. It is also clear that a
typical questionnaire study offers little incentive to engage in reasoning. While Yaari and
Hillel (1984) initially acknowledged that the evidence with which a theory should be con-
fronted consists in “the ethical judgments made upon reflection by disinterested people”
and restricted their attention to axiomatised allocation rules4, they deemed the character-
isation of reasoned judgments as a premature endeavour and focused on the first-thought
statements from part of the respondents. Most of the subsequent literature has followed
this line. Many subsequent studies have kept a focus on direct answers following the pre-
sentation of a vignette. Such an approach would mainly capture heuristics and intuitive
judgments. As will be argued in section 1.4, these studies are little informative about
the reasoned judgments that would arise following reasoning and argument. Among the
handful of studies that addressed this concern, Hurley et al (2011) studied how judgments
varied according to a verbal or quantitative framing of the allocation in the vignettes of
Yaari and Bar-Hillel’s initial study. Depending on the framing, They find significant dif-
4More precisely, the authors focused on non-trivially axiomatisable allocation rules that is, on allocations
rules that were characterised by “axioms which have a force of their own and which can reasonably
put forth as fundamental principles”.
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ferences between the judgments expressed. Their claim is that the verbal formulation is
more tantamount to the formulation of principles and the deductive derivation of axioms
and allocation rules, while the quantitative description of an allocation is closer to the
direct description of a particular allocation. They also report that, when the respondents
are presented with both descriptions, their answer conforms more to the quantitative de-
scription. In summary, and if the formulation of the question does not explicitly direct
the answer otherwise, we shall interpret answers as spontaneous and reasonably impartial
moral judgments.
Concerning the general strengths of this method, we first note that the meaning of an
observation is rather univocal, provided we presume that, in the absence of any incen-
tives, the respondents would answer sincerely. A difficulty still exists in interpreting the
results as the meaning of words such as “just”, “fair”, “acceptable” or “equitable” is not
always clear. Questionnaire studies are also relatively cheap. This opens the possibility
for an extensive observation of the judgments held in the general population. Besides,
the vignette approach can allow for the description of the many contextual cues that
characterise a given policy problem. In addition, the relevance of a given framing may be
assessed by asking the respondents whether they felt some information was lacking. An
important limit of this approach is that, in the absence of incentives, respondents would
not give much considerations to the cases proposed in complex settings. Random answers
or heuristics may be checked through the internal consistency of individual answers or
the sensitivity of answers to irrelevant cues (such as the position of an answer).
The hypothetical and declarative nature of the judgments observed suggests that they are
poor predictors of the actual attitudes of stakeholders, making this method more relevant
for the study of justice in a deliberative perspective. Yet, we saw that the relevance of
this approach may also be questioned in such a perspective, mainly due to the absence of
incentives to reason. This point is further developed in Section 1.4.
1.2 Revealed judgments of outside observers
As was discussed, a strong limitation of questionnaire studies is that they presuppose
the sincerity of respondents who, in addition, have little incentives to form thoughtful
judgments. One the other hand, it is established that personal stakes significantly bias
individual judgments in a self-serving way. Therefore, we may be interested in experimen-
tal protocols that incentivize respondents to pay attention to cases in which they have no
personal stakes. In this section, I present and discuss two such protocols: quasi-spectator
experiments and tacit coordination games.
18
1.2 Revealed judgments of outside observers
1.2.1 Quasi-spectator experiments
In the Theory of Moral Sentiment, Adam Smith (1759) proposed to infer one’s moral con-
ception from the would-be sympathetic feelings of an impartial and well-informed spec-
tator. This thought experiment was, according to the philosopher, the process through
which the content of morality could reasonably be inferred, including “the view to the gen-
eral interest of society” or “the welfare of society” (III-2-3). Initially proposed by Konow
(2000), the judgments of individuals involved in the situation of an impartial spectator
constitute now a well-accepted empirical material in the empirical social choice approach.
In quasi-spectator experiments, a participant, the quasi-spectator, makes a decision that
affects the payments of one or several stakeholders in a real situation, most often, in the
lab. These experimental conditions are intended to approach the ideal conditions depicted
by Adam Smith, which are assumed to be relevant for observing the content of moral rule
and judgments (Konow, 2012). These conditions notably involve impartiality, information
and sympathy. Impartiality is encouraged by fixing the payment of the quasi-spectator
in advance and by keeping the spectator and the stakeholders anonymous. Despite a
tension between the need for impartiality and the many potential biases that information
may bring, a detailed description of the situation along with its many contextual cues is
encouraged (Konow, 2009). The provision of information intends to ease the plurality of
perspective and allows dispensing with a priori judgments regarding the relevant details
of a situation. Still, many biases may arise from the identification of the quasi-spectator
with some individuals.5 These are assumed to be drawn away through the statistical
nature of the observations. In practice, the provision of information is limited by the
third requirement, sympathy, which is encouraged by the real consequences of the choice
made by the quasi-spectator. While the need for a real experimental setting limits the set
of situations that may be contemplated, evidence suggests that stated moral judgments
may significantly differ from the actual choice of an impartial observer (see e.g. Gold et
al, 2015).
The motivation behind the choice is assumed to be sympathy, where this term is to
be broadly understood as a mixture of moral motivation, including strong reciprocal
feelings toward norm breaching. This later motivational source was evidenced in the third-
party punishment situation (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), a variant of the quasi-spectator
setting. This pleads for interpreting the observed allocations as resulting from the social
norms that have been internalized by the participants, including the norms regarding
5Actual experiments reveal the sensitivity of the conditions for the impartiality of the judgments ex-
pressed by quasi-spectators. By reporting an experiment in which the quasi-spectator and the two
stakeholder were publicly allocated a given sum of money beforehand, Aguiar et al (2010) show a
tendency to privilege the individual whose endowment was most similar to the spectator’s. This
shows that the judgments observed in a quasi-spectator setting are not always immune from partial
considerations.
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praise and punishment for others’ actions. In line with Konow (2012), I further argue that
sympathy has the epistemic role of incentivizing the spectator to enlarge her judgment
to other’s experience and perception of a situation, and the motivational advantage of
moderating her own moral doctrine and align more closely with the perception of the
stakeholders. This seems to suggest that the choices observed are more to be interpreted
as normative expectations rather than individual moral beliefs. Still, the anonymity and
the lack of social context of the situation may plead for the reverse.
Overall, the judgements observed in quasi-spectator experiments seems suited to the de-
liberative perspective. In this perspective, a further interest of the quasi-spectator ex-
periment is that, the observed judgments are immune from a self-serving bias. Still, this
approach faces challenges. The main challenges to this approach are the diversity of the
motivational basis of the choices observed. In spite of its real impact, the allocation of
the reasonably moderate sum of money may result from many motives such as a moral
motive, altruism, strong reciprocal feelings toward norm breaching, warm glow, a will-
ingness to please the experimentalist, jealousy, and so on. In contrast, tacit coordination
games offer a clearer answer to the motivational basis of the choice.
1.2.2 Tacit coordination games
Tacit coordination games were initially introduced in economic discussions by Schelling
(1960). While some connection with fairness was discussed, they were not primarily
intended to reveal such judgments. Only recently, Camerer and Fehr (2004) and Krupka
and Weber (2013) have proposed to use these situation to reveal the existence of social
norms.6 While tacit coordination games have not been much in use for the assessment of
fairness judgments at present, I will argue that they can offer informative insights both
in the bargaining and deliberative perspectives.
In the version of tacit coordination game that is for interest to us, two individuals are
presented with a situation. They have to express a judgment without communicating.
If their answers coincide, they get a payment fixed in advance. Answers may be about
the appropriateness of an action on a Likert scale (Krupka and Weber, 2013), or the
recommendation of a given allocation (Schelling, 1960).
As the sole motive in this situation is to coordinate with the other, we shall assume that
tacit coordination games are suited to the observation of consciously shared knowledge,
6Other designs have been proposed to elicit social norms. For instance, Bicchieri and Chavez (2010)
proposed to elicit the mutual expectations regarding the appropriate behaviours in a given context by
directly asking the participants their normative expectations regarding a decision maker’s behaviour
and to check the consistency of the answer of the decision maker to an incentivized question about
her beliefs regarding the other’s expectations. They claim that the consistency of these answer signal
the presence of a social norm.
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among which are social norms. The main limit of coordination games for measuring
normative expectations is that many confounding factors may account for the participants’
answers, making their interpretation contentious. Indeed, the participants may find in
their best interest to coordinate on other salient features of the environment such as
visual cues or symmetric allocations. For instance, it may be hard to be convinced that
the coordination on an equal split allocation reveals the existence of a norm for this
allocation as the symmetry of this allocation may also make it a good candidate for
coordinating.
In the bargaining perspective, this criticism may be lessened for two reasons. The first
is that salience may in itself constitute a determinant of individual fairness judgments in
bargaining environments; As emphasized in Schelling (1960, p.73), “even in those cases
in which the only distinguishing characteristic of a bargaining result is its evident fair-
ness, by standard that the participants are known to appreciate, we might argue that the
moral force of fairness is greatly reinforced by the power of a fair result to focus attention,
if it fills the vacuum that would otherwise exist”. A second argument in favour of this
method is that, when confronted to competing salient elements, there is some evidence
that participants tend to give precedence to normative salience (Isoni et al, 2014).7 Would
the question be directly asked to them, it seems reasonable to assume that social norms
are considered as a first basis for coordinating, at least, when the cardinality of the nor-
matively salient allocations does not exceed the cardinality of visually salient allocations.
This makes tacit coordination games a promising tool for investigating fairness judgments
in the bargaining perspective. Herrero et al (2010) provides an example of the use of this
device for the investigation of social norms. In the problem of adjudicating conflicting
claims, they show that participants tend to coordinate on the proportional allocation.8
The second argument further suggests that, the judgments observed in this situation may
also be deemed insightful from a deliberative perspective. In this perspective, a clear
interest of this method is that, as payments do not depend on the answer, we are ensured
that self-interest does not bias the observed judgments. Furthermore, perspective taking
is also encouraged as it is in one’s best interest to consider what another person from her
group would be most likely to find fair. Thus, this method provides credible incentives
for participants to engage in a social form of reasoning. As such this form of reasoning
seems to fulfil some of the required conditions of the impartial spectator’s view or on
deliberations behind a veil of ignorance.
7Note that their setting is actually not properly a tacit coordination game as participants are invited
to coordinate their choice on an allocation.
8In their situation, they incentivize the participants to coordinate on the majoritarian choice. Judgments
expressed in this condition may differ from these expressed in two-person tacit coordination games,
and depending on the reasons behind these variations, their relative relevance for social choice could
be discussed. I do not know any work in this line and leave the comparison of these two variants for
further discussion.
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In the end, despite not being univocal, this method allows for observations of interest
to motivate theories of justice. From a practical point of view, this methods is all the
more interesting as it may be implemented in surveys and therefore, allow for a measure-
ment of judgments on reasonably large and representative samples of the population at
a reasonable cost. It also allows for an extensive observation of the judgments of a single
individual, and the description of detailed contextual cues. All these features make this
methods worth including into the realm of empirical social choice.
As an illustration, the climate negotiation arena is one context in which this perspective
on fairness may be particularly insightful. In this context, the allocation of greenhouse gas
emissions among states remains a debated issue. To my knowledge, most existing studies
on this topic have used a survey design to elicit individual judgments. Unsurprisingly
enough, they reveal a self-serving bias in the judgments of the negotiators or the citizens
of each country (see e.g. Lange, 2010 or Carlsson, 2013). An interest of tacit coordination
games is that they may provide a way to counteract this bias and may improve on standard
survey results.
1.3 Revealed judgments of stakeholders
As was emphasized, a strong limitation of previous approaches is that observations may
both suffer from a hypothetical bias and significantly differ from the actual views of stake-
holders. This may rather seem to be an advantage of these in a deliberative perspective.
Yet, one may also advocate for the strength of reasons that individual would actually ac-
cept to balance against their own self-interest. While not initially designed to the study of
fairness judgments, experimental methods have this interest to jointly test for the nature
of fairness judgments and their motivating force. In these situations, fairness judgments
are observed indirectly through individual choices. This requires discussing how fairness
judgments can be disentangled from self-interested motives.
1.3.1 The dictator game
The dictator game is the most common approach to show the existence of distributive
preferences. In the simple version of the game, two subjects are paired and one of them,
the dictator, decides how to split an exogenous amount of money with another participant,
the recipient. The participants then get their payments and leave the experiment. In the
standard situation, no communication or direct contact occurs and the experiment is
performed using a double blind design, in which the experimenter does not observe the
participants’ choices and final payoffs. This simple version of the dictator game has been
widely performed. In the simple version of this game, the usual observation is that 60%
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of the dictators give a positive amount to the recipient, roughly 20% of the endowment
(Levitt and List, 2007). Usually, a non-negligible proportion of the respondents is also
observed that gives half the endowment.
Interesting variants of this game makes the sum of money to allocate contingent to choices,
efforts, or luck. They revealed the sensitivity of fairness judgments and preferences to con-
textual cues. In a meta-analysis, Engel (2011) shows that distributional concerns are a
robust and major source of differences across experiments. Consistently with the observa-
tion of questionnaire studies, concerns of needs, desert and social efficiency are all shown
to influence the dictators’ offers. More precisely, dictators tend to give a lower fraction
of the endowment when it resulted from their effort, and the reverse if the endowment
results from the recipient’s effort, if recipient is needier, or if the offer was inflated (Engel,
2011).
In simple settings, these approaches are said to reveal the extent to which moral norms
may account for individual behaviour. In more complex settings, they may also offer
interesting information about the individual moral judgments. This requires disentan-
gling self-interested motives from competing fairness motives. Approaches in this line
rely on a structural specification of utility, which significantly differs across the different
contributions and suggests different representations about the motives at work.
For instance, Andreoni and Miller (2002) propose to generalize the participants’ utility
functions as a general altruistic utility function that depends both on the dictator and re-
cipient’s payments. In this approach the participants are assumed to assess the allocation
through the comparison of their own payoff with some social welfare function reflecting
their views on fairness, or directly through a social welfare function in which welfare lev-
els are weighted differently between self and others. This approach was shown to fairly
well rationalize the data observed in different circumstances (Andreoni and Miller, 2002;
Fisman et al, 2007). Still, in a further experiment List (2007) challenged this representa-
tion by giving evidence that slight change in the choice set may induce large behavioural
changes. He suggests that these changes be due to different underlying norms. This ob-
servation cannot be directly accounted for with the altruistic utility function proposed
by Andreoni and Miller (2002) unless utility is allowed to vary according to parameters
which are independent of the choice set. This emphasizes a limit of such a representa-
tion of preferences. Besides, these representations may be limited in conveying the main
intuitions behind the motives at work.
An alternative set of approaches has proposed to adopt utility functions that trades off a
self-interest motive against the moral worth of the action taken. In particular, some have
proposed to model the moral worth of an action by a decreasing function of the distance
between this action and the fairness ideals held by the participants (see e.g. Cappelen et
al, 2007). Among these models, some allow the fairness ideal to result from an endogenous
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stage of reasoning (see e.g. Brekke et al, 2003). What distinguishes these approaches from
the former are the greater emphasis put on the formation of individual judgments and the
non-welfarist representation of moral reasoning adopted. As argued in Tungodden (2004),
welfarist reasoning actually contradicts our experience of public and moral deliberations,
which relies on verbal statements over rich considerations of desert, needs, freedom, and so
on. In a policy perspective, an important interest of this approach is that it explicitly links
the observed actions with the underlying judgments. In particular, it opens possibilities
for the empirical testing of the theories of fair allocations which will be presented in the
next chapter. The relevance of such a representation of preferences and the extent to
which it differs from the preferences characterised by Andreoni and Miller (2002) remains
to be investigated.
This latter approach was able to provide interesting insights on the formation of actual
fairness judgments. Konow (2000) adopts such a representation of utilities that relies
on fairness ideals. He further proposes a model a cognitive dissonance to account for
the manipulation of one’s own belief about fairness in a self-serving way in the dictator
setting and provides evidence of a self-serving bias. This suggests that the judgments
uncovered by this method may show limited relevance from a deliberative perspective.
More recently, Cappelen et al (2007) use a structural model to disentangle the fairness
ideals from the role of self-interested motives among subjects facing an allocation problem
that requires conciliating a principle of accountability for one’s choice with a principle of
compensation for circumstantial events. Their model documents the pluralism of fairness
ideals. The authors observed behaviours consistent with a fair fraction of individuals
favouring each of three different fairness ideals they previously suspected to be considered
as such. In a subsequent experiment, they further observed that a preliminary stage
of reasoning, consisting in exploring the implications of the three fairness ideals and
expressing a judgment about them, did influence both the weight attached to fairness and
the proportion of participants referring to each of them (Cappelen et al, 2010). Noticeably
enough, they observed a decrease in the proportion of participants referring to a strict
egalitarian allocation. Whereas it does not constitutes per se a proof for an equal split
heuristics, this is consistent with this idea which has been suggested by many other work
(Messik, 1993) and the observations reported in chapter 5.
1.3.2 The ultimatum game and bargaining environments
The ultimatum game is the most common approach to show the existence of reciprocal
preferences, which denote a genuine willingness to sanction norm-breaching. Bargaining
environments may also provide interesting insights on fairness judgments although obser-
vations in these contexts are subject to confounding motives (Roth, 1995). Yet, according
to Eisenkopf et al (2013), observed behaviour in bargaining environments provide “the
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most accurate information about subjectively perceived entitlements”. Since the intro-
duction of the simple ultimatum game, bargaining environments have extensively been
studied in the experimental literature. They have been used to test for existing theories
of distributive justice.
In the standard bargaining situations, two anonymous participants have to agree on how
to allocate a given sum of money. A first participant makes an offer about how to allocate
a given amount of money, which the other can accept or reject. If the offer is rejected,
the total amount to share is reduced and the other participant makes an offer in turn.
The game usually proceeds until an offer is accepted or no amount in left to share. Many
variants of the bargaining game have been studied, ranging from the standard structured
bargaining without communication to unstructured bargaining with communication (e.g.
Luhan et al, 2013). The traditional ultimatum game is a particular case of bargaining
games which consist in a single stage. In this game, the proponent makes an offer regarding
how to share a given endowment, after which the respondent can accept or refuse.
Sophisticated self-interested concerns of reputation building and fairness preferences are
both acknowledged to account for behaviour in this context (Roth, 1995). In bargain-
ing environments, fairness preferences are evidenced by a rejection of some offers while
only Pareto inferior outcomes could be proposed afterwards. The main interest of the
ultimatum game is that a rejection of the offer can directly be interpreted as a manifes-
tation of fairness preferences and reveal existing social norms. Still, the interpretation
of the choices in complex settings remains delicate. In their study about the individual
beliefs regarding the just division of a division problem with claims, Gächter and Riedl
(2006) find that participants declare to find fairest the proportional allocation, both in
general and in particular cases. However, in actual bargaining, they settled closest to the
constrained equal award allocation rule.
1.3.3 Individual decision-making behind the veil of ignorance
In the Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) proposed to infer one’s political conception of
the fair from the likely decision that would be reached after a hypothetical deliberation
behind a veil of ignorance. This thought experiment was, according to the philosopher,
the process through which the content of social justice could reasonably be inferred. The
veil of ignorance was the guarantee of impartiality. It was also taken on board by Harsanyi
(1953), who rather framed it as a problem of rational individual choice.
Just as quasi-spectator experiments aim at putting participants in the role of an impartial
observer, a branch of experiments have sought to observe judgments in this hypothetical
situation. Most experiments reported in the economic literature actually fall closer to
Harsanyi’s perspective and reduce the deliberation stage to a stage of isolated decision-
25
Chapter 1 Observing individual judgments
making (e.g. Krawczyk, 2010) or to direct voting (e.g. Beckman et al, 2002). In a series
of questionnaire studies reported in Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012), choices behind the
veil of ignorance are framed as an individual choice. They report significant differences
with observations in other settings. Still, in this case, instrumental motives and risk
attitudes seem to be much more relevant motives than fairness motives in accounting
for the observed choices. Absent a direct and consensual link between risk attitudes
and fairness, the relevance of these observations for the motivation of a social fairness
judgment may be questioned.
A crucial characteristic of Rawls’ veil of ignorance thought experiment is the existence
of a collective deliberation. This guarantees that the motivation of general rules rests
upon an explicit appeal to reasonable and impartial principles. A set of experiments
tried to approximate these ideal conditions in a laboratory context. In these conditions,
the participants first get involved in a deliberation and choose an allocation rule in a
hypothetical situation. The decision after deliberation may ideally be unanimous, but
majority decision may also be chosen. In a second stage, they get to know their precise
position and the allocation rule is implemented. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992) provide
an example of such a research program.
In their setting, the strength of the observed choices mainly comes from their motivation as
the outcome of an open deliberation process in which self-serving biases and instrumental
considerations may reasonably be assumed away. Another strength of this method is that
it offers insights regarding the considered judgments on general principles, whereas most
previous methods are better suited to elicit considered judgments in particular situations.
One weakness is that the laboratory setting may constrain the set of achievable situations
and cast doubts on the external validity of the observations.
In conclusion, individual choice behind a veil of ignorance may not have the potential
to form convincing arguments about fairness as long as they are framed as an individual
decision problem. However, the experimental design as initially proposed by Frohlich
and Oppenheimer (1992) has a potential to uncover insights on the fairness judgments
held by individuals that seem relevant to the deliberative perspective of the democratic
community.
1.3.4 Other experimental protocols
As emphasized in this discussion, the search for fairness may be an effective motive in a
large set of situations. Each protocol drives a focus on a different normative source, give
different incentives to reason, and rely on different sources of motives for acting fairly.
Additional examples include public good games (see e.g. Reuben and Riedl, 2013), the
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split-the-dollar game, prisoner’s dilemma, voting, etc.9 A common limitation of all these
approaches is that they only allow observing fairness judgments indirectly through individ-
ual choices. While structural econometric methods have been proposed and successfully
implemented to disentangle the fairness ideals from self-interest, the ad-hoc nature of
structural models, and the suspicion of a self-serving bias may disqualify the inferred
judgments from any normative force in the deliberative perspective. It is indeed a robust
finding from the experimental literature that the self-serving bias becomes pervasive as
soon as one hold personal stake in the matter. Compelling evidence of this has been
given in the context of the dictator game (Konow, 2000 ; Ubeda, 2014) and bargaining
environments (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).10 However, this does not make these
observations irrelevant to all sorts of social judgments. On the contrary, the connection of
the observed judgments with actual behaviours makes them particularly relevant to the
bargaining perspective.
1.4 Ways forward for the empirical social choice program
The previous discussion emphasized the diversity of methods that may be used to elicit
individual fairness judgments. Given the large literature that is potentially relevant to the
empirical social choice program, it focused on the specific contributions that most clearly
fall within the scope of economics.11 Table 1 provides an overview of these methods.
Two observations may be made. First, none of these methods systematically investigates
the effect of normative reasoning on the judgments. Second, all these methods remain
focused on judgments made in isolation. In this section, I discuss how this could limit the
relevance of these observation as a basis of social judgments in the deliberative perspective
and motivate further developments.
9See Camerer and Fehr (2002) for a review of these protocols.
10A provision may be given to this claim though. As observed by Bicchieri and Mercier (2010) in the
context of a trust game, individuals may bend toward a self-serving option provided it remains publicly
justifiable and reasonable. As soon as we are not interested in the observation of fairness ideals, but
reasonably fair options, this self-serving bias may appear less of an obstacle.
11Its main features may be a focus on individual judgments, a reliance on a formal theoretical background,
and the use of monetary incentives. Still, this choice may occult the interdisciplinary nature of this
area of research and the complementary insights of other social science and humanities. For instance,
Forsé and Parodi (2010) adopt a similar approach and provide a recent sociological perspective on
public opinions regarding social justice.
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Beliefs involved Motives involved Self-
serving
bias
Incentive
to reason
Individual outside observer
Questionnaire
studies
Fair allocations according to
individual moral values
Sincerity Low Low
Tacit
coordination
games
Shared knowledge (including
social norms)
Salience
Material payoff
Sincerity
Low Medium
Quasi-spectator
experiment
Fair allocations according to
individual moral values and
internalized social norms
(Konow, 2012)
Moral satisfaction (Konow,
2009), Strong reciprocity toward
norm abidance or breaching
(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004)
Low
(Konow,
2012)
Medium
(Konow,
2012)
Individual stakeholders
Dictator game Fair allocations according to
individual moral values
Material payoff
Altruism (Andreoni and Miller,
2002)
Self image concerns, moral
satisfaction & guilt (Levitt &
List, 2007)
Cognitive dissonance reduction
(Konow, 2000)
High
(Konow,
2000)
Low (if not
repeated)
Medium (if
repeated or
preliminary
question-
naire)
Ultimatum game Fair allocations according to
social norms
Salience (Schelling, 1960)
Proposer : Material payoff
(including expected
punishment)
Responder : Material payoff
Strong reciprocity (Bowles et al,
2005)
High Low
Bargaining Fair allocations according to
social norms (Roth, 1955)
Reputation building (Roth,
1995)
Salience (Schelling, 1960)
Material payoff (Roth, 1995)
Strong reciprocity (Roth, 1995)
High
(Babcock
and
Loewenstein,
1997)
Low
Veil of ignorance
without
deliberation
Objective or subjective
probabilities
Beliefs about fairness
Material payoff
Risk attitude
Fairness motive
Low Low
Table 1.2: Overview of existing methods for the observation of individual fairness judgments.
Chapter 1 Observing individual judgments
Eliciting reasoned judgments
An important reason why the judgments observed through the previous methods would
remain unsatisfactory from a deliberative perspective is that none of them is able to
give a convincing picture of individual reasoned judgments. There is ample evidence
that individual judgments are unstable and subject to change (see e.g. Cappelen et al,
2010) and these changes are at the core of the deliberative ideal. These two reasons
emphasize the need for observing reasoned judgments. I will argue in the next chapter
that such a study of reasoned judgments shall strive to jointly observe consistent individual
judgments over principles and in particular cases. In this endeavour, two types of empirical
observations would be particularly interesting to document.
The first are moral mistakes (Sunstein, 2005). They consist in jointly held, yet incon-
sistent judgments. These empirical approaches may actually suggest and confirm moral
mistakes by pointing at apparent inconsistencies. The empirical study presented in chap-
ter 5 actually suggests such a mistake when the observation that the equal split is deemed
fair, in a situation in which is fails to be satisfy individually rationality, another widely
supported principle. What is meant here by “mistake” is that these spontaneous judg-
ments would not resist reasoning and therefore observations of individuals revising their
judgments could be expected when made aware of inconsistencies. An empirical account
of moral mistakes would therefore have to be related to a contradictory adhesion to prin-
ciples and a change in judgment. In the process of identifying moral mistakes one may
arrive at a characterisation of reasoned judgments in a sense that will be made more
precise in the next chapter.
Second, judgments still be subject to change while being perfectly consistent. We may call
moral discoveries (Daniels, 1996, p.348) changes from one consistently justified judgment
to another one. These may result from the consideration of additional principles or from
a change in the representation of the policy problem. An account of moral discoveries
would have to be related to systematic changes in judgments after some well-characterised
consideration.
Enriching social interactions
This chapter mostly focused on the observation of individual judgments and choices per-
formed in isolation or in the context of simple and stylized social interactions such as
in the tacit coordination game or in the ultimatum game. This may be too rapid an
abstraction from the profound influence of institutions and social relation in shaping our
own beliefs and preferences (Bowles, 1998). Without going into the fundamental criticism
of the possibility of methodological individualism to comprehend what essentially lies in
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interpersonal relationships, the question whether the judgments observed would differ
significantly when performed in isolation or in social settings deserves closer scrutiny.
Of importance to the deliberative perspective, is the potential difference in the nature of
reasoning performed in both settings. Actually, there is ample evidence of our limited
ability to perform moral reasoning in isolation (see e.g. Haidt, 2001). It may therefore be
too optimistic to expect individual judgments to reach a satisfactory degree of consistency
and impartiality when performed in isolation, and illusory to expect any elicitation of
judgments in reflective equilibrium. That being acknowledged, however, interpersonal
argument and scrutiny have been suggested as a a set of conditions under which individuals
may be much more willing to achieve consistency (Mercier, 2011 ; Mercier and Landemore,
2012; Vieider, 2011). This suggests that people usually do practice socially-oriented
reasoning in order to convince others whereas moral reasoning seems seldom observed
in practice. Then, as soon as we are interested in eliciting reasoned judgments, some
well-designed social settings may provide relevant conditions.
Proposals in this line may be inspired from experimental deliberative settings such as the
one proposed by Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1992). In the spirit of the former approach,
deliberative opinions polling is another method of interest. Until now these polls have
confined themselves to discuss factual claims and have discarded fairness considerations
from the discussions (Fishkin et Luskin, 2005).
Conclusion
The discussion of this first chapter has shown that the perspective taken on the democratic
political community bears significant implications regarding the nature of the judgments
that are relevant to motivate a social fairness judgment. In bargaining settings in which
the role of fairness remains limited to favour coordination over the set of Pareto improv-
ing policy options, tacit coordination games may be most suited to point at fair policy
proposals. However, experiments have also revealed the existence of settings in which
fairness motives may bear some weight in accounting for stakeholders’ behaviours. In this
perspective, economic experiments are able to reveal some deeply felt fairness views that
could trigger sanctioning behaviours or, on the contrary, constitute opportunities to foster
cooperative behaviours. While these observations are of great interest in the bargaining
perspective, other protocols, such as direct surveys, quasi-spectator experiments or tacit
coordination games allow for the observation of individual judgments that are immune
from a self-serving bias. These are most interesting in a deliberative perspective. In this
perspective, I further argued that existing protocols may benefit from focusing on the
characterisation of reasoned judgments, which may have to occur in the context of inter-
personal interactions. These results, along with a clear understanding of how reasoning
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may lead to different reflected judgments, may be particularly helpful in the identification
of candidates for an overlapping consensus. This leads to point at the need for clarifying
what is meant by reasoning and propose a theory of judgment formation, which is the
object of the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
Reflecting about fairness
The reflective equilibrium procedure and the
axiomatic program
“Of course, we cannot know of
how [men’s] conception [of
justice] vary, or even when they
do, until we have a better
account of their structure. And
this now we lack, even in the
case of one man, or
homogeneous groups of men.”
(John Rawls, 1971, A Theory of
Justice)
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Introduction
No objective, scientific method of inquiry can tell what is fair. Fairness lies in the eyes of
the beholder. Absent any anchorage point, one may soon conclude that arguments about
fairness are condemned to a permanent drift and leave this analysis to other endeavours.
Yet, recognizing that ethical reasoning is fundamentally reflective does not exhaust the
possibilities of inquiry. This is one message of John Rawls (1951) when he came to pro-
pose the reflective equilibrium procedure as a permanent process of mutual adjustment
between our adhesion to general principles and our considered judgments in particular sit-
uations. This procedure came as an answer to the question whether a reasonable decision
procedure, which is sufficiently strong to determine the manner in which competing in-
terests should be adjudicated, could be shown to exist by rational methods of inquiry. As
Rawls (1971) puts it, “there is a definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured
principles can be checked, namely, our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.” As
such our judgments in reflective equilibrium constitute the provisional anchorage point
around which normative inquiry can be organized.
This procedure is a widely acknowledged form of ethical inquiry. It also matches our
experience of moral inquiry and interpersonal argument. At least to some extent, we
must be familiar with a form of deliberation in which one justifies a line of action to
oneself or to others from an appeal to intuitively appealing principles that are thought
to make sense of our strong intuitions regarding the right thing to do in particular cases.
We may also have felt uncomfortable when being revealed inconsistencies between our
adhesion on general principles and our intuitions in particular cases. In such a process,
we may then find ourselves revising one or the other. In all cases, we seek to get closer
to a mutual consistency between both sets of beliefs.
From a practical viewpoint, the reflective equilibrium procedure begins with the definition
of a list of desirable properties a rule of judgment shall meet, followed by an assessment
of their joint consistency and their practical consequences. The tenability of the rule of
judgments identified shall then be assessed in light of their consequences on particular
cases, calling for a revision of the underlying principles as soon as untenable implications
are identified. A judgment is in reflective equilibrium as soon as it results from a rule
of judgment that is retained from such a process. The approach of equity in economic
environments is a useful guide in the second step of the process. It consists in studying
the logical links between general equity principles and rules of judgments in a formal
framework. Among this approach, the theory of fair allocations, focuses on the identifi-
cation of fair allocation rules. This approach has been unified and organized under the
axiomatic program (Thomson, 2001). While the axiomatic nature of the approach is chal-
lenged, its first merit is to operate a clear distinction between the logical inference between
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the objects and the meaning attached to them through the use of formal representation
(Mongin, 2003). Furthermore, by forcing the norms to take a unequivocal form, it avoids
the ambiguities attached to the normative statements and enables for a steady progress
in ethical reasoning. In this chapter, I start by presenting and motivating the theory of
fair allocations. Then I discuss how these theories can contribute to the motivation of
individual and social judgments.
2.1 The theory of fair allocations
The theory of fair allocations shares at least two characteristics. The first is about the
informational basis of the social judgment. As coined down in Fleurbaey et al (2005),
these theories may be interpreted as a relaxation of the independence condition in the
Arrovian framework. As soon as we allow the social judgment to depend on more elements
than the ordinal preferences of the agents, the choice of a given domain starts to have
an ethical dimension, which I discuss. The second dimension is about the form of the
judgment. What further distinguishes the theory of fair allocation among the theories
of equity in economic environments is that they seek to characterize a binary judgment
instead of a full ordering of the alternatives. This contrasts with the evaluation of public
policies in practice, which mostly relies on the assessment of quantitative indicators. Still,
I will argue that in the deliberative perspective, we may prefer to focus on these binary
judgments. I will eventually present the results that are obtained through this approach.
2.1.1 Domains as representations of the situation
The domain (or the economic environment) is a formal representation of the class of sit-
uations that are considered. It can range from the most abstract and general domain,
the universal domain1, to more context-specific domains. These domains consists in a set
of micro-economic models in which a set of agents (e.g. individuals, households, com-
munities), their characteristics, including potentially their preferences and beliefs, their
property or entitlements, the available resources and existing technologies are explicitly
formalised2.
The choice of a domain defines the level of generality at which reasoning is performed.
From an applied perspective, a given policy context is usually very rich and actual judg-
ments would likely rely on many contextual cues that are absent from general theories
(see e.g. Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984). When it is convincing, we may be willing to consider
1The universal domain consists in a set of undefined alternatives, a set of individuals with arbitrary
preferences over these alternative.
2A discussion of the different domains used to represent the NIMBY problem can be found in Chapter 3.
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some forms of interpersonal welfare comparisons. We may also be willing to rely on some
individual characteristics that are deemed to elicit reward. As these two examples suggest
it, we shall not refrain from considering what is deemed normatively relevant a priori.
This is why I propose to follow the approach of equity in economic environments and
focus on small and context rich domains rather than on general and abstract domains.
Eventually, the choice of a domain will have to result from the arbitrage between several
considerations. First, the domain should capture all the ethically relevant facts upon
which differences in treatments and outcomes may be justified. This is precisely the ques-
tion of the informational basis of the judgment. Relevant information may notably include
the characteristics required to assess individual welfare. Second, the domain should also
take into account the effectively relevant facts that constrain what allocation can be
achieved. This is the problem of determining the set of feasible alternatives. This should
notably take into account the likely behaviour that the individuals are expected to follow.
Usually, these behaviours will be represented as the maximization of some individual ob-
jective that is equated to individual welfare. However, as soon as it is acknowledged that
the individuals involved may themselves endorse different view regarding their personal
objectives and how society should assess their achievement of their personal objectives,
the individual objective may not equate the individual welfare. Finally, the choice of a do-
main will also result from the necessary simplifications required for conducting a tractable
analysis, which have to rely on some judgment regarding the relative importance of each
of these facts. This latter constraint should obviously be as little binding as possible.
What comes clear from this discussion is that the choice of a domain is a normative
operation in itself. As such, it should therefore be included in the reflective equilibrium
process and subject to revision as soon as inconsistencies or untenable judgements are
observed. In practice, I propose to start with a list of relevant generic facts. These
may fall into two categories, according to whether they are deemed ethically or effectively
relevant. The formal description of the situation is then derived to account for these facts.
At first, only some of them may be considered.
Note that, depending on the ethically relevant facts identified, a domain may end up
being very simple. In the context of a joint production problem, for instance, it may
be acknowledged that the only ethically relevant facts are the individual marginal con-
tribution to the total output, or the total cost of a project. Then, the representation of
the situation could boil down to the description of a cooperative game with transferable
utility, which already involves complicated judgments as the multiple complementarities
and substitutabilities between individual actions precludes the unambiguous identifica-
tion of each person’s marginal contribution. For instance, Young proposes to adopt such
a perspective for the allocation of the cost of water resource developments, and further
presupposes that the outcomes of all possible cooperative arrangements are perfectly un-
36
2.1 The theory of fair allocations
derstood (Young, 1994). Another example of such a simplification of a domain is provided
in Chapter 6.
When many generic facts are identified, richer and more complex descriptions of a situ-
ation may gradually be introduced through successive assessments. Note that this pro-
gressive and analytic approach is not only motivated by the need to keep the analysis
tractable. It also constitutes a well-established process of inquiry in ethics, where rea-
soning is progressively elaborated from simple and hypothetical situations in which our
intuitions are more acute (see e.g. Appiah, 2008). In contexts with asymmetric informa-
tion, for instance, it is usual to start with a clarification of our judgments under perfect
information and, only then, to question the implementability of the identified allocations.
An illustration of this progressive approach is provided in Chapter 4. The relevance of
a domain is achieved as soon as all ethically and effectively relevant facts are taken into
account.
2.1.2 Allocation rules as representations of fairness judgments
As was already discussed in the introduction, what is crucial to the social choice approach
is the characterisation of a social welfare judgment over the existing alternatives in a given
situation. It should be emphasized here that as the reflective equilibrium approach makes
clear is that the judgments under scrutiny should be systematic across many situations.
This means that they should not be restricted to the single, actual situation, but to a
broad range of situation (the domain) in a systematic way. We will speak of rules of
judgment for such multi-profiles assessments. These are mappings from a domain into a
set of single-profile judgments. Our former discussion already dealt with the question of
the choice of a domain (their informational content). We now justify why we choose to
rely on binary judgments (their form).
In their recent proposal, and consistently with the original Arrovian framework, Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2011) proposed to consider social ordering functions. These are mappings
from each economy of the domain to the set of orderings of all available alternatives. In
contrast, the theory of fair allocations relies on an alternative absolute representation of
judgments. This approach focuses on allocation rules (or social choice functions). These
are mappings from each economy of the domain to the set of feasible allocations. This
latter theory will be the main focus in this dissertation. We shall try to further motivate
this choice.
The main argument that is proposed in favour of it is that social orderings are better suited
to accommodate second-best contexts when the set of feasible alternatives is difficult to
represent (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011, p. 9).3 Another argument is that the theory of
3Besides, they argue that the approach of fair allocation rule fails to meet the weak Pareto criterion,
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fair allocations was claimed to be less informative than the social ordering approach. For
instance, fairness ideals could easily be derived from an ordering of the former approaches
as the maximal elements of the domain.
All this seems to call for a general use of an ordering approach. Yet, this representation
of social judgments may even contradict our intuitions regarding the relevant use of fair-
ness considerations in the public sphere. We may have views that some policies could be
fairer, but we may also acknowledge the irreducible plurality of individual values. Aware
that a wide agreement on every trade-offs that may exist among policy alternatives is an
illusory endeavour in public arenas, we may rather be interested in identifying reasonable
proposals. These are these tempered judgments that are most relevant in the delibera-
tive perspective, as these are the judgments that enter in the genesis of an overlapping
consensus. Of course, binary judgments may be seen as one step toward the design of
a full-fledged vision of an ordinal judgment, but the relevance of this view may remain
confined to the delegative perspective on the democratic community.
On top of this limitation, the approach of fair allocation rules captures a different nature of
a judgment that a purely ordinal approach would miss. Indeed, a purely ordinal approach
cannot account for “what we are ready (or not ready) to accept”. Yet, social and moral
norms are usually such statements, and so are our intuitions regarding fairness criteria.
“Everyone should be entitled to the product of her labour”; “No one should starve”; “No
inequality should be accepted that is not justified”, “No one should prefer someone else’s
allocation of resources to her own”. These are the most likely expressions of what could be
required in public. As interpreted here, the theory of fair allocations conveys a different
sort of a judgment about whether a given policy is acceptable. Where our tolerance ends
and outrage arises, a purely ordinal approach does not tell.
2.1.3 Axioms as a representation of equity principles
The last part of the reflective equilibrium procedure is the choice of general principles.
The principles are taken as exogenous. They are to be understood as ethical arguments
that are relevant to the public debate or the moral convictions that exist in society. They
may be motivated in the literature of moral and political philosophy, or by an appeal
to intuitions on fairness principles. Some are difficult to oppose. For instance, the two
first requirements are logically flow as soon as we accept the relevance of the domain
considered, which we proposed to take for granted through this stage of the reflection.
• Impartiality is the first requirement. As soon as all normatively relevant informa-
tion is part of the domain, any different treatment should be justified on the basis of
which require that as soon as an alternative is unanimously strictly preferred, then it should be socially
strictly preferred as well. Another argument is that this approach is tantamount the allocation rule
approach when domains are rich enough (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2011, p. 8-9).
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this information. Anonymity formally requires that any permutation of the labels
leaves the allocation unchanged.
• Unanimity is another consensual requirement. It requires that no alternative
should be chosen if another one would be unanimously preferred by the stakehold-
ers. Under the presumption the representation of individual welfare is accepted,
this requirement may be assimilated with Pareto efficiency, which requires that
no allocation is chosen if another one would make all agents at least as well off and
some strictly better off. All such allocations are described as Pareto optima. In the
following, we may systematically restrict our analysis to the set of Pareto optima.
Note that the simplification required in order to conduct a tractable analysis may pre-
clude the direct acceptance of Anonymity or Pareto efficiency. In the approach proposed,
these two requirements are temporarily accepted and the assessment of their relevance is
reserved for a later stage of reasoning.
On top of these two requirements, additional norms intend to make a finer selection
among the Pareto optimal alternatives on the basis of further considerations. These
considerations may be called equity principles or distributive norms as they all focus on
the appropriate allocation of goods and bads. Here, I shall briefly describe the main
distributive norms studied in the literature and some of the main conflicts identified.4
• No Envy is the founding principle in the theory of fair allocation rules (Foley,
1967). In its simple formulation, it requires that no agent prefer the allocation of
another agent to her own. As such, it may not always be achievable and may conflict
with the Pareto criterion and, therefore, appeals to refinements (see e.g. Fleurbaey,
2008).
• Aggregate efficiency consists in preferring outcomes that are more efficient in
aggregate. It relies on the idea that the virtual possibility of compensation is suffi-
cient to ensure the social desirability of a policy. This principle conduces to criteria
such as the cost-benefit analysis, which evaluates policies through the comparison
of their net benefit. In settings in which a numéraire can be used to achieve any
distribution of welfare, it is tantamount with the Pareto principle. Yet, in other
settings, it constitutes an independent criterion that enters in sharp conflict with
other principles.
• Solidarity norms require that all the agents are affected to the same extent, or at
least in the same way, by changes in circumstances, such as a decrease in a com-
mon resource or a change in the size or the characteristics of the population. These
norms may align with other norms in surprising ways. For instance, in the setting
considered in Chapter 4, solidarity regarding overall changes in preferences clearly
4Thomson (2011) reviews the recent results in the theory of fair allocations.
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aligns with an egalitarian requirement. Still, solidarity regarding the size of the pop-
ulation may conduce to require someone not to gain from the increased competition
of others and, surprisingly align with allocations that reward the communities with
lower costs.
• Needs and poverty alleviation, also enter the formation of our judgments. They
lead to prefer allocations that grants to all a minimum levels of some basic goods,
what distinguishes them from equality principles.
• Equality norms lead to prefer outcomes that are more equal. Yet, this notion
remains undefined with several respects. First, when perfect equality cannot be
obtained, there is no natural and complete ranking of allocations. Second, this
theory may conflict with the (ex ante) Pareto criterion in settings with risks. Third,
most settings offer multiples possibilities regarding what could be equalized. With
this regard, this theory remains undefined.
• Freedom, rights and autonomy capture the liberal idea that the allocation rule
should not interfere with some individual sphere of autonomy. A first ways to express
them is by imposing limits on public intervention. On top of these procedural
requirements, lower welfare bounds have been proposed as a formulation of rights.
These notions do not go without difficulties. First the question of which welfare
bounds best represent existing rights remains undefined. Furthermore, lower welfare
bound requirements may emphasize the need to limit the autonomy of individuals
in social dilemmas so that arbitrage between the two sort of requirements may
be required. This is illustrated in Chapter 6. Also, it was notice early that the
protection of a sphere of autonomy is not compatible with the Pareto criterion in
general (Sen, 1970).
• Merit or desert lead to prefer to reward individuals with a higher contribution. As
for equality, the fundamental nature of this category is questionable as desert-based
theories need to rely on external values and goals for defining a desert-basis (what
makes an individual deserving) and the condition of it validity (e.g. voluntariness)
(Lamont, 1994).
• Consistency is the requirement that some change shall not affect the one’s judg-
ment. For instance, one may acknowledge that for any pair of independent problems
such that the welfare of any group of agents can be summed up, the allocation should
give to each agent the sum of what it would give to him in each problem. These
“technical” requirements are often pretty constraining.
As suggested by the previous presentation, norms are usually too vague to recommend
unambiguous practical conclusion. They may state that “people should not be held re-
sponsible for circumstances” and leave undefined its practical implications. Some norms
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may even contradict themselves in the context of a given problem. For instance, a norm
that would require treating all people equally may prove too constraining when the prob-
lem comes of allocating and indivisible task. The axioms are to be understood as a clear
and operational expression of these norms to the set of situations described. In the con-
text of the theory of fair allocation rules, they take the following form “An allocation rule
satisfies axiom X if and only if Condition A”. The condition may bear on the allocation
selected in a single situation. For instance, it may be required that all individual wel-
fare shall not reach below or above some level, or that no agent should prefer another’s
allocation to her own. The condition may also bear on variations across situations. For
instance, a robust way to formalize the requirement that “people should not be held re-
sponsible for circumstances” is to require that “for any change in circumstances, either
all people should benefit, or all should lose”. While this may seem to be a weak necessary
condition of the former statements, the analysis actually reveals this requirement as a
very strong one on the domain we consider in Chapter 4.
We convey the reader to Chapter 4 to get an illustration of how these different notions
are formalized into axioms. It should be emphasized here that the formalization of such
distributive norms into axioms is not as straightforward as it may seem. In some en-
vironments, an axiom may convey very different norms. As an instance, the axiom of
Individual Cost Reward that is introduced in chapter 4 may at the same time result from
the view that one should be rewarded for socially more beneficial preferences, but also
from the view that, everything else equal, transfers should not decrease would a commu-
nity get poorer. This is developed in subsection 3.2.4 of Chapter 3. On the contrary, a
given norms may also be expressed through many axioms, some of which having radically
different implications.
This flexibility in the articulation of principles and axioms is especially interesting in the
deliberative perspective as it allows to build an independent set of public norms that may
be articulated with the multiple individual values that exist in society.5 An example of
this is developed in section 3.2.4. Because it is much more plausible to expect individuals
to accept changes in how they express their own values rather than to renege on their
values, this gives credibility to the idea that this approach may trigger convergence in
5The existence of an independent set of public values is an essential component of most political con-
ceptions of modern democracies. Rawls is only one instance of this and, the following description of
the Habermas suggests a convergence on this point:
“Modern societies are set up so that any agent in any situation can be asked to justify
their action and is pre-committed to doing so. In this way reasons provide the invisible lines
along which sequences of interactions unfold, and which guide agents away from conflict. As
social agents become accustomed to having their actions guided by speech and the mutual
recognition of good reasons, so relatively stable patterns of social order begins to form that
do not depend directly on credible threat of punishment, on shared religious traditions, or
antecedent moral values”
(Finlaysson, 2005 , p.27)
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individual adhesions to public norms through deliberation. This in turns reinforces the
credibility of the existence of an overlapping consensus.
2.1.4 Characterisations and impossibilities
Once the domain is properly defined and the axioms are stated, the analysis consists in
assessing the joint consequence of these conditions. This analysis may yield positive or
negative results.
First, it may be the case that, despite the joint desirability of the initial principles, no
allocation rule satisfies all the axioms. This establishes an impossibility result, which is
in itself an indication that trade-offs exist regarding the principles initially imposed. An
example of such a situation is to be found in section 4.5.2. This requires revising the initial
principles. The theory remains silent regarding the process through which the revision
can be performed. Usually some of the principles may be dropped, or logically weakened
in order to reach a positive result. By evidencing the source of the impossibility, the proof
of the impossibility may in itself provide useful cues for the revision: in some instances,
the impossibility will result from a anecdotal counterexample with no moral force so that
a marginal adjustment in the principles would suffice; in others, a deeper conflict will be
identified between two, equally desirable properties that requires careful consideration.
When an example is found that satisfies all the principles, the analysis may seek to
describe exactly the set of allocation rules that satisfies the axioms. This establishes a
characterisation result. Among these characterisations, the characterisation of a single
allocation rule (the solution) from different combination of the axioms is particularly
informative as it informs us on the limits of what is possible. By making explicit the
trade-offs between the axioms, characterisation results draw, progressively, the frontiers
of the firm land on which social judgments may be grounded. A characterisation ensures
that any alternative allocation rule would fail to meet one of the axioms involved in the
characterisation. It can therefore be an exceptionally strong support for an allocation as
it tells us that for any different allocation, an example could be found that contradicts
these axioms and the underlying principles. When all the axioms involved are intuitively
appealing, such an example is likely to constitute a convincing argument in favour of the
characterized allocation. Nevertheless, it also signals the proximity of the impossibility
and any identification of untenable properties among these characterizing an allocation
would require a difficult but necessary reconsideration of the principles endorsed.
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2.2 The construction of reasoned judgments
In the context of a policy problem, the reflective equilibrium procedure can be described
as follows.
1. Draw a list of the relevant generic facts that is, existing constraints on the allocations
and differences between individuals that may justify a departure from equality. This
allows deriving a domain, that is, a formal representation of these situations.
2. Identify a set of desirable principles that an allocation rule should meet in and across
all the situations considered. This leads to a set of the axioms.
3. In this formal framework, characterize the set of allocation rules that satisfy these
properties. As long as no such rule exists, revise the set of principles and axioms.
4. If an allocation rule that satisfies all the axioms is shown to exist, fully characterize
the set of such allocation rules.
5. Assess the tenability of the rule of judgment on the domain. In case some recommen-
dations conflict with intuitive judgments on some particular case, choose whether
to maintain the judgment or to revise the initial set of principles. In this latter case,
the conclusion reached is said to be untenable.
6. Assess the relevance of the formal framework adopted by broadening the assessment
to the actual situations in lights of the generic facts identified. This may reveal some
missing features of the problem and require revising the description of the domain
and/or the principles adopted. As soon as a set of allocation rules pass this latter
test, a reflective equilibrium is achieved.
The general framework is summarized on Figure 2.1. It extends the four-stage process
proposed by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984) to make it applicable to actual judgments in a
policymaking perspective. It also clarifies the contribution of the theory of fair allocation
in the constitution of reasoned judgments (or, in Rawls’ terms, considered judgment in
reflective equilibrium) over alternative policies. This chart shows that many operations
are external to the axiomatic approach. In particular, I wish to emphasize that the
representation of the problem should be part of the reasoning if we want the method
outlined to feed into the policy-making process. Real policy issue may be described in
a many alternative ways and a every single axiomatic study on a well-defined domain is
likely to raise questions that require to proceeds the analysis further.
In the context of a practical policy problem, it is likely that the mere description of
a fairness judgment in reflective equilibrium would fail to convince. Our spontaneous
judgments are grounded on informal and often contradictory principles. A judgment in
reflective equilibrium may be adopted for lack of a better one, after several reconsidera-
tions of one’s intuitions over these principles and their implications in particular cases.
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This is through the whole process that we eventually come to a settlement. Therefore, a
convincing description shall not only consist in the end points but also in the many paths
that lead to them, including the reasons of each successive move. This may seem tedious,
but this is the most convincing motivation for a given rule of judgment. An illustration
of this is provided in Chapter 3.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I argued in favour of the use of the theories of fair allocations. This
approach puts the emphasis on the coherence between our considered judgements in par-
ticular situations and our intuitions regarding the regarding the general rules of judgments
that generate them. In the context of this operation, the main interest of the axiomatic
approach is to bridge the gap between these two sets of judgments. This choice was mainly
justified by the possibility of including contextual information and the interest to limit the
expression of a judgment to the reasonableness of different policy choices in a deliberative
perspective. In the end, the conclusions that may be reached by this approach are very
much in the spirit of the following conclusion that Minehart and Nemann (2002) present
in the context of the NIMBY problem: “a siting procedure based on the one proposed in
[their] paper that in addition is sensitive to issues of “environmental justice” and other
moral considerations [...] could well provide an acceptable and satisfactory solution”.
I also stressed that this approach alone is not directly applicable to an actual policy con-
text. Given the many potential controversies regarding the definition of the domain, I
argued that this should explicitly be part of the reasoning process. Given the many ele-
ments and possibilities involved, the development of a tractable framework for structuring
all existing results that are relevant to a given policy issue may be required. Such a scheme
would help identify the pending theoretical developments and to formulate assumptions
for empirical testing.
The approached proposed clearly aim at the constitution of a narrow reflective equilibrium.
In order to be fully convincing, the set of beliefs that should cohere should be further
expanded to background theories, in particular about the nature of persons and political
institutions. In the conceptual representation of a wide reflective equilibrium as proposed
by Daniels (1996, p. 51), a theory of the person and of a theory of society can both
lead to different perspectives about the role of morality in society, which in turn impacts
our considered judgments about policy options in a wide reflective equilibrium. What
is proposed in this thesis amounts to this view provided we endorse one of the three
perspectives on the democratic community suggested at the beginning as a background
theory. As emphasized earlier, these contrasted background theories differ significantly
regarding the level of reasoning involved in a social judgment. We also suggested in
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Figure 2.1: Frontiers of the theory of fair allocations in the reflective equilibrium
procedure
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this chapter that these may rely on a different form of a judgment. This makes the
discussions of normative reasoning more or less relevant, depending on the perspective
adopted. While at the core of the deliberative perspective, the approach presented here
would appear irrelevant in the bargaining perspective.
46
Chapter 3
Application to the context of locally
undesirable land uses
“Justification is a matter of the
mutual support of many
considerations, of everything
fitting together into one
coherent view.”
(John Rawls, 1971, A Theory of
Justice)
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Introduction
In June 2008, the French government called for candidates for hosting a site for low-level
radioactive waste storage among 3115 technically eligible municipalities. About 40 of
them, all located in North Eastern France, showed their interest in the project. After de-
tailed investigations, the Governement announced the selection of two municipalities for
complete investigations: Pars-les-Chavanges and Auxon. However, facing strong public
opposition in surrounding municipalities and pressure from intermediary political levels,
Pars-les-Chavanges withdrew from the process, rapidly followed by the second municipal-
ity. The agency in charge of the process stated that "consistently to the approach chosen
by the Government and [itself], based on the voluntary participation of municipalities, the
municipalities resorted to their right to withdraw from the project"1. The site selection
process was in a dead end.
Examples abound of oppositions to locally undesirable land use. More surprisingly, oppo-
sition is often believed to occur in spite of the presumption that such projects are socially
beneficial in the sense of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Richman and Boerner, 2006).2 Such
situations are called the “Not In My Backward” (NIMBY) problem. Landfills, inciner-
ators, power plants, windmills or airports are among the multiple potential examples of
such locally undesirable facilities.3 Sometimes, projects such as prisons or refugee camps
are presented as potential examples. Generically speaking, NIMBY problems arise when a
group of communities4 can undertake a project that is unanimously recognised as globally
beneficial but which remains locally undesirable. These projects often feature a conflict
between a small group of people and an institution that upholds a vision of the public
interest. They often end up in a gridlock.
In this setting, an assessment of fairness appears relevant to different perspectives of the
political community. In the deliberative perspective, the mere issue of balancing the par-
ticular loss of the host against the general interest requires the design of a careful and
consensual scheme of justification that is valuable in itself. In the bargaining perspective,
the location of locally undesirable land uses gives typically raise to conflicts where fair-
ness concerns are prominent. The identification of means to alleviate these conflicts and
allow the group to overcome this problem is required for achieving mutual gains. This
is suggested by the following analysis. “The key to solving NIMBY, in short, is trust.
1the author’s translation.
2This criterion consists in comparing the sum of the benefits with the sum of the costs associated with
the project as compared to no project. When the former is higher, the project is said to meet such a
criterion.
3The socially beneficial dimension of such projects is the NIMBY hypothesis; we will not question it.
We do not address the question of efficient provision which is the source of an important literature in
mechanism design and could also explain the social disapproval of these projects (sometimes referred
to as the “Not On Planet Earth” (NOPE) problem).
4By community, we mean a group of individuals with a common objective.
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Various sources of evidence suggest that individuals can be made receptive to the siting
of noxious facilities in their communities if they can be made to believe that society is
committed to treating their interests with respect. Appropriately structured bottom-up,
negotiated-compensation schemes - ones framed to emphasize respect for the interests and
autonomy of prospective host communities - are one way to reverse deep-seated resent-
ments and thus excite a reciprocal openness to siting decisions. If individuals can’t be
made to believe that the burden of accepting a noxious facility is being fairly reciprocated
either in kind or by like sacrifices, the current of resentment that fuels NIMBY will be
difficult to reverse, even with financial incentives” (Kahan, 2005, our emphases).
What comes clear from this discussion is that regardless of the perspective adopted, a key
question what treating the communities’ interest with respect actually requires in this
context. The object of this chapter is to conduct an analysis in search for a reasonable
proposal that draws both from the methodological discussions of the previous chapters
and the contributions presented in the second part of this thesis.
3.1 Representations of the problem
NIMBY problems arise for the location of land uses problems. The basic ingredient for
these problems is the existence of at least two communities and a project. We shall further
assume that this project is expected to bring local nuisances but that it yields an overall
benefit that is deemed greater than its cost. In each case, what has to be decided is
• whether or not to implement the project, and, in the event of its implementation,
• where to locate it, and
• how to design it and whether or not some form of transfers (monetary or not) should
be implemented.
As emphasized earlier, reasoning about this problem requires widening the analysis to
rules of judgment, which specify a set of fair decisions for any potential situation. As
was also discussed in the former chapter, the very simple representation we sketched may
miss important features of most situations and fail to propose an accurate representation
of the feasible alternatives or to capture the normative views most commonly expressed
in this context. This is why we first have to consider carefully which features of these
situations should be taken into account when making a decision about facility location.
3.1.1 Generic facts
Here follows a proposition of ten generic facts that shall motivate the choice of a domain.
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Fact 1 Basic structure: The expected net monetary benefit of the project denotes its
monetary benefit net from its construction, operation and maintenance costs. It
may vary across communities.
Fact 2 Multiple costs: On top of the monetary costs of the project, the communities may
have different compensation requirements for the nuisances that come with the
project.
Fact 3 Composite costs: Differences in the compensation requirements of the commu-
nities may be due to different objective conditions making some of them more
vulnerable to the nuisances associated with the project, but also to their differ-
ent collective plans, and to their differences in social, demographic and economic
characteristics. They may in particular result from unfair existing differences in
wealth as poorer communities would tend to have systematically lower compen-
sation requirements.
Fact 4 Non-subsitutabilities: It may be the case that, for some communities, no amount
of money could compensate for a deterioration of their living environment.
Fact 5 Private information: Only the citizens of the communities can assess the worth
that a degradation of their living environment represents for them. As a result,
the compensation requirement of each community is private information.
Fact 6 Individual mobility: Individuals may engage efforts and resources to move across
communities.
Fact 7 Externalities: The project may not only be perceived as a nuisance by the host
community, but also by the neighboring communities.
Fact 8 Intra-community disagreement: The communities are a collective and may not be
able to express a consensual compensation requirement.
Fact 9 Third parties: Third parties, such as future generations, are absent whereas their
interest may also be at stake.
Fact 10 Risks and uncertainties: The non-monetary nuisances may range from a known
deterioration to an uncertain threat on a community’s living environment.
This list aims at capturing the main features of a NIMBY situation. It is to be taken as a
fixed point in our reasoning. We shall assume that if we reach a policy proposal that fares
well on domains that appropriately reflect these facts, we would have reached a reasonable
policy proposal. Still, this list may not be exhaustive and may be discussed and revised
in light of identified policies.5 Taking all these facts into account in the decision clearly
constitutes a challenge. The approach proposed consists in introducing progressively these
features, sometimes separately.
5In the context of a precise NIMBY problem, additional facts may appear relevant such as, for instance,
the history of cooperation among the communities. These features could be further introduced within
the procedure.
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3.1.2 Domains
The following table presents the different domains that are considered in this thesis, as
well as in other papers that will be discussed throughout the presentation. All consider
a group of communities who can implement an indivisible project and have to decide
about its host and transfers. They all capture the basic structure of the problem (Fact
1) and mainly differ according to the way they allow for multiple costs (Fact 2), private
information (Fact 5) and externalities (Fact 7). Among the domains considered in the
literature, Minehart and Neeman also pay some attention to the nature of the costs (Fact
3) and the potential of intra-community disagreement (Fact 8).
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Verbal description of the domain
Formal
description
In this thesis
Domain 1 (Chapter 4)
A group of n communities can undertake an indivisible project that
yields a common benefit B and a private cost ci to the host chosen.
This cost is considered as a whole. Preferences are quasi-linear.
Information is complete.
(B, c) ∈ Rn+1+
Domain 2 (Chapter 4,
section 5.1)
A group of n communities can undertake an indivisible project that
yields a common benefit B and a private cost ci to the host chosen.
This cost is considered as a whole. Preferences are quasi-linear.
Information is incomplete on ci.
(B, c) ∈ Rn+1+
Domain 3 (Chapter 4,
section 5.2)
A group of n communities can undertake an indivisible project that
yields a common benefit B and a private cost ci to the host chosen.
This cost consists in the sum of costs of different nature, cci and
cri . Preferences are quasi-linear. Information is complete.
(B, cc, cr) ∈ R2n+1+
Domain 4 (Chapter 6)
A group of n communities can undertake an indivisible project that
yields a private benefit to all and a private cost cij to the host
chosen i and each of her neighbors j. This cost is considered as a
whole. Preferences are quasi-linear. Information is complete.
(b,C) ∈
R
n
+ ×Mn(R+)
In the literature
Sakai, 2012
Each district of a group of n needs to deal with a private amount of
wastes wi. They can jointly undertake an indivisible project which
yields a private cost to the host only. This cost is the sum of a
construction cost ci and a disutility vi. They are both increasing
and concave in the amount of waste processed. Preferences are
quasi-linear. Information is incomplete on vi and complete otherwise.
(w, c,v) ∈ Rn×C2n
where C denotes
the set of strictly
increasing and
weakly concave
mapping from R+
into R+ that takes
value 0 in 0.
Minehart and
Neeman, 2002
Each community of a group of n needs to deal with a private amount
of wastes wi. They can jointly undertake an indivisible project which
yields a private cost to the host only. This cost may be considered
as a whole, ci. It is increasing and concave in the amount of waste
processed. Preferences are quasi-linear. Information is incomplete on
ci and complete otherwise.
(w, c) ∈∈ Rn × Cn
Dehez, 2013
A group of n communities have to undertake an indivisible project that
yields a private cost to the host only. This cost may be considered
as a whole, ci. It may be heterogeneous among communities.
Preferences are quasi-linear. Information is complete.
c ∈ Rn
Table 3.2: Domains considered in this thesis and in the literature for the analysis of the NIMBY problem.
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One may ask whether these choices of a domain are appropriate or whether they miss
important features of the actual situations. We first articulate the results obtained on
these different domains. The need for further developments will eventually be discussed.
3.2 Proposal for considered judgments in reflective
equilibrium
In the general problem, an allocation consists in the decision to implement the project or
not, its location and monetary transfers. We may assume that all relevant information
is considered and focus on anonymous allocation rules. This requires us to allow the
possibility to select among several locations through a lottery in case two communities
have the same cost. We also focus on Pareto optimal allocation rules. They consist in
implementing the project whenever its benefits outweigh its cost and at locating it where
the cost is lowest. We may next focus on allocation rules that satisfy these two former
criteria, and focus on the monetary transfers.
3.2.1 A first line of reasoning
Let us start with Domain 1, the simplest, and consider a situation in which a group of
communities may implement a project whose net monetary benefit is the same wherever
it is located but which may be perceived differently across location. This perception may
be summarized by the communities’ willingness to accept the project, or compensation
requirements, expressed in monetary terms. Let us assume also that the true compensation
requirements of the communities are known.
An example of an allocation rule selects a community with a lowest compensation re-
quirement and shares the value of the project equally among the communities. We may
call it the strict egalitarian allocation rule. This rule may not seem tenable as the host
community may actually find itself worse off after the implementation of the project. As
this rule seems to give raise to untenable allocations, we need to get more precise about
which additional requirements could be imposed on the problem:
Norm 1 The first comment was related to the fact that the mere existence of the project
could be considered as a beneficial circumstance for all. This would a minima
require that “all communities should benefit from the existence of the project”
(corresponding axiom: Individual rationality).
Norm 2 Perhaps more arguably the previous requirement could be extended to the
communities preferences. This could lead to the following requirement “No
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community should find herself worse off when the all compensation require-
ments get unambiguously lower”. (corresponding axiom: Full solidarity)
Norm 3 No community should envy the others, that is the host should not prefer not
to be non-host and get her payment and the non-host should not prefer to be
host and get her payment. (corresponding axiom: No envy)
Using the results presented in Chapter 4, it results from the first and last requirements
that the allocation rules should give to the host an amount that lies in between her own
compensation requirement and the second lowest one (or, in case it is greater than the
total value of the project, this value), and share what is left equally among all users,
including the host. The second condition further requires that the amount paid to the
host’s should be his own compensation requirement. This so called welfare egalitarian
allocation rule is an attractive solution which is both proposed in Chapter 4 and in Sakai
(2012). Yet the tenability of this solution may be questioned in light of the following
conclusions.
Observation 1 In some instances, the allocation rule would give all the less to a community
as her compensation requirement is low.
Observation 2 In some instances, the allocation rule would give a significant share of the
value of the project to a community who would not be willing to implement
it on her own.
These two particular conclusions could be accepted or rejected. In this latter case, a
revision in the set of principles is required. The formulation of the situation could lead
us to formulate the following two additional requirements.
Norm 4 A community should not be paid less when her compensation requirement gets
lower. (corresponding axiom: Individual cost reward)
Norm 5 A community that would not benefit from the project in the absence of others
should not get any share of its value. (corresponding axiom: No dummy)
The welfare egalitarian allocation rule does not meet these requirements. Actually the
first requires, together with No envy and Individual rationality, that the allocation rule
should share the second highest compensation requirement among users (or, in case it is
greater than the total value of the project, this value). This corresponds to the nucleolus
which is discussed in Chapter 4 and in Dehez (2013). This solution no longer satisfies Full
solidarity but it satisfies Individual cost reward, so Observation 1 does not hold. For this,
it may be deemed attractive by some. Still, Observation 2 still holds for this allocation
rule. To show this, consider a three-community case in which two communities feature
a compensation requirement that is strictly lower than the net benefit of the project
and the third community features a greater compensation requirement than this value.
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With the nucleolus, this latter community will get some part of the value of the project.
Another potential limitation of this allocation may be that when extended to groups of
communities, Observation 1 still holds.
Observation 3 In some instances, would two communities jointly feature lower costs, they
may get a lower aggregate payment.
Again, these observations may be deemed tenable, or rejected. In the latter event, the
set of principles needs to be revised. As, the latter example reveals it, a fundamental
conflict arises between the No envy and the No dummy criteria. Then, imposing the No
dummy criterion requires weakening No envy. For instance, it may be restricted between
communities that have exactly the same costs. We shall call this latter requirement No
envy among equals. Along with Observation 3, this suggests two additional norms.
Norm 6 A group of communities within which each community features a lower compen-
sation requirement should not get a lower aggregate payment. (corresponding
axiom: Collective cost reward)
Norm 7 No community should envy another community who features the same cost.
(corresponding axiom: No envy among equals)
This weakening of No envy along with the extension of the reward requirement to groups
leaves room for many allocation rules. One possibility is to share the whole benefit of
the project among the communities with the lowest compensation requirement and give
nothing to the others, which may be called the We may call it the strict libertarian
allocation rule. The assessment of tenability then raises the following dilemmas.
Observation 4 In some instances, among two communities with arbitrary close compensa-
tion requirement, one can get a high payment while the other gets nothing.
Observation 5 In some instances, a community might suffer from the fact as another com-
munity with a lower cost than herself lowers its compensation requirement
further.
Several routes may be taken depending on whether one or the other observation is con-
sidered untenable. Let us propose an additional requirement that seeks to avoid Obser-
vation 5.
Norm 8 The reward granted to a community should not make the communities with
greater costs worse off (corresponding axiom: Solidarity toward higher-cost
communities)
Along with the No envy among equals requirement, Collective cost reward and Solidarity
toward higher-cost communities lead to characterize the Shapley value, which is further
described in chapter 4 and in Dehez (2013). This allocation rule further satisfies No
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dummy and Individual rationality. It does not satisfy No envy. Nor does it ensure Full
solidarity. But, reaching this stage requires that these axioms have deliberately been
deemed less important than the intuitions with which they necessarily conflicted and that
motivated the alternative requirements.
The general scheme of the possible combinations of the axioms that results from this
discussion is presented on Figure 4.5. One may share some of the intuitions on the norms
and dilemmas proposed here or be indifferent between the different allocations. While
this scheme is not fixed, it seems reasonable to assume at this stage that at least one of
the three allocation rules is deemed tenable.
The next step in the reasoning is then to assess its relevance when applied to a real
situation. It is clear that it is not directly applicable to real policy problems. While
it captures Facts 2, 4, and partially Fact 1, it fails to reflects the others. In order to
get relevant some extensions are required. In particular, Fact 5 leads us to question the
implementability of each of these allocation rules. In the literature on fair allocations,
this is a natural development of the analysis on which we shall now concentrate.
3.2.2 Accounting for private information
On the specific problem of locally undesirable land uses, the unobservability of the com-
munities’ true compensation requirements constitutes a well recognised problem, which
led to many proposals (Kunreuther and Kleindorfer, 1986; Minehart and Neeman, 2002;
Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2011; Sakai, 2012). As soon as the costs are not di-
rectly observable, the assessment should address the means to implement the allocation
rules. These are mechanisms which select an allocation on the basis of the communities’
statements of their own compensation requirements. It is usually acknowledged that the
communities will not be willing to reveal their true compensation requirement if not in
their interest. Given the uncertainty related to the behaviors of others, all sorts of be-
havior may be expected in the context of a mechanism. Some communities may have
different expectation regarding the others’ behavior and be willing to take risks, other
may be willing to maximize the worse outcome for them, and others may be willing to
tell the truth to some extent. We cannot guarantee that the communities always find in
their own interest to reveal their true compensation requirement.
I summarize here the discussions which are presented in Chapter 4. Its development is
the following. As this information is crucial for having the certainty that we actually
achieve these allocations, we conclude that none of the allocation rule that we identified
previously can be implemented for sure on the basis of the true compensation require-
ments. Still, it turns out that the mechanisms that consist is the direct implementation of
the allocation rules previously identified all meet a common requirement: they offer the
57
Chapter 3 Application to the context of locally undesirable land uses
opportunity for all communities to get at least some minimal payment that correspond
to their identical-cost lower bound. For a given community, this bound corresponds to
the level of welfare that would be granted by the welfare egalitarian allocation rule in the
hypothetical situation in which all the communities feature the same cost as her. This
criterion does not focus on the ex-post allocation but on the perception of the mechanism
from the interim stage. If communities do not achieve it at the ex-post stage, it is because
they preferred to take risk in the mechanism. This is difficult to prevent but at least, these
mechanism prevent that such misreport may compromise the others’ opportunities. This
criterion leaves many possibilities which could either be discriminated against through
a finer representation of the communities’ behaviors in the mechanism, or through the
requirement of additional procedural criteria. The previous analysis seems particularly
adapted to justify these procedural requirements.
3.2.3 Accounting for costs of different kinds
Facts 1 and 2 together emphasize the existence of costs and benefits of different kinds.
This can be accommodated in the model as long as we assume that the same norms apply
to them. This is actually a strong requirement. An extension is proposed in Chapter 4
that explores the possibility of requiring the two norms identified in the former separately
for each part of the cost. This actually leads to an impossibility result. A proposal is
made which weakens the reward requirement to situations in which circumstances are
uniform. This characterizes a particular allocation rule.
The results end here with a rather complicated scheme. Actually, some generic facts may
easily be comprised in this model. Fact 1 brings in the possibility of heterogeneous benefit:
these could be incorporated into the model by replacing the costs by a private valuation,
as long as this benefit does not vary according to the location of the facility, which we
will discuss later on. Fact 4 is accommodated by the absence of any restriction on the
costs : costs may be infinite and the results would remain. Fact 6 is accommodated by
the fact that the cost may encompass a moving cost. Finally, the model and the solutions
proposed are still unable to account for Facts 3 , 7, 8 and 9.
3.2.4 Accounting for differences in wealth
Fact 3 relate to the important claim for environmental justice. The relative deprivation
of poorer communities from a good environment is a well established fact which has
implications in terms of health and morbidity (Hamilton, 2006). Therefore environmental
inequalities tend to exacerbate existing wealth inequalities. A difficulty is that, in spite of
this, poorer communities may still express lower compensation requirements for hosting
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a locally undesirable project, exposing them to a further deterioration of their living
environment. This lead some author to plead for considering other locations (see e.g.
Hermansson, 2007). A problem is that such allocations would not respect Pareto efficiency.
Instead, I propose to require that, the allocation rule should not exacerbate existing
inequalities. In this line, I propose the following principle.
Norm 9 Everything else equal, the allocation rule should not give less to a community
when it gets poorer.
Along with an assumption of diminishing marginal utility of money, this leads to a con-
dition that is tantamount to the Individual cost reward axioms,6 and the previous results
apply.
3.2.5 Accounting for externalities
Fact 7 raises the question of externalities. The existence of externalities significantly com-
plicates the problem. In chapter 6, we consider a simple setting in which the communities
may all bear different cost depending on the location of the project, and show that no
allocation rule would pertain to the core of the associated cooperative game. In other
words, no allocation rule guarantees that in any situation, all groups of community would
get what they could get by themselves. Looking at the reason behind this result, one may
propose to apply a polluter pay principle to this specific case and force the communities
to internalize the full social cost of their project. Still, this does not bring us back to the
simpler, externality-free domain.
To see this, let us consider the possibility to extend the unanimity lower bound require-
ment in the setting with externalities and perfect information as presented in chapter
6. This requirement is especially interesting as it is met by the 3 allocation rules that
we characterized on Domain 1. This requirement was also central in the discussion of
private information. Let us consider the simple 2-community case on a domain presented
in Chapter 6 (Domain 4). The communities’ benefits from the project write bi, i ∈ {1, 2},
and the costs for j of a project located at i writes cij so that the structure of costs may
be represented by the matrix
C =

 c11 c12
c21 c22


In such a setting, the identical-cost lower bound may be expressed from an analog rea-
soning as the one presented in Chapter 4. It proceeds as follows. Consider community1
6This is an instance of how different principles may motivate a same axiom, which illustrates how
individual with radically different values may still find room for consensus without having to concede
on their own values.
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and an situation in which all communities are identical to her. There exists a single such
economy for arbitrary costs.
C =

 c11 c12
c12 c11


In this situation, it seems reasonable to claim that the two individuals should not envy
each other. This determines a single distribution of welfare. It turns out that we cannot
take this welfare as a feasible welfare guarantee. Consider for instance, the following case:
C =

 0 B
0 B


In this case, community 1 bears no nuisance regardless of the location of the project,
and community 2 considers so high a nuisance. Their identical-preference welfare bounds
are B
2
and 0 respectively. However, the reluctance of community 2 makes it inefficient to
implement the project. The maximum total welfare that can be achieved in this setting
is 0, so these bounds are not jointly feasible.
This example points to the facts that externalities considerably harden the justification.
Still, this fact cannot be assumed away. The first reason is that, as Fact 8 emphasizes it,
communities may not exist so that the problem has to be accommodated at the individual
level. At this level, assuming externalities away seems excessively restrictive. This lead us
to conclude that a reasonable and practical policy proposal shall accommodate Fact 7. In
fact, here may be the crux of the opposition against current land developments project.
Still, the observation of individual fairness judgments in the externality-free context is
required to consolidate our results. Only then could we proceed confidently in extending
the scope of this discussion.
3.3 Observed individual judgments
Two studies involving the empirical observations of individual judgments are reported in
this thesis. The first study in presented in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4. It consists in an on-line
vignette study. In the situation presented, two communities face a common opportunity
of implementing a project (a wind park or a waste water treatment plant) that is worth
five million euro. They state different compensation requirements for hosting the project.
The precise vignette and details regarding the design are presented in the Appendix of
Chapter 4. While not representative of the general population, this survey allows us to
draw some conclusions. The second study brings the structure of the NIMBY situation
studied here in the laboratory. Instead of hosting a project, individuals have to perform
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an indivisible task and its benefit is allocated. A detailed presentation of the experiment
is provided in Chapter 5. Both studies rely on the observation of individual judgments in
a situation with a same structure. The main difference is that the on-line survey gathers
the expression of judgments in a contextualized framing whereas the experimental setting
only shares similarities with the actual NIMBY problems in its structure.
Three conclusions may be reported. Before presenting them, a caution is in order. None
of the two studies is representative of the general population. More particularly, the
sample surveyed is younger, more educated and more business-oriented than the general
population. All the three characteristics can be expected to influence fairness judgments
in this setting (see e.g. Keller and Sarin, 1995).
A first observation is that the people seem to be generally supportive for implementing
beneficial projects and locating them where the compensation requirement are lowest, at
least in our setting in which these compensation requirements are stated and transfers are
unconstrained. In the survey, this proportion amounted to an overall 80% in the cases
in which the compensation requirements differ significantly. This goes against the idea
that “a siting should not be decided depending on who demands the least compensation”
(Hermansson, 2007). As soon as communities are allowed to freely state their compensa-
tion requirements and that some form of transfers are allowed, this paternalistic position
seems difficult to maintain and the answers to the survey seem to go along this line. It
should yet be mentioned that Keller and Sarin (1995) reported judgments that go against
the Pareto criterion for the allocation of risk and benefits. In their study, respondents
tended to prefer an even and proportional distribution of risks and benefits (the objective
allocation) to Pareto superior allocations.
A second observation is that a significant proportion of the respondents still refer to an
equal split, especially when compensation requirements are equal. We find this observa-
tion surprising as it goes against No envy, and more fundamentally Individual rationality.
Some argument is favor of this may be found and this is consistent with the observa-
tion of many respondents preferring an equal distribution of risks and benefits in Keller
and Sarin (1995). However we may note that this observation is most salient in the
context-free experimental context. Besides, the experimental results suggest that these
judgments are heuristics. They get less frequent after normative reasoning. They may be
expected to vanish in the course of deliberation but still constitute important focal points
in bargaining.
A last observation concerns the main patterns of the judgments observed in this setting.
The overall payments to the host are found to be sensitive to both the lower and the higher
cost in the pair. In both empirical settings, I observe that the payment to the host deemed
fairest increases which the higher cost, and that it is lowest when both costs are equal.
This suggests patterns in the formation of judgments that differ significantly from what
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the previous discussions proposed. Nevertheless, and beyond the previous observation, we
also noted several apparent contradictions in the observed judgments and, at present, we
lack a general theory that accounts for a significant proportion of the judgments. Further
investigation would be required to overcome these inconsistencies and better characterize
judgments in reflective equilibrium. As an example, it would be interesting to test for
the adhesion to Individual rationality and observe how individual revise their judgment
regarding fair allocation rules when made aware of their breaching this requirement. In
the end, this is in this sort of trade-offs that we are interested.
Conclusion
This chapter is intended to illustrate how the approach proposed in this thesis can lead to
identify fair policy options and motivate them. As it relies in a large part on reasoning, the
approach proposed seems mainly suited to the delegative and the deliberative perspective
on the political community and I first highlight the innovative propositions and suggest the
ways toward future research. Still, the discussion presented in the introduction suggests
that is may also prove relevant to the bargaining perspective.
Consistently with most of the economic literature on the subject, I argued that a solution
to the NIMBY problem would have to take the specific preferences of the communities
in the decision and that compensation schemes may be a useful device for managing the
unfair initial distribution of the benefits of the project. The most innovative outcome of
this research is related to its characterizations in the externality-free problem. An inter-
esting output of this analysis is the identification of arguments in favor of some already
existing proposals in favor of budget-balanced auctions. In particular, the opportunity for
everyone to get, not only some positive level of welfare, but even their own identical-cost
welfare lower bound seems to be a strong argument in favor of these auctions schemes.
Of course, many practical details may further be considered before getting to the recom-
mendation, and we may still be far from proposing a solution to the NIMBY problem in
all contexts. Among the many questions that remain to be addressed to reach practical
recommendations, an important one relates to the treatment of externalities. A second
one deals with the addressee of compensation payments as soon as individual may move
away.
In the end, we shall note that the discussion presented in this chapter is only one scheme
of reasoning. Many other possibilities may actually exist, depending, among other things,
on one’s initial judgment. For this, and as further generic facts get integrated and more
results accumulate, I shall stress the interest of structuring the multiple representations
and results in a systematic and practical way. Such a tool remains yet to be invented.
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Chapter 4
Fair allocation rules for sharing the cost
of a locally undesirable facility
A discussion of solidarity and reward
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Abstract
I consider the problem of allocating an indivisible project and sharing its benefit among
communities with an equal right on it but different provision costs. The differences in
these costs may arise from variations in building, operation and maintenance costs for
the project but also from differences in the communities’ compensation requirements for
hosting the project. In this setting, I characterise three allocation rules that correspond to
three prominent cooperative solution concepts: the welfare egalitarian solution, the nucle-
olus and the Shapley value. The principles invoked involve Pareto efficiency, Anonymity,
No envy, and axioms of solidarity or reward related to the communities’ provision costs.
The results clarify how considerations over the nature of the cost could influence fair
allocations. The analysis is then extended to settings with asymmetric information and
to setting with costs of several kinds. In each extension, I propose and motivate a fair
solution. The results of a survey motivated by this analysis are eventually presented.
Keywords: NIMBY, fairness, allocation, axiomatic analysis.
JEL codes: D63, Q56.
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Introduction
Examples abound of oppositions to undesirable land use. More surprisingly, opposition is
often believed to occur in spite of the presumption that such projects are socially beneficial
in the sense of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion (Richman and Boerner, 2006).1 Such situations
correspond to the acronym NIMBY for “Not In My Backward”. Landfills, incinerators,
power plants, windmills, airports, prisons are among the multiple potential examples of
such facilities.2
None of the existing approaches for siting locally undesirable land use have proved well
suited for a large class of cases. The authoritarian Decide-Announce-Defend approach has
usually triggered significant protest and opposition, leading to costly trials and delays.
Voluntary negotiations with communities have often ended in a gridlock. Among all
accounts for these failures, the perception of the process and its outcomes may play a
significant role both in the decision to oppose a project or to refuse a proposal deemed
unfair.3 This calls for a careful justification of the processes involved in this context as well
as their distributive outcomes. In order to address these latter, the use of compensation
scheme has often be proposed.
In both contexts, the use of compensation schemes remains a much debated issue. Whereas
building, operation and maintenance costs are monetary and directly observable, the non-
monetary costs of environmental degradations such as odours, noise, landscape degrada-
tion or health risks are subjective and cannot be directly observed. Considering this, the
economic literature on this question has mainly focused on implementation issues (see
e.g. Kunreuther et al, 1987; Kleindorfer and Sertel, 1994; Minehart and Neeman, 2002;
Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2011). Most of these analyses have relaxed the dominant
strategy implementability requirements, emphasizing the difficulty to alleviate the prob-
lem through the use of compensation schemes. This was reinforced by other work which
further emphasized that compensation could conflict with existing norms, and, as a re-
sult, crowd out a sense of civic duty, undermine trust, and foster opposition (Frey and
Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Sandel, 2013). In the NIMBY problem, economists are indeed used
to observing outright rejection and infinite costs when trying to infer the willingness to
1This criterion consists in comparing the sum of the benefits with the sum of the costs associated with
the project as compared to no project. When the former is higher, the project is said to meet such a
criterion.
2The socially beneficial dimension of such projects is the NIMBY hypothesis; I will not question it. I
do not address the question of efficient provision which is the source of an important literature in
mechanism design and could be at the origin of the social disapproval (sometimes referred to as the
“Not On Planet Earth” (NOPE) problem).
3The experimental literature documents how normative judgments could lead to wasteful behaviours.
See e.g., experimental evidence of strong reciprocity in one-shot ultimatum games (Camerer, 2003),
the observation of the refusal of propositions followed by Pareto inferior propositions in bargaining
environments (Roth, 1995) or the discussion of how self-serving fairness judgments could lead to
bargaining impasse (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).
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accept of individuals for environmental degradation or health hazards. Some philosophers
have also opposed the use of monetary welfare measures and compensations schemes in
some conditions.4 While it is not clear that all these criticisms fully undermine the use of
compensation schemes, they highlight the need for a careful justification of transfers on
the basis of existing norms. They also emphasizes that we shall not discard the possibility
for individuals to refuse to trade-off some dimensions of their welfare against monetary
compensations. In this way, answers to these major arguments will be kept explicit.
In this article, we propose a framework that seeks to address this problem. We consider
a group of agents (persons, communities) facing an economic opportunity on which they
have an equal right a priori. This opportunity has a known economic value. For instance,
the production of a jointly undertaken facility or the expected savings associated with a
common landfill. This opportunity requires to be undertaken by one of the communities,
who will bear its provision cost. It includes the disutility for the local nuisance (local
pollution, noise, increased traffic) which will be borne by the host community. Provision
costs may vary across communities. Communities may express different willingness to
accept the nuisance. In the context of the location of a landfill some communities may
even strongly reject their hosting the project. In all these situations, what would be a
fair allocation of the object and the benefit associated with it? On the one hand, the
equal communities’ entitlements on this opportunity plead for an equal sharing of its
benefit. However, the diversity of provision costs and considerations over the degree the
agents could be deemed responsible for them may also play a role in the answer. We first
perform an axiomatic analysis of the problem. An illustrative survey is then motivated
and presented.
Related literature
This article relies on the theory of fair allocations. This approach formalizes the intu-
itions about fairness that may exist in society. It consists in studying the logical links
between equity principles (hereafter axioms) and allocation rules (or solutions) in a formal
framework (hereafter a domain). The emphasis is on the normative side of the analysis,
the trade-offs between principles and the characterisation of the rules of judgments to
which they logically conduce.5 The approach presented here relates to different part of
the literature about fair allocations.
First, our approach brings the focus to a set of solutions that have been proposed in the
context of the NIMBY problem. Existing approaches related to the NIMBY problem
4For interesting philosophical expositions of claims against a perfect substitutability of some dimensions
of welfare with money, see Walzer (1983) or, Anderson (1995, section 9.3). Sandel (2013) also contains
a recent argument that specifically addresses the NIMBY problem.
5See Thomson (2001) for a general presentation of this approach and the axiomatic program.
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consider a group of communities which benefits from a project. One of them has to
host it and to bear its cost. In this setting, an allocation consists in choosing a host
and performing monetary transfers. Two recent works have proposed the view that all
communities should benefit from a decrease of some of the communities’ provision costs.
This view is consistent with the idea that provision costs are circumstantial, and therefore,
that the communities should be held jointly liable for any change in the distribution of
provision costs. It leads them to recommend to compensate the host on the basis of its
own provision cost (Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux, 2010; Sakai, 2012).6 However, as soon
as provision cost result from choices, beliefs or preferences of the communities, one could
point at the little recognition of the specific role of the host of the previous approach.
By framing the problem in a cooperative framework, Dehez (2013) deviates from these
recommendations. He finds that two well known cooperative concepts, the nucleolus and
the Shapley value, both recommend to take into account the whole distribution of costs
instead of the minimal cost only.7 Both solution concepts recommend a higher allocation
to the host than the previous analyses do. Our analysis will be framed in the same context.
It seeks to carry these analyses further by clarifying how each of these allocation rules
can result from different considerations over solidarity and reward.
Second, the domain of the analysis is similar to the literature on the fair allocation of a
joint production with a convex technology. 8 In this model, a product results from the
aggregate input (e.g. work, effort, or investment) of several agents. The total production
results from this aggregate input. As soon as the marginal returns are decreasing with the
aggregate input, several possibilities arise as for the allocation of the final output. Our
setting differs from it as a single input from an agent is required to get a fixed production.
It can be seen as a limit case in which the production function is extremely concave. In
spite of this difference, the main intuitions behind the analysis performed in this literature
are relevant to our setting. As a result, many axioms of this literature will be introduced
in our analysis. The main axioms introduced in this literature are No envy, Resource and
Population monotonicity, and some welfare bounds. In our analysis, two notable welfare
bounds are introduced and discussed. They are the Identical-preference lower bound,
which, in our analysis is required by No envy, and the Stand-alone upper bound which is
required by Population monotonicity. Some results will also appear. This is the case of
the conflict between No-Envy and the idea of Population monotonicity (Kim, 2004).
Third, our approach relates to the literature about the fair allocation of the cost of a
joint project. As argued in Dehez (2013), our setting is closest to the so-called airport
6Note that is both of these works, the communities derive a private and heterogeneous benefit from the
project what allows them to focus the reasoning on the benefit side. Here the focus is on the cost
side. Therefore, a simpler representation of the benefits will be chosen.
7We also depart from Dehez (2013) in that we explicitly introduce the benefit in the analysis. This is
why our solution concepts will get a different expression than in his work.
8See e.g. Moulin and Roemer (1989) and Moulin (1990, 1992).
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problem.9 This problem considers the allocation of the cost of an infrastructure (e.g. an
airport) when it is driven by the maximum capacity required by the agents (e.g. the
airline companies). It proposes different allocation rules on the basis the contribution
of each individual to the final provision cost. An important difference with the problem
presented here lies in that the eventual cost of the project is the minimum instead of the
maximum of all the participants’ provision costs. In the airport problem, Individual cost
monotonicity requires that the amount one pays does not decrease with one’s cost. It is
met by most solutions. In this analysis, a similar axiom, Individual cost reward, requires
that the amount paid (resp. received) does not increase (resp. decrease) with one’s cost.
The main difference with this problem is that we consider costs may be internal. They are
directly borne by the provider and do not reduce the extent of the external benefit. In the
airport problem, costs are external. They are already part of the benefit to share and the
identity of the provider is no longer relevant. Therefore, their analysis is tantamount to
the problem of allocating the benefit of the project after having compensated the host for
her own provision cost. Our requirement, on the contrary, focuses on the direct transfers
including the compensation of the host. As a result, transfers always sum up to the same
value and the axioms have different interpretations and consequences. In our analysis,
the characterisation of the Shapley value relies on an idea of reward that is absent from
this literature. This yields a different characterisation of the Shapley value which, in this
literature, is based on axioms of independence from higher costs, additivity or incremental
no-subsidy.
Fourth, our approach relates to the problem of fair allocations in economies with a single
indivisible good (or bad) along with monetary transfers.10 This problem deals with the
allocation of an object to agents with different preferences. As part of their preferences,
the cost is fully acknowledged to be internal to the agents. Several axioms in this analysis
are also considered here. First, the axiom of No envy requires that agents should not prefer
the allocation of others to their own. A weaker version of it, the Identical-preference lower
bound, restricts this requirement to the hypothetical economy in which all agents have the
same preferences. In our analysis, this requirement proves especially interesting as soon as
we introduce asymmetric information. We also consider a weaker version: No envy among
equals. Another axiom, Welfare-domination under preference replacement, was proposed
in this context by Thomson (1997). It requires any change in one’s preference to make
all agents better off. It is a weaker version of the axiom of Full solidarity and a stronger
requirement of Solidarity toward higher-cost communities introduced in this article. The
literature established that, within the set of envy-free allocations, this principle leads to
characterise the allocation which is least favourable to the provider. This result will also
9The literature on this problem is reviewed in Thomson (2007).
10The literature on this problem is reviewed in Thomson (2011) and Fragnelli and Gagliardo (2012) a
recent relevant contribution to our problem.
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appear in this analysis. The main difference with our approach lies in the fact that our
axioms of reward are focused on the treatment (the transfers), and not the results (the
utilities). To our knowledge, no analog for the axiom of Individual cost reward has been
proposed in this setting. As a result, the nucleolus and the Shapley value, two allocation
rules that will be shown to rest upon such an idea of reward are absent from the analysis
of this problem.
Finally, our approach relates to the theories of equality of opportunity and the problem
of fair compensation.11 In this problem, a divisible good (money) can be allocated to
agents with differing characteristics. Some of them are deemed to elicit compensation
while others not. While the axioms of compensation are similar to the axioms considered
here, the axioms of responsibility differ significantly. In their analysis, responsibility
mostly relies on an idea of natural reward: the inequalities that naturally arise from
the responsibility characteristics of the agents should not be subject to redistribution.
In our setting, we are confronted to the particular difficulty that the realization of the
agents characteristics do not arise naturally but from the allocation of the resource.12
In this condition, we propose a different view on responsibility, more akin to an idea of
reward. Similarly to the analysis performed in this literature, we explore the possibility
of jointly compensating the agents for differences in circumstances and rewarding them
for characteristics that are deemed worth rewarding in Section 4.5.2.
Notions of autonomy and reward is often a significant component of the justification
of compensation schemes in the NIMBY context.13 While little emphasis is found in ax-
iomatic literature on the notions of reward and desert, the willingness to punish or reward
other’s according to their contribution to the group is a robust and widespread observa-
tion in the social sciences. In this line, the literature on distributive justice has discussed
the notion of desert and emphasized its incomplete character (Lamont, 1994). This no-
tion and related notions such as accountability and responsibility still proved necessary to
account for stated fairness judgments in the experimental social choice literature (Konow,
2003; Gaertner and Schokkaert, 2012). To some extent economic experiments also have
brought evidence in this line. In an experimental best-shot public good game, close to
the problem we consider, Kroll et al (2007) observe that subjects are more reluctant to
require the person that features the lowest cost to incur the provision cost as soon as
these latter result from past effort. However, they do not allow for transfers so they do
not reveal the extent of a fair compensation. In the end, we apparently tend to judge that
11This literature is introduced and reviewed in Fleurbaey (2008) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011).
12The distribution of the project through a lottery has been proposed in this setting. It would lead to
this problem. However, this allocation scheme does not satisfy the Pareto principle.
13As an anecdotal illustration, the following justification, reported by Inhaber (1998), was provided by
the federal siting task force on Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management in Canada in support for
its policy: “Such accusations [...] have been answered by indicating that a bribe is something offered
as an illicit payment and that it induces a betrayal of trust. The ’reward’ proposed in this process is
well deserved” (our emphases).
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those whose provision costs are lower would deserve a better treatment in this context.
We formalize this as a principle of reward and discuss its implications.
In relation to the survey conducted, this work can be related to the empirical social choice
literature. Our approach is closest to Schokkaert et al (2007). The authors consider a
problem with the same structure. They briefly discuss allocation rules in this setting and
seek to test the empirical relevance of competing axioms through a survey. A difference
with this work is that the axioms of reward allow us to go further in the axiomatic analysis
and propose characterisations. The eventual survey is also framed differently. We do not
observe as strong a support for considerations of responsibility and reward as in their
work.
This article is structured as follows. The first section introduces the framework. The
second section presents the three allocations rules formerly evoked. The third section
presents and motivates a set of axioms. The fourth section presents the characterisation
results. These results are extended to a setting with asymmetric information and with
composite costs in the fifth section. Finally, the last section presents the results of a
survey motivated by the analysis.
4.1 The domain
Let us consider a group of communities. They can cooperate and build a unique facility
(e.g. a landfill or a wind farm). The project yields a common monetary benefit. It is
rival and excludable. Yet, communities all have an a priori equal right on it. We are
interested in the allocation of this benefit when the provision cost for the project depends
on the location chosen. We assume that communities are indifferent between locations
as long as they do not host the project. Additionally, we assume quasilinear preference
over a numéraire and their hosting status, and allow for non-susbstitutability between
the numéraire and the hosting status. In this context, we characterise the preference
of each community i with a single provision cost ci, potentially infinite. This cost en-
compasses both the construction cost at each community and their specific compensation
requirements.
Formally, an economy E is defined as a pair (B, c) ∈ R+×R¯n+ where R¯+ = R+∪{+∞}, B
denotes the total monetary benefit derived from the project and c = (ci)i∈N is the vector
of individual provision costs. H = argmin
N
{ci} is the set of optimal location in E. The
set of all such economies is denoted by E . We may distinguish the subset of economies
in which the project is beneficial, that is B ≥ min
N
(ci). This subset of economies will be
denoted by E∗.
For any coalition S ⊆ N , we can define the cost associated with S, c(S) = min
S
(ci), and
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the value of the coalition S, v(S) = max{0, B − c(S)}. This defines a cooperative game
with transferable utility.14
Example 4.1. Three similar communities, i ∈ {a, b, c}, can jointly undertake a public
project. This project is estimated to yield a net monetary benefit of 3, wherever it is
located. However, this project is associated to some nuisance to the community that
hosts it that cannot be avoided. These effects are respectively evaluated to be worth 1, 2
and 3 for communities a, b and c.15 This defines the problem E0 = (3, (1, 2, 3)) in E∗. In
this problem, H = {a}, B = 3 and c(N) = 1. This economy will be evoked for illustration
in the rest of the paper. It is represented on figure 4.1.
a b c 
1 
2 
3 
Figure 4.1: A representation of the situation E0.
4.2 Allocation rules
4.2.1 Definition
In a given economy E, an allocation φ is a pair of a vector of hosting status h = (hi)i∈N ,
where hi takes value 1 for at most one community and 0 for non-hosting communities,
and a transfer scheme t = (ti)i∈N . The host community is denoted by h, and h = 0 if the
project is not implemented.
Definition 4.1. In a given economy E ∈ E , a feasible allocation φ is a pair (h, t) ∈
{0, 1}n × Rn such that
∑
N ti ≤ B1{h>0}.
14Note that the marginal contribution of an individual gets lower as a coalition grows: the cooperative
game considered is concave.
15These “evaluations” for the communities’ willingness to accept the nuisance could be thought as being
inferred from valuation methods (hedonic pricing, benefit transfers, etc.) or as statements over their
compensation requirements. In the latter case, they may not be thought as the true compensation
requirement.
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For a given allocation φ, φi = (hi, ti) denotes the individual allocation of community i. An
allocation φ fully determines the distribution of welfare levels u(φ), where the welfare ui of
the community i under the allocation φ is defined as follows: ui(φi) ≡ ui(hi, ti) = ti−cihi.
16
Definition 4.2. An allocation rule Φ is a correspondence that associates with an econ-
omy E ∈ E , a non-empty set Φ(E) of feasible allocations.
We will restrict our attention to allocations that satisfy the two standard and appealing
requirements of Pareto efficiency and Anonymity. Pareto efficiency guarantees that no
solution that would make all communities better off exists. In this setting, an allocation
rule Φ is Pareto efficient if and only if it always implements efficient projects, always
recommends to locate the project where the cost is minimal and transfers to be budget-
balanced.
Pareto Efficiency. An allocation rule Φ is Pareto efficient on E if and only if for any
E ∈ E and φ ∈ Φ(E), the three following conditions are met
• Productive efficiency: φ recommends to implement the project if and only if it
is (strictly) beneficial
• Allocative efficiency: φ recommends to locate the project in the set of optimal
locations H
• Budget balance:
∑
i∈N ti = B.
A second appealing requirement is Anonymity. Anonymity guarantees that all differences
in treatments are justified. It is a fundamental requirement in normative reasoning and
presupposes that all normatively relevant information is included in the description of the
problem.
Anonymity. An allocation rule Φ is anonymous on E if and only if for any E ∈ E,
φ ∈ Φ(E) and permutation σ of N , σ(φ) ∈ Φ(Eσ), where Eσ = (B, σ(c)) and σ(φ) =
(σ(h), σ(t)).
4.2.2 Three allocation rules
Three allocations have been proposed in this class of environments. The first allocation
rule corresponds to the rule that is characterised in Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2010)
and Sakai (2012). The two following rules, the nucleolus and the Shapley value, are
derived from the cooperative game perspective adopted in Dehez (2013).
16Note that this notion of individual welfare is not intended to capture the actual behaviours of the
communities. It is the representation of the welfare that is adopted from an evaluative perspective,
and may not be what truly motivates the communities. For instance, multiples arguments have
been provided for not including political preferences, altruism or moral satisfaction in the welfare
assessments (see e.g. Dworkin (1981), or Diamond (2006)).
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4.2.2.1 The welfare egalitarian allocation rule
Welfare egalitarian allocation rule Φe. For any E ∈ E\E∗,Φe(E) = {(0,0)}, and for
any E ∈ E∗, Φe(E) =
{(eh, t)|h ∈ H, ∀i ∈ N, ti =
B − c(N)
n
+ hic(N)}
It recommends to fully compensate the host to the extent of the cost undergone c(N)
and share the remaining benefit B − c(N) equally between all the communities. In the
example 4.1, it recommends to locate the project in community a and implement the
transfers (5
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
). This yields an equal distribution of individual welfare levels (2
3
, 2
3
, 2
3
).
4.2.2.2 The nucleolus
Consider a coalition S. The deficit of this coalition is the difference between the total
welfare obtained from the allocation and the welfare it could get by herself. The nucleolus
seeks to make these deficits as equal as possible by maximizing the minimal deficit over
all possible coalitions (Schmeidler, 1969). A derivation of the nucleolus on E is carried
out in Appendix 4.B.
Nucleolus Φn. For any E ∈ E\E∗,Φn(E) = {(0,0)}, and for any E ∈ E∗, Φn(E) is the
set of all pairs (eh, t) such that h ∈ H and, for all i ∈ N ,
ti =
max{B − c(N\h), 0}
n
+ himin{B, c(N\h)}
The nucleolus does not only recommend to compensate the host to the extent of the
cost undergone c(N) but also recommends to grant an additional reward to the host
to the extent of c(N\h) − c(N) provided it does not exceed the benefit of the project.
In case all the communities’ provision costs but one exceed the benefit of the project,
it recommends to transfer the whole benefit of the project to the community with the
lowest cost. In the case where the lowest provision cost is featured by two communities
or more, it coincides with the welfare egalitarian allocation rule. In the example 4.1, it
recommends to locate the project in community a and implement the transfers (7
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
This yields the distribution of individual welfare levels (4
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
4.2.2.3 The Shapley value
Consider an arbitrary ordering of the communities and, for a given community i, the
coalition S formed by all communities preceding it. The marginal contribution of i to
S is defined by v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S). The Shapley value grants to any community its
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average marginal contribution over all possible orderings (Shapley, 1953). It has been
characterised in multiple ways.17 A derivation of the Shapley value on E is carried out in
Appendix 4.C.
Shapley value Φs. For any E ∈ E\E∗,Φs(E) = {(0,0)}, and for any E ∈ E∗, Φs(E)
is the set of all pairs (eh, ts) such that h ∈ H and transfers ts(E) can be represented as
follows. Let σ be a permutation of N such that cσ−1(1) ≤ ... ≤ cσ−1(n) and σ
−1(1) = h. The
resulting index will be written in brackets: (i) denotes the initial index of the community
with rank i in the ranking induced by σ. Let q be the highest rank such that c(q) ≤ B. For
all i ∈ N , the distribution of welfare levels writes:
us(i) =


0 if i > q
B−c(q)
q
if i = q
B−c(q)
q
+
∑q−1
k=i
c(k+1)−c(k)
k
if i < q
and the associated transfers:
ts(i) =


0 if i > q
B−c(q)
q
if i = q
B−c(q)
q
+
∑q−1
k=i
c(k+1)−c(k)
k
+ h(i)c(i) if i < q
Allocations described by the above formula are constructed as follows: first order the
communities from the lowest to the highest provision cost. Choose the first community to
be the host h and compensate her for the cost ch undergone. Then, share the remaining
benefit B − ch as follows. For all communities whose costs are higher than B, give
nothing. For the community (q) with the highest cost that would allow the project to
be implemented, share the resulting benefit B − c(q) among the q communities with a
cost lower than c(q). Then, share the difference c(q)− c(q−1) among the q− 1 communities
with a lower cost than c(q−1), and so on. In the example 4.1, it recommends to locate the
project in community a and implement the transfers (5
2
, 1
2
, 0). This yields the distribution
of individual welfare levels (3
2
, 1
2
, 0).
4.2.2.4 Comparison of the three solutions
These three allocation rules propose different views about how to share the benefit of
the project. Note that for any E ∈ E and h ∈ H, we have for any (φe,φn,φs) ∈
Φe(E) × Φn(E) × Φs(E), uh(φe) ≤ uh(φn) ≤ uh(φs). As noticed in Dehez (2013), the
Shapley value could potentially allow for some non-hosts to get more than an equal share
17see e.g. Moulin (2003) for a review of these results .
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of the benefit, which means that these agents would be paid instead of contributing to the
cost of the project. In particular, this means that, contrary to the two other allocation
rules, the Shapley value does not pertain to the core of the cooperative game induced by
this situation. Intuitively, the nucleolus and the Shapley value both seem to grant more
recognition to the communities featuring lower costs. This is precisely this point that the
following analysis seeks to clarify.
4.3 Axioms
In this section, we introduce and motivate the axioms that aim at capturing the conflicting
notions of solidarity and reward and will constitute the basis of our analysis. We start
by presenting the No envy requirement. Then, we present the axioms capturing ideas of
reward and solidarity in this setting. Finally, welfare bounds are presented.
4.3.1 No envy
No envy is a cornerstone principle in the theory of fair allocations. Originally introduced
by Foley (1967), its implications have been studied in a broad range of environments,
and especially in the context of the allocation of indivisible goods. It requires that all
communities should prefer their allocation to the allocation of others. This corresponds
formally to the following property.
No envy (NE). For any it E ∈ E, any φ ∈ Φ(E), and (i, j) ∈ N2,
ui(φi) ≥ ui(φj)
.
The consequences of this requirement are presented in section 4.4.1. In particular, this
precludes any possibility of performing different transfers among the non-hosts. To the
extent that this can be considered as too strong a limitation, it will be useful to consider
a weaker version of the No envy criterion which applies in settings in which communities
features the same provision cost.18 This leads us to the following weaker version of the
No envy criterion.
18It is interesting to note that the need to adapt the No envy requirement to accomodate considerations of
responsibility and reward is not exclusive to this environment. For instance, Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2011) also propose to adapt this axiom as its application in their setting leads to recommend an equal
distribution of the external resource and precludes the satisfaction of their reward requirements.
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No envy among equals (NEE). For any E ∈ E, any φ ∈ Φ(E), and (i, j) ∈ N2,
ci = cj ⇒ ui(φi) ≥ ui(φj)
.
4.3.2 Cost Solidarity or Cost Reward?
This part presents and motivates two sets of axioms which capture, to different degree, how
one would like to reward communities for their lower provision costs. What is common to
these axioms is that they impose requirements for changes in the cost profile. We start by
presenting the reward axioms, which require that communities do not get a lower transfer
as their cost decrease. Next, we introduce the solidarity axioms, which require particular
changes in the cost profile to affect some communities in the same ways.
4.3.2.1 Reward axioms
Consider the view that each community should be held accountable of its own provision
cost. We propose to express the resulting requirement by the following idea of reward:
for any decrease in the provision cost of a single community, the transfer received by this
community should not decrease. As change in costs may also lead to revise the location
choice, we limit this requirement to changes that do not lead to such a revision. The
following axiom formalizes this idea:
Individual Cost Reward (ICR). For any E = (B, c) and E ′ = (B, c′) in E, if ∃j ∈ N ,
cj > c
′
j and, ∀i ∈ N\j, ci = c
′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈ Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) such that h = h′, we have
tj ≤ t
′
j.
The former requirement focuses on individual changes. It leaves the possibility that a com-
munity gets a lower transfer while her provision cost decreases if some other communities
also have decreasing costs. Besides, overlaps between different notions of a community
may exist. Therefore, an extension of this requirement to groups can be worth consid-
ering. Such an extension requires that for any strict decrease in the individual provision
cost of some communities, and provided this change does not lead to revise the optimal
site, the aggregate transfer to this group of communities should not decrease. Note that
this latter axiom implies the former.
Collective cost reward (CCR). For any E = (B, c) and E ′ = (B, c′) in E, if ∃S ⊂ N,
∀i ∈ S, ci > c
′
i and ∀i ∈ N\S, ci = c
′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈ Φ(E) × Φ(E ′) such that h = h′,
we have ∑
S
ti ≤
∑
S
t′i
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.
4.3.2.2 Solidarity axioms
As soon as the provision costs are deemed akin to circumstances, there is no ground to
justify a difference in welfare on this basis. The first solidarity principle requires that any
decrease in the cost profile should result in a benefit for all. It is equivalent to the axiom
of Extended Cost Monotonicity introduced in Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2010).19
Full solidarity (FS). For any E = (B, c) and E ′ = (B, c′) in E, if ∀i ∈ N , ci ≥ c′i,
then, ∀(φ,φ′) ∈ Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) and i ∈ N ,
ui(φi) ≤ u′i(φ
′
i)
where u′i(hi, ti) = ti − hic
′
i.
The following results will show that it is a strong requirement as it directly requires the
transfers to depend solely on the minimal provision cost. Therefore, this axiom leaves
no room for the recognition of the specific contribution of communities with lower costs.
As argued earlier, we may be willing to reward communities for their low provision costs,
which leads us to require that a community should never get a lower transfer as its costs
get lower. As we know that this requirement is not compatible from the idea that all
communities should benefit from a decrease in the provision costs of some, one possibility
is to restrict the solidarity requirement to the communities with initially greater provision
costs. This is because the reward - and therefore the welfare - of the communities with
lower provision costs may be justified to get lower when the discrepancy between their
provision costs and the others gets reduced. The following requirement captures this
idea. It conveys an idea of solidarity while allowing for the recognition of the positive role
played by some particular communities.
Solidarity toward higher-cost communities (SHC). For any E = (B, c) and E ′ =
(B, c′) in E, if ∃S ⊂ N, ∀i ∈ S, ci > c′i and ∀i ∈ N\S, ci = c
′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈
Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) and i ∈ N such that ci ≥ max
j∈N
cj,
ui(φi) ≤ u′i(φ
′
i)
where u′i(hi, ti) = ti − hic
′
i.
Note that the solidarity axioms rely on a comparison of different utility functions. This
makes sense as we compare money-metric utilities.
19This axiom is also similar the weaker Monotonicity axiom introduced in Sakai (2012). The main
difference is that this latter axiom only requires the welfare levels to be non-decreasing for an individual
change in the cost that strictly decrease the minimal cost. The following results would obtain with
such an axiom for continuous allocations.
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4.3.3 Welfare bounds
The individual rationality requirement guarantees that no community looses from the
project. It is a standard and appealing axiom.
Individual rationality (IR). For any it E ∈ E, any φ ∈ Φ(E), and i ∈ N ,
ui(φi) ≥ 0
Notably, two additional welfare bounds have been proposed in the related literature.
These axioms are generally weaker than the axioms we consider and do not lead to char-
acterisations. Yet, they can be intuitively appealing.
The first is a lower bound on welfare. It requires that any community should not be worse
off than when it gets an envy-free allocation in the hypothetical economy in which all other
communities have the same preferences (here, provision costs). This requirement was first
introduced by Moulin (1990) and proposed as a weakening of No envy in the context of
the allocation of an indivisible good (Thomson, 2011). Its main justification relies on a
two-stage argument that makes clear how this requirement extends the axiom of No envy
among equals with a notion of solidarity. For a given community i with provision cost
ci, consider the economy in which all communities feature the same provision cost. No
envy among equals requires to equalize all welfare levels to max(0; B−ci
n
) in this setting.
Now, consider the change from this distribution of the costs to any arbitrary distribution,
holding ci constant. This resulting environment is unambiguously better. A solidarity
principle requires that no community is made worse off from the heterogeneity in the cost
profile. This leads to the requirement the Identical-cost Lower bound (Moulin, 1990).
Identical-cost Lower Bound (ICLB). For any E ∈ E, any φ ∈ Φ(E), and i ∈ N ,
ui(φi) ≥ max
(
0;
B − ci
n
)
This axiom requires productive efficiency. It further requires that the provision cost of
the host is lower than the average provision cost. On the domain we consider, this axiom
is weaker than No envy and stronger than No envy among equals. It conveys and idea of
solidarity which is weaker than the idea conveyed by the two solidarity axioms formerly
introduced. The three allocation rules we characterise in the following satisfy this axiom.
In the following, it will become clear that the three allocations formerly introduced rely
on these stronger notions of solidarity than the one conveyed by this axiom.
The second is an upper bound on welfare. It requires that no community gets more than
what it would have got on its own. This requirement was introduced in the context of this
problem to capture the idea of responsibility (Schokkaert et al, 2007). In this situation,
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the existence of a single project can be seen as a scarcity that is akin to circumstances. If
transfers to the non-hosts are intended to compensate the communities from this specific
feature of the situation, there is no ground to give more to a community than what it
would get on its own. This gives rise to the Stand-alone upper bound (Moulin, 1992).
Stand-Alone Upper Bound (SAUB). For any E ∈ E, any φ ∈ Φ(E), and i ∈ N ,
ui(φi) ≤ max (0;B − ci)
This axiom is logically independent from the reward axioms formerly introduced. It is
stronger than the No dummy axiom, which requires that a community who would not
benefit from the project on its own does not get any benefit. Interestingly, the Shapley
value is the only rule to satisfy this requirement among the three we consider (Schokkaert
et al, 2007).
4.4 Results
This section starts with the presentation of the implications of No envy. We then sequen-
tially present characterisation results for the three allocation rules presented in Section
4.2. The three characterisations rely on the standard axioms to which differing axioms
for solidarity or reward are required. Results are eventually summarized in Subsection
4.4.5.
4.4.1 Implications of No envy
The following lemma characterises the set of individually rational and envy-free allocation
rules on E .
Lemma 4.1. The allocation rule Φ is individually rational and envy-free on E if and only
if, ∀E ∈ E, ∀φ ∈ Φ(E), ∃p ∈ [c(N);min {B, c(N\h)}],
φ ∈ {(eh, t)|h ∈ H and ∀i ∈ N, ti =
B − p
n
+ hip}
As this Lemma shows, No envy considerably reduces the degrees of freedom of the problem.
It requires allocative efficiency and reduces the problem to the determination of a single
parameter, a premium to the host p(E), in every economy. It further requires this premium
to belong to the interval [c(N);min{B, c(N\h)}]. The proof of Lemma 4.1 is provided in
Appendix 4.D. The intuition behind this result is the following. First, No envy requires
that all non-hosts get the same transfer, then an allocation is fully characterised by the
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premium granted to the host. Preventing envy from the host to the non-hosts requires
this premium not be higher than c(N). Furthermore, no-envy from the non-hosts to the
host sets a higher bound on this premium: by being host instead, a non-host would incur
its own cost but get this premium. Therefore it should not be higher than any of the non-
hosts’ own costs, which is most constraining for the second lowest cost c(N\h). In case
when the second lower cost is so high that it would prevent the project to be implemented,
Individual Rationality further requires that the non-hosts do not have to give more than
the whole benefit of the project to the host.
Interestingly, the allocation rules Φe and Φn both satisfy No envy and Individual Ratio-
nality on E . They actually correspond to the two extreme compensation values p = c(N)
and p = min{B, c(N\h)}. Hence, the welfare egalitarian allocation rule (resp. the nucle-
olus) is the rule that minimizes (resp. maximize) the welfare of the host among all the
envy-free and individually rational allocation rules. The next two propositions provide
characterisations of these allocations.
4.4.2 Characterisation of the welfare egalitarian allocation rule
The first Proposition provides a characterisation of the welfare egalitarian allocation rule.
Proposition 4.1. The welfare egalitarian allocation rule Φe is the only anonymous and
efficient allocation rule which satisfies No envy among equals and Full solidarity on E.
A formal proof of this characterisation is provided in Appendix 4.E. An illustration on
the economy E0 conveys the main intuition. From the economy E0, consider the economy
E ′0 in which all costs are equalized to 1. In this latter economy, Anonymity and No
envy among equals together require to choose any location, and equalize the welfare
levels across communities. Full Solidarity requires the welfare levels achieved to change
uniformly from E ′0 to E0. Because the total welfare to allocate remains unchanged from E
′
0
to E0, it requires the distribution of welfares to be the same in both economies. Therefore
the allocation in E0 has to be the welfare egalitarian allocation.
This characterisation is already a well known result. It is much in line with the char-
acterisations performed in Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2010) and Sakai (2012) and
emphasizes the crucial role of their monotonicity requirement for the compensation value
to be the actual provision cost. Note that Thomson (1997) also suggests an alternative
characterisation of this allocation based on No envy and Welfare dominance under pref-
erence replacement, where this latter axiom requires the welfare levels to change in the
same way only among the communities whose preferences are not changed. This lat-
ter characterisation presents the interest of dispensing with interpersonal comparisons of
utilities.
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a b c 
1 
2 
3 
Figure 4.2: Comparisons performed to characterise the welfare egalitarian allocation rule.
As this result suggests it, Full Solidarity precludes the reward and the Stand-alone upper
bound requirements introduced previously. In order to leave the possibility of rewarding
lower cost communities, we have to weaken this specific requirement.
4.4.3 Characterisation of the nucleolus
Adopting a different perspective on the nature of the costs, the following proposition
provides a characterisation of the nucleolus:
Proposition 4.2. The nucleolus Φn is the only anonymous and efficient allocation rule
which satisfies No envy, Individual rationality and Individual cost reward on E.
A complete proof of this characterisation is provided in Appendix 4.F. The intuition of
the result is illustrated on the economy E0 from Example 4.1. From the economy E0,
consider the economy in which the provision cost of community a is increased to 2. No-
envy requires that the host be simply compensated to the extent of her own cost in such
economy, that is to locate the project in the community a or b and give a premium of 2 to
the host. In the allocation where the community a hosts the project, transfers are (7
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
).
Now consider the change to E0. Individual Cost Reward requires that community a does
not get a lower transfer than in the previous allocation. No-envy additionally requires the
transfer to this community not to exceed that amount. It follows that the transfers have
to be exactly (7
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
) in E0.
Note that the nucleolus does not satisfy the Stand-alone upper bound condition. Actually,
Lemma 4.D shows that any envy-free allocation rule would fail to meet this requirement.
In order to propose an allocation rule that satisfies this requirement, we must therefore
weaken No envy.
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a b c 
1 
2 
3 
Figure 4.3: Comparisons performed to characterise the nucleolus.
4.4.4 Characterisation of the Shapley value
No envy constrains the solution in two distinct ways. First, it requires equalizing con-
tributions among non-hosts. Second, it puts a higher bound on the extent to which the
host could be rewarded. In this context, Solidarity toward higher-cost communities may
constitute another argument for placing a higher bound on the reward. Replacing No
envy by this axiom leaves room to strengthen Individual cost reward to Collective cost
reward. This fully characterises the Shapley value.
Proposition 4.3. The Shapley value Φs is the only anonymous and efficient allocation
rule which satisfies No envy among equals, Solidarity toward higher-cost communities,
and Collective cost reward on E.
A complete proof of this characterisation is provided in Appendix 4.G. We give here the
intuition of the proof on the example E0. First, consider the economy where all provision
costs are set to 3. In this economy, Anonymity and No envy among equals together require
considering all three allocations that consist in locating the project in any of the three
communities and grant a premium of 3 to the host. Now consider a decrease in cost from
3 to 2 for the communities a and b. Efficiency, No envy among equals and Anonymity
together require to consider the two allocations that consist in locating the project in a or
b. Collective cost reward additionally requires that for any of these allocations the total
transfer received by the two communities a and b is not lower than the transfer received
in the previous economy, that is 1. Besides, Solidarity toward higher-cost communities
requires that the community c is not made worse off from such a change. Therefore, c
has to get exactly 0 in this economy. Anonymity and No envy among equals then require
to equalize the welfares of a and b, that is to give 1
2
for the non-host and 5
2
for the host.
Finally consider a further decrease of the provision cost of a from 2 to 1. Efficiency requires
locating the project in community a, and Collective cost reward requires giving at least
5
2
to this community. Solidarity toward higher-cost communities requires not giving less
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than respectively 1
2
and 0 to the communities b and c. From budget balance, the three
communities should get exactly these amounts. This corresponds to the Shapley value.
a b c 
1 
2 
3 
Figure 4.4: Comparisons performed to characterise the Shapley value.
One interesting conclusion that comes out of this result is that the Shapley value actually
encompasses an idea of solidarity. An example of an anonymous and efficient allocation
rule that jointly satisfies No envy among equals and Collective cost reward is the rule
that always share the total surplus equally among the communities in H.
4.4.5 Summary
In this section, we argued that considerations of reward could consistently be evoked and
lead to different recommendations in the class of environment considered. All results are
summarized in Table 4.1 and Figure 4.5.
Egalitarian Nucleolus Shapley value
Φe Φn Φs
Anonymity Yes⋆ Yes Yes•
Pareto efficiency Yes⋆ Yes Yes•
Individual rationality (IR) Yes Yes Yes
No envy among equals (NEE) Yes⋆ Yes Yes•
Collective cost reward (CCR) No No Yes•
Individual cost reward (ICR) No Yes Yes
Full solidarity (FS) Yes⋆ No No
No envy (NE) Yes Yes No
Solidarity toward higher-cost communities (SHC) Yes Yes Yes•
Identical-cost lower bound (ICLB) Yes Yes Yes
Stand-alone upper bound (SAUB) No No Yes
Table 4.1: Properties of the three allocation rules characterised on E .
Superscripts indicate the characterisations presented in this section.
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Compensation Reward
FS
⇒ NE ICR
⇓
⇑ICLB
⇑
⇒ SHC CCR
Figure 4.5: Logical relations among axioms for anonymous, individually rational and ef-
ficient allocation rules satisfying No envy among equals on E .
Frames indicate the characterisations presented in this section.
4.5 Extensions
On top of the monetary building, maintaining and operating costs, a significant part of
the total cost of a facility may result from the communities’ disutility from the local
nuisance that arise from hosting it. This raises questions about the direct application of
the previous results. First, the actual compensation requirements of the communities may
not be observable. This is dealt with in subsection 4.5.1. Second, different considerations
may hold regarding the responsibility of the communities for different part of the costs.
This raises the question of whether the equity principles proposed in the previous section
could be applied separately on each part of the costs. This is dealt with in subsection
4.5.2.
4.5.1 Accounting for private information
A significant part of the provision cost of the communities may consist in their subjective
disutility for the local nuisance associated with the project. From a practical point of
view, such information may not be easily observed. At a more fundamental level, even if
such information were actually observed, communities may still be considered as the best
judge of their own interest and left free to state their own compensation requirements.
This acknowledged, the challenge is to design a procedure in which the communities are
incentivized to reveal enough information to argue credibly that a fair outcome is achieved.
As we shall soon see, this considerably restricts the set of achievable allocations. Still we
may propose arguments for a class of mechanisms that includes the mechanisms consisting
in the direct application of the three allocation rules formerly characterised.
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4.5.1.1 Mechanisms
We will focus on budget-balanced direct revelation mechanisms.20 These are mechanisms
that select alternatives from the following set :
A = {(eh, t)|h ∈ {0} ∪N and
∑
N
ti = B1{h>0}}
Definition 4.3. A budget-balanced direct revelation mechanisms is a function M that
associates with any report cˆ ∈ Rn+ a probability distribution over the set of alternatives
∆(A).
We denote byM the set of such mechanisms. Examples may be built from the allocation
rules formerly characterised. The mechanism built on the welfare egalitarian allocation
rule corresponds to the first price auction that was advocated for by Sakai (2012) in a
similar context.21 The mechanism built on the nucleolus corresponds to the second price
auction. It was proposed by Minehart and Neeman (2002).22 As they do not rely on the
actual cost but on the communities stated cost, none of these mechanisms guarantees that
the allocation rules are actually implemented through these mechanisms. For instance, in
the first-price auction, the optimal community may be tempted to overstate her cost in
order to get a higher compensation.
A way to ensure that some allocation is actually achieved is to ensure that truthfully
reporting one’s compensation requirement is a dominant strategy for all communities.
This corresponds to the following requirement, called Strategyproofness.
Strategyproofness. For any E ∈ E, i ∈ N , cˆ−i ∈ R
n−1
+ and ci ∈ R+,
ui(M(ci, cˆ−i)) ≥ ui(M(cˆi, cˆ−i))
It is well-known that no budget-balanced and strategyproof mechanism is ex-post Pareto
efficient (Green and Laffont, 1979). This result also holds here and, none of the allocation
rules formerly characterised can be implemented in dominant strategies. Ways out of
this impossibility have been explored by weakening each of the three requirements. The
approach that is adopted here consists in a weakening of ex-post Pareto efficiency and
strategyproofness.
20We choose to focus on budget balanced mechanisms. This requirement has strong consequences. How-
ever, when the unanimity lower bound is required, it may be weakened to a no-deficit requirement
and the results would remain.
21Sakai’s proposal was actually more general as the author argued in favour of the mechanisms that lo-
cates the facility at the lowest reported cost and share the this cost proportionally to the communities’
individual benefit.
22The mechanism proposed was actually slightly more general as the authors argued in favour of the
mechanisms that locates the facility at the lowest reported cost and share the second lowest reported
cost according to exogenous weights.
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4.5.1.2 The identical-cost lower bound
We propose to focus on mechanisms that satisfy a weak axiom met by all the allocation
rules formerly characterised: the identical-preference lower bound. When imposed at the
ex-post stage, it requires a community to weakly prefer the outcome of the mechanism than
a monetary transfer of max
(
0; B−ci
n
)
, whichever rational strategy is chosen. Note that
this condition requires Productive efficiency and Individual rationality but not Allocative
efficiency at the ex-post stage. Still, it requires the project to be located in a community
with a lower provision cost than the average provision cost, which amounts to some degree
of allocative efficiency.
Ex-post identical-cost lower bound. For any E ∈ E, i ∈ N , and cˆ ∈ R+,
ui(M(cˆ)) ≥ max
(
0,
B − ci
n
)
It is clear that if a mechanism meets this requirement, then it implements the set of
allocations satisfying the identical-cost lower bound in dominant strategy. From the
revelation principle, we know that there must exist a strategy-proof mechanism that
implements this set. Besides this mechanism has to meet productive efficiency and always
choose a location where the actual cost is lower than the average cost. In the two agent
case, this requires ex-post efficiency. Yet, this condition is too strong to be met by budget-
balanced mechanisms.
Proposition 4.4. No budget-balanced mechanism satisfies the ex-post identical-preference
lower bound.
A way to weaken the previous requirement is to require it at the interim stage. This
requires understanding how the communities’ form their decision in the context of a
mechanism, which requires to consider communities’ preferences over a course of actions
for which outcomes are uncertain. Many possibilities arise. One is the general Bayesian
framework adopted in Borgers and Smith (2014), in which rationality is common knowl-
edge and the communities are expected utility maximizers characterised by their prefer-
ences, their risk attitudes and their subjective beliefs. Another possibility is to consider
that communities maximize the worst possible outcome of the mechanism. This maximin
behavior was proposed and axiomatized by Minehart and Neeman (2002) in the context of
the NIMBY problem. From this discussion, we may rather accept that there exist many
possibilities for defining a rational decision criterion and for assessing the communities
welfare in this setting. Therefore, we may be willing to design mechanisms that are robust
in the sense that they satisfy some properties independently from these many possibilities.
One such possibility is to require, for all communities, the existence of an opportunity to
achieve their identical-cost lower bounds, independently from the others’ choices.
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Interim identical-cost lower bound. For any E ∈ E, i ∈ N , there exists cˆi ∈ R+ such
that for any cˆ−i ∈ R
n−1
+ ,
ui(M(cˆi, cˆ−i)) ≥ max
(
0,
B − ci
n
)
We first note that this is achievable.
Proposition 4.5. There exist budget balanced mechanisms that satisfy the interim identical-
preference lower bound.
The proof of this result is provided in Appendix. It relies on the presentation of the first
and the second-price auctions, previously introduced. It turns out that they both satisfy
the interim identical-preference lower bound condition as, by reporting truthfully one’s
type, every community is ensured to get at least her identical-preference lower bound. To
put it differently, no community can deprive another from the opportunity of achieving
this welfare level. To get oa sense of what this axiom requires, consider a community
whose true compensation requirement is c2 and assume that this community is convinced
to actually feature the second lowest cost. In a second-price auction, this community
would find beneficial to understate her compensation requirement. If it turns out that
she stated the lowest cost so that she actually hosts the project. This choice would be
inefficient if there exists a community with a lower true compensation requirement than
her. Yet, all other communities would actually benefit from this misreport: community 2
will always bear at least the entire inefficiency cost of her misreport. Of course, this
community could have benefited from this misreport but in any case, the potentially
large efficiency loss resulting from her risk taking would have limited consequences on the
other’s opportunities.
We are interested in characterising the whole class of mechanisms that satisfy the in-
terim identical-preference lower bound. The next result establishes that there is a sense
according to which this property extends exactly to the following class of mechanisms U .
Definition 4.4. A mechanism M belongs to U if and only if
• It always implements a project that is beneficial according to the claims:
min(cˆi) ≥ B ⇐⇒ M(cˆ) = (0,0)
• When a project is implemented:
– Transfers are budget-balanced :
∑
N ti = B
– th ≥
n−1
n
(B − cˆh)
– ∀i ∈ N\{h}, ti ≥ max
(
0, B−cˆi
n
)
89
Chapter 4 Fair allocation rules for sharing the cost of a locally undesirable facility
The characterisation writes as follows:
Proposition 4.6. A budget-balanced mechanismM satisfies the interim identical-preference
lower bound if and only if it is payoff equivalent to a mechanism in U for maximin players.
The proof of this result is provided in Appendix.
4.5.1.3 Conclusion
It comes with no surprise that the former allocation rules cannot be implemented un-
der asymmetric information. Still, we showed that the mechanisms built upon the three
allocation rules formerly characterised would still meet some reasonable distributive re-
quirements. In the end, such mechanisms are not ex-post efficient, but, from an interim
perspective, they are not too inefficient either. They do not ensure that any community
will achieve some level of welfare at the ex-post stage, but they all offer to the communi-
ties the opportunity to benefit from the project to the extent of their own identical-cost
lower bound.
At this stage, a crucial question still remains open: are all mechanisms in U Pareto
optimal at the interim stage? An answer to this question would have to consider more
precisely the likely behaviors of the communities in this context. I conjecture that further
improvements may not be achievable without restricting the set of plausible behavior or
imposing additional structure to this problem. For instance, the core of the argument
proposed by Minehart and Neeman (2002) in favor of the second price auction relies on
its greater ex-post efficiency. Still, this result is only established in a standard Bayesian
framework. As soon as we allow for more general type spaces, little room seems to be left
for Pareto improvement at the interim stage (Borgers et al, 2015, p.194).
This analysis brings additional arguments in favour of mechanisms that were advocated
for in the context of this problem (Minehart and Neeman, 2002; Sakai, 2012). It also
suggests and motivates the direct implementation of the Shapley value as another poten-
tially desirable mechanism in this setting. An important remark is that the design of a
mechanism upon the three allocation rules formerly characterised constitutes a significant
departure from distributive to procedural justice. As was noted by Young (1995, chap.
8), a focus on fair processes rather than on fair allocations may be required in this specific
context. It is actually in such a procedural perspective that the reward axioms make most
sense as a manifestation of reciprocity.
4.5.2 An extension to additive composite costs
The results presented in Section 5.3 rely on a simple description of the cost and a unique
perception of how each communities could be deemed responsible for it. Nevertheless, the
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communities’ provision costs may result from the combination of many different sources.
As in Sakai (2012), we may consider that the cost of a project is composed of at least two
elements. The first is the monetary cost of constructing, operating and maintaining the
project at a given community. This may depend on purely circumstantial characteristics
such as location or the geological properties of land. The second source of cost is the
community compensation requirement for bearing the nuisance. This may as well depend
on many factors among which socio-demographic characteristics may play an important
role. It seems unlikely that the same consideration would hold for each of these costs.
Therefore, we shall look at the possibilities of combining compensation and reward when
costs result from both characteristics. In this extension, we assume that the communi-
ties’ provision costs can be decomposed additively into a part that elicit compensation,
and another that elicit reward. To fix ideas, one can think of the cost of constructing,
operating and maintaining the project to be tied to compensation but the communities’
compensation requirement to elicit reward. Of course, this decomposition of the cost
may be challenged and alternative decompositions could be considered. For instance,
the cost of constructing, operating and maintaining the project may also depend on past
investments in infrastructures, which are deemed to elicit reward.
When costs are the sum of a circumstantial and a responsibility costs, a natural extension
of the former analysis would seek to conciliate Full Cost Solidarity for the circumstantial
part of costs, and Collective cost reward and Solidarity toward higher-cost communities
for the part of the cost that is deemed to elicit reward. Yet, in many settings, a tension
between compensation and reward has been identified (see e.g. Fleurbaey, 2008). This
extension proposes a solution to this problem.
4.5.2.1 The domain
In this framework, communities are characterised by two types of costs. One which is
deemed circumstantial, denoted by cc ∈ Rn+, and one that elicits reward, denoted by
cr ∈ Rn+. The total provision cost in community i therefore writes ci = c
c
i + c
r
i . Let us
denote by E+ the set of such economies. Most concepts defined on the domain E can be
transposed to E+.
Example 4.2. Three similar communities, i ∈ {a, b, c}, can jointly undertake a public
project. This project is estimated to yield a total monetary benefit of 6. It is associated
to negative effects to the community that hosts it. Some additional monetary costs would
be required to build the project in some communities. These additional costs are deemed
circumstantial.23 They are estimated to amount to 1, 0 and 4 in a, b and c respectively.
23As an example, a landfill is more expensive to build on sandy soil than clay. The geological properties
of the land could be an example of a characteristic akin to circumstances.
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Besides, some nuisances cannot be avoided. These nuisances are objectively similar on the
three sites. Yet the communities’ compensation requirements are evaluated to be 2, 4 and
1 for communities a, b and c respectively.24 Considering these latter amounts as worth
of reward, this defines the problem E+0 = (6, (1, 0, 4), (2, 4, 1)) in E
+. In this problem,
H = {a}, B = 6 and c(N) = 3. This economy will be evoked for illustration in the rest
of the section. It is represented on Figure 4.6.
a b c 
2 4 
1 
1 
4 
Figure 4.6: A representation of the situation E+0 .
The crux of the problem is that the two costs and their correlation jointly determine
the actual cost of the project. In the example 4.2, Pareto efficiency requires to locate
the project in community a, regardless of the nature of her costs. A direct application
of the welfare egalitarian solution to this problem would fail to to recognize the specific
contribution of the community a. Still, a direct application of the Shapley value in this
economy would unduly sanction community c as her featuring the highest cost only results
from poor circumstances. As we will see, a direct application of the former axioms on
each part of the costs is not possible. All this suggests that an application of the Shapley
value would only be consistent with an idea of compensation for different circumstances
in a setting in which the communities’ circumstantial costs are equalized.
4.5.2.2 An allocation
We focus on allocation rules that allocate the total welfare among communities according
to the Shapley value in the hypothetical economy in which all communities feature a same
circumstantial cost. This is the sense of the following allocation Φ+:
Allocation Φ+. Let E = (B, cc, cr) ∈ E+ and define the hypothetical economy E ′ =
(B, c′) ∈ E such that ∀i ∈ N , c′i = c
ref + cri where c
ref = min
N
ci −min
N
cri .
24These “evaluations” for the communities’ willingness to accept the nuisance could be thought as being
inferred from valuation methods (hedonic pricing, benefit transfers, etc.) or as direct statements over
their compensation requirements.
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Φ+(E) is the set of anonymous and efficient allocation rules that yields the distribution
of welfare of the Shapley value uSh(E ′).
In the Example 4.2, the allocation rule Φ+ recommends to locate the project in a. The
reference cost is cref = 2 so the distribution of welfare levels is similar to the distribu-
tion induced by the Shapley value in the hypothetical economy (B, (4, 8, 3)). Therefore,
the distribution of welfare levels induced by Φ+ in E is (1, 0, 2). This is achieved by
implementing the transfers (4, 0, 2).
Several comments can be made. First, note that while Φ+ yields a single allocation of
utilities, some degrees of freedom are left regarding how to actually allocate the project is
the situations for which there exists several optimal locations with different composition
of the costs. In the 2-agent case, the allocation set Φ+ contains an infinite number of
allocation rules which allocates the project to h ∈ H and allocates the whole benefit of
the project to the host if cch+ c
r
−h ≥ B and, otherwise, allocates th =
B+cc
h
+cr
−h
2
to the host
and t−h =
B−cc
h
−cr
−h
2
to the other community.
4.5.2.3 Axioms
The transposition of the axioms of Efficiency, Anonymity, Individual Rationality and No
envy among equals on E+ is straightforward. The axioms related to compensation and
reward are defined only for the part of the cost to which they are deemed to apply. This
entails the following definitions.
Circumstance Solidarity. For any E = (B, cc, cr) ∈ E+ and E ′ = (B, cc′, cr) in E+, if
∀i ∈ N , cci ≥ c
c′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈ Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) and i ∈ N ,
ui(φi) ≤ u′i(φ
′
i)
where u′i(hi, ti) = ti − hic
′
i.
Collective Reward for Responsibility Cost. For any E = (B, cc, cr) and E ′ =
(B, cc, cr′) in E+, if ∃S ⊂ N , ∀i ∈ S, cri > c
r′
i and ∀i ∈ N\S, c
r
i = c
r′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈
Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) such that h = h′, we have
∑
S
ti ≤
∑
S
t′i
.
Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-cost communities. For any E = (B, cc, cr)
and E ′ = (B, cc, cr′) in E+, if ∃S ⊂ N , ∀i ∈ S, cri > c
r′
i and ∀i ∈ N\S, c
r
i = c
r′
i then,
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∀(φ,φ′) ∈ Φ(E)× Φ(E ′) and i ∈ N such that cri ≥ max
j∈N
crj ,
ui(φi) ≤ u′i(φ
′
i)
where u′i(hi, ti) = ti − hic
′
i.
Corollary 4.1 that follows establishes that no anonymous, efficient allocations meet these
former three requirements along with No envy among equals. Therefore, we will have to
consider weaker requirements. We propose to weaken the requirements on the responsi-
bility cost to situations in which circumstantial costs are uniform. This gives rise to the
two following axioms.
Collective Reward for Responsibility Cost in Uniform Circumstances. For any
E = (B, cc, cr) and E ′ = (B, cc, cr′) in E+, if ∀i ∈ N , cci = c and ∃S ⊂ N , ∀i ∈ S,
cri > c
r′
i and ∀i ∈ N\S, c
r
i = c
r′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈ Φ(E)×Φ(E ′) such that h = h′, we have
∑
S
ti ≤
∑
S
t′i
Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-cost communities in Uniform Circum-
stances. For any E = (B, cc, cr) and E ′ = (B, cc, cr′) in E+, if ∀i ∈ N , cci = c and
∃S ⊂ N , ∀i ∈ S, cri > c
r′
i and ∀i ∈ N\S, c
r
i = c
r′
i then, ∀(φ,φ
′) ∈ Φ(E) × Φ(E ′) and
i ∈ N such that cri ≥ max
j∈N
crj ,
ui(φi) ≤ u′i(φ
′
i)
where u′i(hi, ti) = ti − hic
′
i.
4.5.2.4 A characterisation
We have the following characterisation:
Proposition 4.7. An anonymous and efficient allocation rule satisfies Individual ratio-
nality, No envy among equals, Circumstance solidarity, Collective reward for responsibility
cost in uniform circumstances, and Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-cost communi-
ties in uniform circumstances on E+ if and only if it belongs to Φ+ .
A proof of this results is provided in Appendix 4.K. We provide an intuition of it on
Example 4.2. It relies on the fact that there exists a single reference level for the circum-
stantial costs that, when equalized across the communities, keeps the total net benefit of
the project constant. It is this reference level that defines Φ+.
A direct Corollary of this result relates to the difficulty to achieve Circumstance Solidarity,
Collective Reward for Responsibility Cost, and Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-
cost communities on E+.
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Corollary 4.1. No anonymous and efficient allocation rule satisfies Individual rationality,
No envy among equals, Circumstance solidarity, Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-
cost communities, and Collective reward for responsibility cost on E+.
The proof of this result is provided in Appendix 4.L. We show that the allocation Φ+ does
not satisfies Collective reward for responsibility cost on a specific example.
4.6 An illustrative survey
Any axiomatic analysis remains speculative until it is confronted with the observation
of actual judgments and this is what lacks from this analysis. In particular, the axioms
of reward were only motivated based on intuition and anecdotal evidence. As a further
confrontation, we implement a survey in order to test for the relevance of these axioms and
the overall analysis in accounting for actual judgments. This survey was administered on-
line among 257 University students in Toulouse between November, 13th and December,
13th, 2014. The main results are presented in this section. Further details are presented
in Appendix 4.M.
The vignettes presented to the participants are intended to capture situations in E . In
order to keep the problem simple, the situation of the vignette corresponded to the sim-
plest two-community problem.25 The costs are presented as a direct expression, from the
communities, of their willingness to accept the nuisance associated with the project. Two
framings are proposed. In one of them, the project is a wind park. In the other, it is
a wastewater treatment plant.26 In the main vignette the project is expected to yield a
benefit of five million euros and the respective provision costs of communities a and b are
one and three million euros. This defines the situation E1 = (5, (1, 3)).
After being presented with this situations, respondents are also presented with the prob-
lems E2 = (5, (1, 6)), E3 = (5, (3, 3)) and E4 = (5, (1, 2)) in order. For each of these
problems, they were asked whether they think the project should be implemented, and,
when so, in which community, and how its benefit should be shared. The distribution of
the answers for each case is presented in Table 4.2, and for the participants who chose to
implement a project and locate it in “A” or in “A or B”, the average amount given to A for
hosting the project is reported on Figure 4.7.27 We observe the average amount granted
to the host is greater in E2 than in E4 (t-test for difference of the means, p-value=0.0025).
This is consistent with the idea of reward. Nevertheless, another difference is that the
25Note that in the 2-agent case, the nucleolus and the Shapley value coincide.
26As the answers related to the allocation of the benefit does not significantly differ between the two
situations, answers are reported jointly.
27When the participants answered “A or B, indifferently” for the location choice, they were asked to
state how much A should get, would it be chosen to be the host.
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amount granted to the host is significantly lower in E3 than in E1 and E2 (t-test for
difference of the means, p-value<0.001 in both cases). This result is surprising as none of
the three allocation rules that have been considered requires this: the welfare egalitarian
allocation rule requires this amount to increase from E1 to E3 whereas the nucleolus and
the Shapley value both require it to remain constant. An increase in the allocation from
E4 to E3 is also required by the two latter rules. Instead, a decrease is observed (t-test
for difference of the means, p-value=0.011). In the end, none of the allocation rules in-
troduced in this analysis is able to fully account for the observed answers. There may
be at least two explanations for that. One possible explanation is the more frequent and
intuitive appeal of the equal split heuristics in the situation E3. Another one is the adhe-
sion to a principle of ex-ante fairness in the situation in which the host is to be decided
through a lottery, which is suggested by the answer “A or B, indifferently”.
No Project located in
% project “A” “A or B” “B”
E1 = (1, 3) 9 81 9 1
E2 = (1, 6) 11 77 10 2
E3 = (3, 3) 17 2 81 0
E4 = (1, 2) 8 65 23 4
Table 4.2: Fraction of the repondents choosing each location for the facility in the different
problems.
(1,3) (1,6) (3,3) (1,2)25
00
00
0
29
00
00
0
33
00
00
0
Figure 4.7: Average compensation chosen for the host in four different cases.
Next, respondents were asked to state their adhesion to simple statements. These were
intended to reflect the main axioms chosen in the previous analysis.
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• Principle A (Pareto efficiency): “The project should be located in the commu-
nity A as its estimation of the damage borne is lowest.”
• Principle B: “It is a project of general interest. The hosting community should
not receive any particular compensation for hosting it.”
• Principle C: “Only the hosting community bears its nuisance. It should therefore
get the whole benefit of it.”
• Principle D (No envy among equals (NEE)): “Would both community have
the same estimation for the damage borne, they should benefit from it to the same
extent. Then, the community which hosts the project should be compensated to
the extent to its own estimation of the damage and the remaining benefit should be
shared equally.”
• Principle E (Full solidarity (FS)): “Would they have an estimation of the dam-
age low or high, all communities should benefit from the project to the same extent.”
• Principle F (Individual cost reward (ICR))28: “The community whose estima-
tion of the damage is lowest contributes to the interest of all. It should be rewarded
for that.”
(in %)
No
Agree Disagree opinion
Principle A
Windpark 86 14 0
Wastewater plant 75 24 2
Principle B
Windpark 13 86 0
Wastewater plant 13 86 2
Principle C
Windpark 49 50 1
Wastewater plant 39 60 2
Principle D
Windpark 67 30 3
Wastewater plant 71 26 3
Principle E
Windpark 34 62 4
Wastewater plant 40 55 5
Principle F
Windpark 71 23 6
Wastewater plant 57 33 10
Table 4.3: Adhesion to the different principles.
We observe that the principles of Pareto efficiency and No envy among equals are widely
accepted. A majority of respondents seems to disagree with the principle of full cost
solidarity while agreeing with the principle of individual cost reward. However, these
differences could be due to the ambiguities in the statement of the principles and the
unusual framing of the problem. In order to get more insights about the perception of
28Note that in the two-agent case, ICR and CCR are equivalent.
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the principles, we investigate how the adhesion to a given principle correlates with the
allocation to the host for the respondents who chose A as the host.29 Regression results
are presented in Table 4.4.
Allocation to A Case (1,3) Case (1,2) Case (1,6)
(million euros)
Constant 2.97∗∗∗ 2.99∗∗∗ 3.71∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.32) (0.33)
Adhesion A 0.36∗∗ 0.20 −0.30
(0.18) (0.26) (0.27)
Adhesion B −0.27∗ −0.37∗ −0.63∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.19) (0.21)
Adhesion C 0.50∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.12) (0.13)
Adhesion NEE 0.02 −0.10 −0.14
(0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
Adhesion FS −0.14 −0.36∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.13) (0.14)
Adhesion ICR 0.00 0.11 0.15
(0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
R2 0.18 0.20 0.21
Adj. R2 0.16 0.17 0.19
Num. obs. 207 168 198
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.4: Relationship between the adhesion to the principles and the allocation to the
host for the respondents who choose A as the host.
The main observation that comes out of this table is the expected correlation between the
adhesion to FS and a lower allocation to the host. Yet we do not observe that the adhesion
to ICR correlates with this allocation. However, the expected correlation are observed
when we look at the respondents who completely agreed with the principles as shown on
Table 4.5. A puzzling observation is that this correlation is not observed in all these cases
and, particularly, not in the case (1,3) which, contrary to the two other cases, was decided
after being shown the principles and the different allocation rules. This suggests an effect
of the order of the different elements which could be investigated further.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the judgments expressed regarding different allocations in the
problem E1. The allocations proposed all consider the community A as the host commu-
nity. The difference lies in the allocation of the benefit of the project:
• Allocation 1: “The community A should get half the benefit, which is 2.5 million
euro.”
29The total number of respondents is 257, so choosing A as the host in the cases (1,3), (1,2), and (1,6)
gathers respectively 81, 65 and 77% of the respondents.
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Allocation to A Case (1,3) Case (1,2) Case (1,6)
(million euros)
Constant 3.31∗∗∗ 3.04∗∗∗ 3.33∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.09)
Strong adhesion A 0.20∗∗ 0.10 0.06
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
Strong adhesion B −0.27 −0.14 −0.46
(0.33) (0.35) (0.44)
Strong adhesion C 0.71∗∗∗ 1.01∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.19) (0.20)
Strong adhesion NEE −0.01 0.01 −0.15
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
Strong adhesion FS −0.11 −0.43∗∗ −0.59∗∗∗
(0.16) (0.21) (0.22)
Strong adhesion ICR 0.03 0.29∗∗ 0.35∗∗
(0.11) (0.14) (0.15)
R2 0.15 0.22 0.20
Adj. R2 0.13 0.19 0.17
Num. obs. 207 168 198
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 4.5: Relationship between a strong adhesion to the principles and the allocation to
the host for the respondents who choose A as the host.
• Allocation 2 (Egalitarian allocation): “The community A should get her own
valuation of the damage borne, which is 1 million euros, plus half the remaining
benefit, which is 2 million euros, thus, in total, 3 million euro.”
• Allocation 3: “The community A should get the average valuation of the damage
borne, which is 2 million euros, plus half the remaining benefit, which is 1.5 million
euros, thus, in total, 3.5 million euro.”
• Allocation 4 (nucleolus, Shapley value)30: “The community A should get the
other’s valuation of the damage borne, that is 3 million euros, plus half the remaining
benefit, which is 1 million euros, thus, in total, 4 million euro.”
• Allocation 5: “The community A should get the whole benefit of the project,
which is 5 million euro.”
Both figures actually suggest that the welfare egalitarian allocation is the allocation
deemed fairest by a majority of the respondents in this situation. However, according
to Figure 4.9, fairness ideals are diverse: 45% of them would deem fairest to give a
greater amount to the host than the amount necessary to equalize welfare levels. This
is also surprising as we observed a much lower adhesion to the idea of full solidarity
than to the idea of reward. This suggest that the judgments that are observed are not
30Note that in the two-agent case, the nucleolus and the Shapley value are confounded.
99
Chapter 4 Fair allocation rules for sharing the cost of a locally undesirable facility
fully consistent with the individual adhesion to principle. A consequence of this it that
the judgments reported here may be expected to evolve with the awareness between the
logical relationship of the different elements.
Injuste Juste Ni juste ni injuste Sans opinion
Allocation 1
Allocation 2
Allocation 3
Allocation 4
Allocation 5
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Figure 4.8: Percentage of respondents deeming each of the different allocations proposed
(respectively) “unfair”, “fair”, “neither fair, nor unfair” or “without opinion”
in the situation E1.
The allocations 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 respectively correspond to an allocation of 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4
and 5 millions euros to the first community (the host).
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Figure 4.9: Percentage of respondents chosing each allocation as “the fairest” in the sit-
uation E1.
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This survey suggests that the welfare egalitarian allocation remains the most reasonable
allocation in this setting. Yet, it also suggests that considerations of reward play a role in
the formation of individual judgments. In a more thorough analysis, we may be willing to
test whether the adhesion the welfare egalitarian allocation resists the potential arguments
in favor of other allocations that have been suggested in this analysis. In particular, we
may be willing to observe the adhesion to the view that the host should not get a lower
transfer would he have a lower compensation requirement as this is a crucial element of
this analysis.
Conclusion
In the simple description of NIMBY environments three allocations proposed in the lit-
erature are characterised on the basis of No envy, and axioms related to considerations
of solidarity and reward. We further discussed the consequences of asymmetric informa-
tion and brought additional arguments in favor of two classical mechanisms that were
proposed in the context of this problem. We further discussed the necessary arbitrage be-
tween principles in settings where the provision costs consist in the sum of circumstantial
and responsibility costs.
Despite its initial motivation in the context of the NIMBY problem, this analysis may
prove relevant in other problems. A more general model would allow each type to en-
compass community-specific valuations that may be observable or unobservable. Part
of these valuations may be deemed to elicit reward while another part may be deemed
worth compensating. The resulting framework is presented in Table 4.6. Among the ex-
amples that would fit this description, the problem of allocating of property right on the
commons, like water, fish, or clean air may be of great interest. Concerns about overex-
ploitation of these resources have led to the establishment of property rights in the form
of water quotas, fishing quotas or emissions rights. While guaranteeing the efficient use
of these resources, the establishment of property requires the exclusion of former users
and has to cope with heated debate and vivid opposition (Raymond, 2003; Hanesson,
2004). This makes fair allocations particularly relevant to this problem. In the case of a
fishery, the market value of the catch associated with the fishing quota is an observable
common value B. Fisherman may express various willingness to undertake the effort to
fish vinti and may incur various operation and maintenance costs c
ext
i . In this example,
a community’s observable valuation vexti is defined as B − c
ext
i . Both the observable and
the unobservable valuation can be decomposed into a part that elicit reward and another
that elicit compensation.
While this discussion suggests that the framework presented could be relevant to many
problems of current interest, we also have to acknowledge that this framework may require
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Communities valuation
Observable Unobservable
Reward vext,ri v
int,r
i
Compensation vext,ci v
int,c
i
Table 4.6: Characteristics of the communities in a general context.
to be extended further to tackle the crux of NIMBY conflicts. A first limitation of this
model is that we assumed that the project was yielding a certain and well-defined common
benefit. This may not be the case. In some instances such as in the case of prisons or
refugee camps, this benefit may not easily be expressed in monetary terms. Our analysis
does not directly carry over to these settings. A second - and maybe most crucial -
limitation of this approach is that we assumed away externalities in the costs. Yet, these
externalities may actually be the crux of the issue. Developments along this line seem
to be a necessary step toward the design of justifications applicable to public decision
making in NIMBY contexts.
This being said, we shall be confident with the conclusion of this analysis before consid-
ering any further extension. For this, a confrontation with the actual judgments held in
society is required. In a tentative survey, we find that the welfare egalitarian allocation
attracts the support of a majority of the respondents but we also observe a large adhe-
sion for an idea of rewarding the host. This suggests that the observed judgments may
be susceptible of change. These potential changes would be particularly interesting to
investigate further.
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4.A Notations
N Set of communities
E = R+ × Rn+ Set of economies
E ∈ E Particular economy
B Benefit of the project
c = (ci)i∈N Provision costs
H = argminN ci Set of optimal locations
φ = (h, t) Allocation
h = (hi)i∈N Vector of hosting status
h Host (h = 0 if no project is undertaken)
t = (ti)i∈N Vector of transfers
F (E) = {(h, t)|
∑
i∈N ti ≥ B1{h>0}} Feasible allocations
Φ : E → 2F (E) Allocation rule
Φe Welfare egalitarian allocation rule
Φn nucleolus
Φs Shapley value
E+ = R+ × Rn+ × R
n
+ Set of economies with additive costs
e Vector with all components equal to 1
ei Vector with i’s component equal to 1, and others 0
0 Null vector
4.B Derivation of the nucleolus on E
Let E ∈ E and consider h ∈ H, t be a transfer scheme and S ⊂ N . The deficit associated
with the coalition S is:
d(S) =


−min(B, c(S))− t(S) if h ∈ S
−t(S) if h ∈ S
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It is straightforward to check that all deficits associated with the equal sharing rule are
negative. Hence, all deficits associated with the nucleolus are negative as well. Let us
consider tn, the nucleolus. Note that the deficits decrease with the inclusion of any j 6= 1.
It follows that deficits are minimal for coalitions N\{i}, i ∈ N .
We have:

d(N\{i}) = tni for all i 6= h
d(N\{1}) = tn1 −min(B, c(N\{h}))
When these deficits are equalized, the minimal deficit is maximized. This gives the fol-
lowing system :

t1 −min(B, c(N\{h})) = t
ti = t∑
i∈N ti = B
for all i 6= h
This system is invertible and its solution yields the nucleolus.
4.C Derivation of the Shapley value on E
First note that, for any coalition S ⊆ N , the value of a coalition writes: v(S) =
B − min
(
B,min
S
(ci)
)
. Using the additivity property of the Shapley value and the re-
sult presented in Dehez (2013), an expression of the welfare distribution induced by the
Shapley value follows:
uσ−1(i) =
B
n
−
min(B, cσ−1(n))
n
+
n−1∑
k=i
min(B, cσ−1(k+1))−min(B, cσ−1(k))
k
This distribution of welfare is implemented by choosing h ∈ H and through the following
transfers:
tσ−1(i) =
B
n
−
min(B, cσ−1(n))
n
+
n−1∑
k=i
min(B, cσ−1(k+1))−min(B, cσ−1(k))
k
+ c(N)hi
4.D Proof of Lemma 4.1
Let Φ anonymous, individually rational and envy-free allocation rule, E ∈ E and φ =
(eh, t) ∈ Φ(E). First, let’s consider (i, j) ∈ N\h2 two different non-hosts. No envy from
i to j implies ti ≥ tj and No envy from j to i, ti ≤ tj. Hence, ti = tj: all non-host
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should get the same transfer. Let’s denote by th and tnh the respective transfers to the
host and the non-hosts. No envy from the host to the non-hosts implies th − ch ≥ tnh
or, equivalently, th − tnh ≥ ch. Finally, No envy from the non-hosts to the host implies
tnh ≥ th − cj for all j ∈ N\h or, equivalently, c(N\h) ≥ th − tnh. This requires h ∈ H
and th − tnh ∈ [c(N); c(N\h)]. Let us define p = th − tnh, the premium to the host. The
budget balance condition writes th+(n−1)tnh = B, which can be rewritten th = Bn +
n−1
n
p.
Therefore, the welfare of the host writes uh(φh) = Bn +
n−1
n
p− c(N) ≥ B−c(N)
n
≥ 0, where
the first inequality comes from the fact that p ≥ c(N) and the second from the efficiency
of the project: B ≥ c(N). Hence the rationality of the host is required by No envy.
The welfare of the non-hosts writes ui(φ) =
B−p
n
, which is positive if and only if p ≤ B.
Therefore, p ∈ [c(N);min(B, c(N\h))]. In summary, we have ∀i ∈ N , ti =
B−p
n
+ hip.
Conversely, it is straightforward to check that such a solution is envy-free.
4.E Proof of Proposition 4.1
Let Φ be an anonymous and efficient allocation rule satisfying No envy among equals
(NEE) and Full Solidarity (FS) on E and E = (B, c) ∈ E . If B < min
N
ci, Pareto efficiency
requires that no project is implemented. Otherwise, define E ′ = (B, c′) such that for all
i ∈ N , c′i = min
N
ci. We have, from Anonymity and NEE, Φ(E ′) = {(eh, t)|h ∈ N and ti =
(hi− 1n)minN
ci}. Now considerH = argmin
N
{ci}, the set of optimal location in E. Efficiency
and Anonymity require that h ∈ H if and only if there exists φ ∈ Φ(E) such that h is
the host in φ. Besides, FS requires that all communities have a higher welfare level in E ′
than in E. Because the net value of the project is the same in both economies, budget
balance further requires the allocation of welfare to be the same as in E ′. Therefore, Φ
can only be Φe. Conversely, Φe is anonymous, efficient and satisfies NEE and FS on E .
4.F Proof of Proposition 4.2
4.F.1 Characterisation
Let Φ be an anonymous and efficient allocation rule which satisfies No envy, Individual
rationality (IR) and Individual cost reward (ICR) on E , E ∈ E and h ∈ H. If B < min
N
ci,
Pareto efficiency requires that no project is implemented. If B = min
N
ci, either no project is
implemented, or a project is implemented and all welfare levels set to 0. Otherwise, let ǫ >
0 such that ǫ < B − c(N) and define E ′ = (B, c′) such that c′h = min(B − ǫ, c(N\h)) and
∀i ∈ N\h, c′i = ci. ConsiderH = argmin
N
{ci}, the set of optimal location in E. Productive
efficiency first requires that a project is implemented. Together with Anonymity it further
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requires that h ∈ H if and only if there exists φ ∈ Φ(E) such that h is the host in φ.
The same applies to the set of optimal locations in E ′. As any optimal location in E in
also optimal in E ′, we know that for any h ∈ H, there exists (φ,φ′) ∈ Φ(E)×Φ(E ′) such
that h is the host in φ and φ′. By Lemma 4.1, t′h ≥
n−1
n
min(B − ǫ, c(N\h)) in E ′. From
ICR, we know, th ≥ t′h. Besides, th ≤
n−1
n
min(B, c(N\h)) by Lemma 4.1. As the former
inequality must hold true for any ǫ > 0, we must have th = n−1n min(B, c(N\h)) and, from
Lemma 4.1 ti = − 1n min(B, c(N\h)) for all i ∈ N\h. Then, we must have φ ∈ Φ
n(E).
Conversely, the nucleolus meets all previously stated axioms.
4.F.2 Independence of the axioms
• The allocation rule defined by ∀E ∈ E , Φ(E) = {(eh, t)|h ∈ H and ∀i ∈ N, ti =
(hi − 1n)c(N\h)} satisfies all axioms but IR on E .
• The welfare egalitarian allocation rule Φe satisfies all axioms but ICR on E .
• The Shapley value Φs satisfies all axioms but No envy on E .
4.G Proof of Proposition 4.3
4.G.1 Characterisation
First note that it is straightforward to check that Φs satisfies No envy among equals
(NEE), Solidarity toward higher-cost communities (SHC), and Collective cost reward
(CCR) on E .
Let Φ be an anonymous and efficient allocation rule which satisfies NEE, SHC and CCR
on E . Let E = (B, c) ∈ E and σ be a permutation of N such that cσ−1(1) ≤ ... ≤ cσ−1(n).
In order to simplify the notations, indexes are redefined according to this new ordering.
If E ∈ E\E∗, Pareto efficiency requires that Φ(E) = {(0,0)}. Otherwise, for any k ≤ n,
define Ek = (B, ck) where ck is defined by cki = min(B, ck) if i < k and c
k
i = min(B, ci)
otherwise. Let m be the highest index such that cm ≤ B and consider the property Hk:
“Φ(Ek) = Φs(Ek)”. We show that Hk is true for any k ≤ m by decreasing induction.
First consider Em = (B,Be). Pareto efficiency and Anonymity together require that all
communities are considered as potential hosts. No envy among equals further requires,
Φ(En) = {(eh, t)|h ∈ N and ∀i ∈ N , ti = (hi − 1n)min(B, cn)}. Therefore Φ(E
n) =
Φs(En). Assume, now, that Hk+1 is true, that is Φ(Ek+1) = {(eh, t)|h ∈ H and ∀i ∈
N, ti =
∑n−1
j=i
min(B,ck+1
j+1 )−min(B,c
k+1
j
)
j
− min(B,cn)
n
+ ck+1hi}. If ck = ck+1, the previous reason-
ing can be iterated and Hk is trivially true. If ck < ck+1, let φk = (hk, tk) ∈ Φ(Ek). From
efficiency and anonymity, we know that φk recommends to locate a project at any h ≤ k.
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For any such h, let φk+1 = (hk+1, tk+1) be the allocation in Φ(Ek+1) that recommends
the same location. SHC first requires that, for all i > k, tki ≥ t
k+1
i . Besides, CCR requires
that
∑
i≤k t
k
i ≥
∑
i≤k t
k+1
i . Assume one of these inequalities is strict, then, summing all
these inequalities and using Budget balance, we get a contradiction. Therefore, these
inequalities must hold with equality. In particular,
∑
i≤k
tki =
∑
i≤k
tk+1i = k

 n−1∑
j=k+1
min(B, cj+1)−min(B, cj)
j
−
min(B, cn)
n

+min(B, ck+1)
Besides, Anonymity requires that welfare levels are equalized for all i ≤ k. Given the
expression of the total welfare to allocate among these communities, we get for any i ≤ k
ui(φki ) =
n−1∑
j=k
min(B, cj+1)−min(B, cj)
j
−
min(B, cn)
n
This yields Φ(Ek) = Φs(Ek). Then Hk is true for any positive k. In particular, H1 writes
Φ(E) = Φs(E) which establishes unicity.
4.G.2 Independence of the axioms
• The nucleolus Φn meets all axioms but CCR.
• Consider the allocation rule Φ defined by ∀E ∈ E\E∗,Φ(E) = {(0,0)}, and ∀E ∈ E∗,
Φ(E) is the set of all pairs (eh, t) such that h ∈ H, ∀i ∈ H, ti = B−ch|H| + hich and
∀i ∈ N\H, ti = 0. This allocation meets all axioms but SHC.
4.H Proof of Proposition 4.4
Note that the ex-post identical-preference lower bound has to be satisfied on any restricted
type space. In particular, in the standard Bayesian, risk neutral type space. On this
domain, we know that if a mechanism implements a social choice function, then there
exists a Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) direct mechanism that also implements it
(the revelation principle). We show that there does not exist such a mechanism.
Assume there exists a direct revelation mechanism M that satisfies the ex-post identical-
preference lower bound and consider the following 2-agent case (i ∈ {1, 2}), with a com-
mon prior with full support on [0;B) and common knowledge of all the features of the
environment. Let c2 ∈ [0;B). From ex-post ULB, we know that M(c2, c2) chooses a com-
munity to host the project with some strictly positive probability and requires a transfer
B+c2
2
to this community. Without loss of generality, let us say it is community 1 and
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consider the economy (c1, c2), where c1 < c2. Ex-post ULB requires some degree of al-
locative efficiency. More precisely, it requires to always locate the project where the cost
is lower than the average cost. Therefore, ex-post ULB requires the project is located in
community 1 for sure in M(c1, c2). In addition, BIC requires that community 1 should
get at least x1 = B+c22 as a transfer in M(c1, c2). Budget balance and the ex-post ULB re-
quirement for the other community, further require that it should get exactly x2 = B−c22 .
It is clear that this allocation rule is not BIC as the community 2 would benefit from
under-reporting her cost. Therefore, there exists no mechanism that satisfies the ex-post
ULB in this case. This establishes Proposition 4.4.
4.I Proof of Proposition 4.5
We respectively show it in the first and second price auctions.
First, consider the first price auction. If all stated costs are greater than B, no project is
implemented. Otherwise, this mechanism selects a host h ∈ argminN cˆi and implements
the transfers xh =
B+(n−1)cˆh
n
and ∀i ∈ N\{h}, xi = B−cˆhn . Consider what can be expected
by the community i with cost ci < B when truthfully reporting her cost. We consider two
cases. First, would all the others’ report a greater cost than her, she would have to host
the project and would end up with a transfer B+(n−1)ci
n
and incur her own provision cost
ci. Therefore, she would achieve a exactly the level of welfare required by her identical
preference lower bound. In the event another community j states a strictly lower cost
that her, cˆj, she would get
B−cˆj
n
. As the community truthfully reports her type, we have
cˆj < ci so this transfer is greater than B−cin . Therefore, by reporting ci, the agent i is
ensured to get a least B−ci
n
.
The same reasoning applies to the second price auction. If all stated costs are greater than
B, no project is implemented. Otherwise, this mechanism selects a host h ∈ argminN cˆi
and implements the transfers xh = min
(
B, B
n
+ n−1
n
min
N\{h}
cˆi
)
and ∀i ∈ N\{h}, xi =
max
(
0, 1
n
(
B − min
N\{h}
cˆi
))
. Consider what can be expected by the community i with
cost ci < B when truthfully reporting her cost. We consider two cases. First, would
all the others’ report a greater cost than her, she would have to host the project and
would end up with a transfer B+(n−1)cˆj
n
, where cˆj ≥ ci, and incur her own provision cost
ci. Therefore, she would achieve a greater level of welfare that what is required by her
identical preference lower bound. If on the contrary, if another community j states a
strictly lower cost that her, she would get B−cˆj
n
. As the community truthfully reports her
type, we are ensured that this transfer is greater than B−ci
n
. Therefore, by reporting ci
truthfully, the community i is ensured to get a least B−ci
n
.
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4.J Proof of Proposition 4.6
Let i ∈ N be a community with cost ci and M be a mechanism that satifies the interim
identical-preference lower bound. We know that there exists a strategy s that guarantees
an ex-post utility of at least max(0, B−ci
n
) to i. We also know that no strategy can
guarantee a strictly higher ex-post utility to i for sure. Indeed, assume there exists such
a strategy s′ and consider the situation in which all communities feature the same cost
ci. In this setting M(s′, ..., s′) would not be feasible. Therefore, maximin players with
cost ci would always (weakly) prefer strategy s. We label this strategy cˆi and extend
the strategy space by duplicating it. We do the same for all costs c ∈ R+. Eventually,
we delete all remaining strategies. As we know that these strategies are never strictly
prefered by maximin players, the resulting mechanism is payoff equivalent and truthfull
for maximin players. Conversely, any mechanism in U satisfies the interim identical-cost
lower bound as, for all mechanisms in U , truthfully reporting one’s cost guarantees an
ex-post utility level of max
(
0, B−ci
n
)
regardless of the others’ statements.
4.K Proof of Proposition 4.7
Let Φ be an anonymous and efficient allocation rule which satisfies Individual rationality,
No envy among equals, Circumstance solidarity, Collective reward for responsibility costs
in uniform circumstances, and Solidarity toward higher responsibility-cost communities in
uniform circumstances on E+. Let E0 = (B, cc, cr) ∈ E+. Define cref = min
N
ci−min
N
cri ≥ 0
and E1 = (B, crefe, cr). Following the proof of Proposition 4.3, Efficiency, Anonymity,
Individual Rationality, No envy among equals, Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-
cost communities in uniform circumstances, and Collective Reward for Responsibility
Cost in Uniform Circumstances together require that ∀φ ∈ Φ(E1) and i ∈ N , ui(φ) =
uShi ((B, c
refe + cr)). Define E2 = (B, cc′, cr) such that ∀i ∈ N , cc′i = c
c
i if c
c
i < c
ref , and
cc′i = c
ref otherwise. Circumstance solidarity requires that individual welfare levels are
all weakly greater in E2 than in E1. However, the minimal cost in E2 has to be the same
as in E1 by construction. As the minimal cost is the same in both economies, individual
welfare levels have to be identical. From the same reasoning, the individual welfare levels
have to be weakly greater in E2 than in E0 and, as the minimal cost is the same in
both economies, individual welfare levels have to be identical in all the three economies.
Therefore, ∀φ ∈ Φ(E0) and i ∈ N , ui(φ) = uShi ((B, c
refe+cr)). This establishes Φ ∈ Φ+.
Conversely, we show that any Φ ∈ Φ+ satisfies all the axioms. Let Φ ∈ Φ+.
We start by showing that Φ satifies CiS. Consider E2 = (B, cc2, cr) ∈ E+ and E3 =
(B, cc3, cr) ∈ E+. Define E ′2 = (B, c
ref
2 e + c
r) and E ′3 = (B, c
ref
3 e + c
r), where cref2 =
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min
N
{cc2i + c
r
i}−min
N
{cri} and c
ref
3 = min
N
{cc3i + c
r
i}−min
N
{cri}. Without loss of generality,
assume cref2 ≤ c
ref
3 . We show that the welfare levels induced by the Shapley value are
non-increasing from E ′2 to E
′
3. For this, we reorder the communities by increasing c
r
i . The
resulting index will be denoted in parenthesis. The welfare levels induced by the Shapley
value can be defined iteratively as follows:
u(n) =
max(0, B − cref − cr(n))
n
∀i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1}, u(i) = u(i+1) +
min(B − cref , cr(i+1))−min(B − c
ref , cr(i))
i
It is clear that u(n) decreases with cref . Now, assuming u(i+1) decreases with cref , we show
that u(i) decreases with cref . Define a = B − cref , b = cr(i+1) and c = c
r
(i). We have b ≥ c.
Consider a′ > a and define : ∆ = min(a′, b)−min(a′, c)−min(a, b) +min(a, c). Six cases
are possible:
1. If a′ > a > b ≥ c, ∆ = 0
2. If a′ > b ≥ a ≥ c, ∆ = b− a ≥ 0
3. If a′ > b ≥ c > a, ∆ = b− c ≥ 0
4. If b ≥ a′ > a ≥ c, ∆ = a′ − a ≥ 0
5. If b ≥ a′ ≥ c > a, ∆ = a′ − c ≥ 0
6. If b ≥ c > a′ > a, ∆ = 0
Therefore u(i) decreases with cref and, by induction, this is true for all i ∈ N . In particular,
we have ∀i ∈ N , uShi (E
′
2) ≥ u
Sh
i (E
′
3). As, for all i in N , the welfare levels in E2 and E3
are respectively uShi (E
′
2) and u
Sh
i (E
′
3), CiS is satisfied.
We now show that Φ+ satisfies Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-cost communities
in uniform circumstances, and Collective Reward for Responsibility Cost in Uniform Cir-
cumstances. Consider E4 = (B, cc, cr) ∈ E+ such that ∀i ∈ N , cci = c. We have Φ
+(E4)
contains a single allocation that implements the same transfer and yields the same dis-
tribution of welfare as Φs(E ′4), where E
′
4 = (B, ce+ c
r). We know that Solidarity toward
higher-cost communities and Collective cost reward are met by Φs. Then, they are met
by Φ+ as well. This establishes Proposition 4.7.
4.L Proof of Corollary 4.1
Let E ∈ E+ with two agents, and such that c1 < c2 ≤ B, cc1 < c
c
2 and c
r
1 > c
r
2. The set Φ
+
contains a single allocation rule that yields the following allocation of welfare levels :
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

us1 =
B−c1
2
+ c
r
2−c
r
1
2
us2 =
B−c1
2
+ c
r
1−c
r
2
2
As cr1 > c
r
2, Solidarity toward higher-responsibility-cost communities requires that any de-
crease in cr2 does not make community 1 worse off, which is contradicted by the expression
of the welfare of community 1.
4.M Presentation of the survey
4.M.1 Implementation
The survey was carried out online among 257 University students in Toulouse. The
following subsections respectively present the vignettes, the structure of the survey and
its results. The detailed screens are presented at the end of the appendix.
4.M.2 The vignettes
The survey relies on two vignettes that are presented below.
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Vignette 1 (windpark)
Two neighboring communities, A and B, consider the implementation of a wind park. A
study is undertaken. Two sites, one in A and one in B, could host the project. After a
consultation about landscape issues, it is admitted that only one of the two sites could
be implemented.
In top of the environnemental benefits brought by the project, that spread beyond the
limits of the communities, the benefit of the project to the communities is evaluated worth
€5 millions, wherever it is located. This benefit corresponds to the value of the produced
electricity during the project lifetime net of the payment to an operator who takes charge
of all construction, operation and maintenance costs. If the project is implemented, this
benefit will have to be shared between the communities.
The project is devised in order to limit as much as possible the nuisance to its neighbors.
However, some remaining nuisance, mainly noise, are unavoidable. They will entirely be
borne by the citizens of the community that hosts the project.
All this considered, both communities decide to estimate the damage they would bear.
The citizens in the community A unanimously agree to estimate the damage worth €1
million and the citizens in the community B, €3 millions. These amounts will next be
called the “estimation by the hosting community of the damage borne”.
From an outside perspective, the two communities are very similar. They have the same
number of inhabitants and a comparable wealth level. The study established that the level
of noise perceived will be the same on both sites. The difference between the estimation
of the damage borne seems to only be explained by the fact that citizens in B are less
inclined to accept the noise associated with the project than citizens in A.
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Vignette 2 (wastewater treatment plant)
Two neighboring communities, A and B, consider the implementation of a wastewater
treatment plant. A study is undertaken. Two sites, one in A and one in B, could host the
project.
In top of the environnemental benefits brought by the project, that spread beyond the
limits of the communities, the benefit of the project to the communities is evaluated worth
€5 millions, wherever it is located. This benefit corresponds to the savings as compared
to alternative solutions fo treating the sewage. If the project is implemented, this benefit
will have to be shared between the communities.
The project is devised in order to limit as much as possible the nuisance to its neighbors.
However, some remaining nuisance, mainly odors and noise, are unavoidable. They will
entirely be borne by the citizens of the community that hosts the project.
All this considered, both communities decide to estimate the damage they would bear.
The citizens in the community A unanimously agree to estimate the damage worth €1
million and the citizens in the community B, €3 millions. These amounts will next be
called the “estimation by the hosting community of the damage borne”.
From an outside perspective, the two communities are very similar. They have the same
number of inhabitants and a comparable wealth level. The study established that the
level of the nuisance perceived will be the same on both sites. The difference between the
estimation of the damage borne seems to only be explained by the fact that citizens in B
are less inclined to accept the noise associated with the project than citizens in A.
4.M.3 Outline of the survey
The survey consists in the eight following screens:
1. Welcome screen: Respondents are presented the object of the survey. They
answer their day of birth within the month in order to be allocated into the different
versions of the questionnaire.
2. Presentation of the vignette: Respondents are presented with the first part of
the vignette. During the presentation of the vignette, the respondents are asked the
following question:
• With which of the following statements do you agree most?
– These are mostly the citizens of concerned communities that are capable
to estimate what a degradation of their living environment is worth. The
decision should proprietarily rely on such estimations.
– These are mostly objective measures, comprising for instance an estimation
of the decline in residential value associated with the nuisance, which can
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constitute a reliable measure of the damage borne. The decision should
proprietarily rely on such estimations.
– None of them.
3. Presentation of the vignette: Respondents are shown the rest of the vignette.
Half of them are asked to make an allocation choice which consists in answering the
three following questions:
a) Should the project be implemented?
b) Which community should host the project?
c) How should the benefit of €5 millions be shared?
4. Diverse situations: Respondents are asked to choose an allocation for three dif-
ferent situations.
5. Principles: Respondents are asked to state their degree of approval for different
principles.
6. Propositions: Respondents are asked their degree of approval for five different
allocation rules.
7. Final choice: Respondents are asked to choose an allocation for the situation of
the vignette.
8. Final screen: Respondents answer some socio-demographic characteristics.
4.N Detailed screens
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Chapter 5
Fairness judgments for the allocation of
an indivisible task and its benefit
An experimental study
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Chapter 5 Fairness judgments for the allocation of an indivisible task and its benefit
Abstract
I study individual fairness judgments and preferences for the allocation of an indivisible
task and its benefit among two individuals with a different willingness to perform it. My
approach relates results from the theory of fair allocations with the empirical observation
of fairness judgments and preferences. I first present and motivate four contrasted allo-
cation rules as possible rules of judgment. For some of the participants, a questionnaire
was proposed before they knew about their situation. Among the four rules of judgment
proposed, the welfare egalitarian allocation rule is the most preferred allocation rule as
stated by the participants. Yet, I also observe support for principles that are not compat-
ible with this rule: an important proportion of respondents deem fair to give nothing to
someone who would not be willing to perform the task, and another substantial propor-
tion deem fair to split the benefit of the task equally when both participants feature the
same compensation requirement. In the experiment, participants had the opportunity to
perform a task for pay. However, for any two of them, a single task was available. As
required by the Pareto principle, it was allocated to the participant with the lower com-
pensation requirement. In this situation, the stated normative expectations of the task
performer are found to be higher, the greater the discrepancy between the compensation
requirements. This does not extend to individual distributive preferences as revealed by
the offers in a dictator setting. I also find that the task performers who took the question-
naire would deem the equal split fair less often. Overall, few respondents are consistent
with any of the four rules proposed.
Keywords: experiment, empirical social choice, vignette study, fairness judgments, dis-
tributive preference, allocation rule, reasoning, resource allocation
JEL codes: D63
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Abstract
Introduction
In most real situations, the diversity and conflicting nature of existing norms makes the
mere nature of what is a fair distribution subject to doubt and argument. Think, for
instance, of a situation in which an indivisible resource held in common is to be allocated
among communities, individuals or firms. Among other problems, one could think of the
allocation of spectrum, or fishing, pollution or water right allocation. This may also apply
to the allocation of an economic opportunity among competing agents. In this situation,
it seems reasonable to guarantee that the agent who actually exerts himself to make the
resource productive reaps the benefit of it. Still, it also seems reasonable to compensate
the others for being deprived from accessing the resource. There is no straightforward
solution to this conflict. In the experiment presented here, the participants were con-
fronted with such a situation. They had the opportunity to perform a task that was paid
€20. However, for any two of them, a single task was available. The individual with
the lower compensation requirement was offered the opportunity to perform it while the
other individual was given the option to leave. The payment of the task could be shared
among the two participants. In this situation, we are interected in the fairness judgments
held by the people. Still, the empirical observation of individual fairness judgments in
this situation is confronted by several alternatives and two important challenges.
The first challenge is that there is no straightforward solution to the conflict mentioned.
As a result, a confident and thoughtful judgment regarding what a fair distribution is
in this situation may require reasoning beyond what individuals are inclined to perform.
The judgments and behaviors observed in this situation may rely on diverse heuristics1
and be susceptible to change through reasoning. By reasoning, we refer to the reflective
equilibrium process proposed by John Rawls (1951) and its positive counterpart, the
dual-process theory of moral reasoning.2 In these theories, reasoning consists in seeking
consistency between one’s adhesion to general fairness principles and one’s considered
judgments in particular cases through a process of mutual adjustment. We first propose
and motivate four contrasted allocation rules as conjectured rules of judgments in reflective
equlibrium. Allocation rules are systematic rules of judgment regarding how the benefit of
the task should be allocated across situations. Their being in reflective equlibrium means
that they both derive from plausible intuitive fairness principles and are consistent with
the likely most compelling intuitions regarding how to allocate the benefit of the task in
particular situations. In a preliminary questionnaire, some participants were invited to
express fairness judgments regarding these rules and in four contrasted particular cases.
We are interested in assessing the consistency between their adhesion to allocation rules
1A heuristic is a practical method for finding a satisfactory solution in complex settings that eases the
cognitive load of making a decision.
2see Saunders (2009) for a discussion of this.
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and their answers in particular cases. We are also interested in the effect of performing
the questionnaire on their judgments and behavior when involved in the situation for real.
Second, the fairness judgments and preferences observed may come from different sources.
Experimental evidence reveals that, in some environments, individuals behavior cannot
be explained by a mere concern about one’s own material payoff, suggesting the existence
of a genuine preference for fair allocations. Such behaviors would have to result from
some form of fairness preferences. The existing literature traditionally distinguishes pure
distributive preferences and reciprocal preferences (Falk and Fischbacher, 2001). The for-
mer denotes a fundamental preference for some ideal distribution. The latter denotes a
preference to punish or reward someone according to her perceived intentions, where, in
some situations, intentions would have to be inferred from an allocation choice. In the
traditional ultimatum game, for instance, the proponent makes an offer regarding how to
share a given endowment, after which the respondent can accept or refuse. In this situa-
tion, intentions are derived from the choice of an allocation, and therefore, also rest upon
some judgment about what a fair allocation is. As theories of distributive preferences
and, to some extent, theories of reciprocity relate fairness behaviors to fairness ideals,
this raises the question of what these ideals are. Following this dual perspective on fair-
ness preference, beliefs about distributive justice could result from two sources. Individual
moral values are the first. We will call these beliefs underlying distributive preferences,
moral judgments. A second basis for fairness preferences can rely on the assumption of
a common understanding on a set of acceptable premise in a given group, in a word, on
the existence of distributive norms. This individual belief regarding others’ normative
expectations may differ substantially from one’s own moral judgments. In this experi-
ment, we propose to measure and contrast both of them. Moral judgments are measured
through a questionnaire answered in isolation and moral preferences are observed in a
dictator setting. Normative expectations are measured in two ways. First, we change the
instructions to the same questionnaire and ask respondents to coordinate with another
participant (Krupka and Weber, 2013). Second, in their situations, each participant is
invited to state what choice of allocation from the other she would find defendable and we
elicit her beliefs regarding the most likely statement of another participant in a different
situation (Bicchieri and Chavez, 2010).
Related literature
The experimental study of distributive preferences originally focused on inequality aver-
sion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and the traditional ultimatum
game has proposed that sanctioning behavior depends on how far the allocation is from
the equal split. There is now clear evidence that equal allocations are not always the
most favored distributions in situations featuring different levels of global efficiency (En-
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gelmann and Strobl, 2004) or individual heterogeneity regarding choices (Cappelen et al,
2013), effort (Konow, 2000; Cherry et al, 2002; Cappelen et al, 2007; Krawczyk, 2010),
or individual characteristics (Cappelen et al, 2010). Following this line of research, some
recent experiments have studied situations of normative conflict. For instance, Cappelen
et al (2007) designed a situation in which two individuals with different productivities can
make an investment decision. The resulting payment is pooled and has to be allocated.
In this situation, a conflict arises between holding the participants accountable for their
investment choice, while compensating them for their differences on productivity. The ob-
served behaviors were consistent with a fair fraction of individuals favoring each of three
different fairness ideals. In a subsequent experiment, Cappelen et al (2013) designed a sit-
uation in which two individuals separately choose their exposure to risk. Risk is realized
and the resulting payment is pooled. In this situation, a conflict arises between holding
the participants accountable for their choice, and limiting the ex-post level of inequalities.
The observed behaviors were consistent with a moderate level of inequality aversion and a
desire to hold the individual accountable for their choice. Similarly, our setting features a
conflict between guaranteeing that the participant who actually performs the tasks reaps
the benefit of it, while compensating the other for being deprived from the opportunity
of performing it. No experiment exists to our knowledge that focuses on how individuals
deal with this trade-off. Similarly to the previous studies, we find that respondents ex-
press a large diversity of views, ranging from an equal division of the monetary benefit to
the allocation of the whole benefit to the task performer.
Several studies further suggest that the direct measurement of fairness judgments and
preferences would fail to capture how these are sensitive to reasoning. Following Cappe-
len et al (2007), Cappelen et al (2010) observed that a stage of reasoning, consisting of
observing the consequence and expressing a judgment regarding each of the three fairness
ideals, did influence the proportion of participants referring to each of them. Follow-
ing this approach, we also design a stage of reasoning which consists of a questionnaire.
Noticeably enough, Cappelen et al (2010) observed a decrease in the proportion of par-
ticipants referring to a strict egalitarian allocation. Whereas it does not constitute per
se a proof for an equal split heuristics, this is consistent with this idea which has been
suggested by many other work (Messik, 1993). This effect is also observed in our setting.
Our questionnaire follows the line of the empirical study of distributive judgments initi-
ated by Yaari and Bar-Hillel (1984). In their approach, respondents are invited to express
their judgments regarding the distribution of a good in a hypothetical situation.3 Among
the following studies in this line, our setting is closest to a recent study conducted by
Schokkaert et al (2007). They study the judgments over the fair allocation of an extra
harvest due to the allocation of a plough among three individuals. In particular, the
3This literature is reviewed by Konow (2003) and Gaertner and Schokkaert (2012).
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authors check the consistency between the adhesion to general principles and the quan-
titative allocation chosen in particular cases. They do not find a clear correspondence.
Recently, Hurley et al (2011) showed that the judgments expressed by the respondents
can differ significantly over the verbal statements describing different allocation rules and
their quantitative implications. They suggest that “some individuals do not understand
the quantitative distributional implications of the various principles”. We pursue this
analysis by assessing the consistency of the adhesion to allocation rules with the judg-
ments expressed in particular cases. These allocation rules are not able to account for
the full range of pattern observed. For instance, most respondents deemed the welfare
egalitarian allocation rule fairest. Yet, they do not seem to conform to it when express-
ing quantitative judgments in particular cases: a majority of respondents deem fair to
give nothing to someone who would not be willing to perform the task (the no-dummy
principle) and to split the benefit equally when both participants feature the same com-
pensation requirement. Overall, few respondents are consistent with one of the four rules
proposed.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents the experimental
situation and motivates the choice of allocations rules and particular cases. Section 5.2
details and motivates the experimental protocol and formulates the predictions we intend
to test. Results are presented in Section 5.3. Finally, we further discuss the results in
Section 5.4.
5.1 Allocation rules
5.1.1 Presentation of the situation
The situation is chosen so as to feature a conflict between two norms of distributive justice.
It is presented in the following vignette.
Two persons, A and B, express separately the minimal amount they require for performing
a given task. Person A declares that it costs her €6 to perform this task, and person B,
14€ for her. The task yields a benefit of €20 which can be shared. However, it may only
be performed once. It will be performed by one of the persons who stated the lowest
amount. Person A is therefore retained to perform the task.
How should the €20 be shared?
The interest of this situation is that it features a conflict between two significant distribu-
tive norms. As the effort is actually undergone by the task performer, it seems desirable
to recognize this individual entitled to the total value of the task. On the other hand, the
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existence of a single task is circumstantial. Therefore, it also seems desirable to take into
account the lack of opportunities in this situation. Therefore, an answer to the question
raised leaves room for reasoning and deliberation.
An informal example of a deliberation scheme could be the following. It can be claimed
that “the person who performs the task should get the value of it as it is her who makes
the effort of performing the task”. However, this would dismiss the fact that the other
“could also have performed the task in the absence of A”. This suggests that “he should get
some amount as he did not get the opportunity of performing the task”, but “it is normal
that the task performer gets more”.4 This leaves many possibilities. One can be to give
the task performer her own compensation requirement and share the rest equally. Yet, in
this case, B may get a part of value even in cases in which she would not be willing to do
the task anyway. This may be deemed too high a compensation. So we may rather look
for an allocation rule that depends on the difference between the value of the task and
the compensation requirement of the deprived individual. One possibility is to give to the
other the difference between the value of the task and her own compensation requirement,
and the rest to the task performer. In this situation €6, and €14 to the task performer.
This rule seems reasonable. Still, it would fail to give more to the task performer in the
situation in which both compensation requirements amount to €6, this rule recommends
to give €6 to the task performer and €14 for the other. This is not tenable. Another
possibility is to gives to the deprived individual half the difference between the value of
the task and her own compensation requirement, that is, in this situation to give €17 to
the task performer and €3 to the other. This allocation rule seems to be a reasonable way
to recognize a right of the task performer to the fruit of her labor while compensating the
other from the deprivation of an opportunity. A more formal analysis is proposed in the
following subsection.
5.1.2 Reasoning about fair allocation rules
In this section, we propose and motivate four allocation rules as alternative ways to
prioritize or conciliate relevant norms applying to this situation. To reason out of general
principle requires defining a level of generality. Then, we have to define a general class
of problems, sufficiently similar to the problem at hand to require the application of the
same principles. We propose to consider the class of situations S in which two individuals
i ∈ {1, 2} state their compensation requirements ci to perform a task worth 20€. A
situation S is then fully described by the pair (c1, c2).5 This class of situations defines the
4Emphasis are quotations from the participants’ justifications for their recommendation in this same
situation collected at the end of the experiment (our translation). These statements and the data
collected in this experiment are available upon request.
5Note that we do not allow the value of the task to vary across situations. This amounts to assume that
the rules of judgments would not change depending on this value. This may be challenged, in which
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level of generality at which reasoning is performed. The objective is to define general rules
of judgment about allocations in all these situations. These are called allocation rules.
Among this class, we already presented the situation S1 = (6, 14). We will also draw
attention to the following particular situations that have a potential to question one’s
conclusions. In the first situation, the two individual are equally willing to perform the
task. Two examples considered are S2 = (6, 6) and S3 = (14, 14). In the last situation, an
individual expresses so high a compensation requirement that he would refuse to perform
the task in the absence of the other. One example can be S4 = (6, 20).
We discuss fair allocation rules in this setting. An allocation rule specifies the assignment
of the task to one of the two individuals (or, possibly, to no one) and, when the task is
performed, in the allocation of the resulting benefit in all possible situations. Individual
assignments and allocations are respectively referred to as roles and transfers hereafter.
We start by introducing two reasonable properties. First, it seems reasonable to consider
allocation rules for which no other rule would be unanimously preferred given what is
known about preferences. Therefore, we focus on Pareto efficient allocation rules. In
this setting, they are rules that always assign the task to the individual with the lowest
compensation requirement. The question then boils down to the allocation of the benefit
of the task. Second, it seems reasonable to require that no individual is made worse off
when involved in this situation. This is the requirement of Individual rationality. In this
situation, it requires that the task performer never gets less than her own compensation
requirement and that the other never gets a negative transfer. We now present more
controversial principles. First, a direct application of the accountability principle (Konow,
2000)6 to the actual effort undergone would lead to recommend to allocate the whole ben-
efit of the task to the subject who performed it. This characterizes the strong libertarian
allocation rule (SL).7
As argued earlier, such an allocation rule may be unsatisfactory in that it does not take
into account the fact that the individual who did not perform the task has been deprived
from the opportunity to perform it. This is particularly salient in the situation S2 and
S3 in which the individual who performs the task turns out to be arbitrary chosen. One
may be willing to acknowledge that no individual should benefit more than the other from
the existence of the task in this particular situation. A way to capture this idea is the
principle of no envy: “no participant should prefer the others’ assignment to their own”.
When applied only to the particular situation when both compensation requirements are
case, we shall consider the more general domain.
6Konow’s accountability principle “requires that a person’s fair allocation (e.g., of income) vary in
proportion to the relevant variable that he influence (e.g., work, effort) but not according to those
that he cannot reasonably influence (e.g. a physical handicap)” (Konow, 2000; our emphasis).
7Given the artificial nature and constrained nature of the situation considered, the names of the alloca-
tions may not properly reflect the subtleties of underlying philosophies. We choose them in order to
ease their interpretation and so as to echo to allocation names in Cappelen and Tungodden (2007).
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the same, we will call this principle No envy among equals. As the former notion of
accountability is too strong to accommodate this view, one may like to endorse a weaker
principle. We propose the following reward principle: “Everything else equal, including
the roles, an allocation rule should never grant a lower share to an individual as her
compensation requirement decreases”. As such this principle remains compatible with the
strong libertarian allocation rule. Still, it is compatible with other rules. We shall now
be able to clarify what we mean by expressing that the strong libertarian allocation rule
goes too far in rewarding the task performer. We propose the following weak solidarity
principle: “as an individual gets rewarded as his compensation requirement gets lower,
this reward shall not penalize the other who’s compensation requirement is greater”. Along
with no envy among equals, the reward and the weak solidarity principles characterize
the weak libertarian allocation rule (WL).
A radically different view could consider that individual should not be held responsible
for their preferences in this context. Therefore, they should also be compensated for the
existing differences in their compensation requirements. We propose to capture this idea
with the following solidarity principle: “for any change in the situation, both individual
should either benefit or lose from it”. Along with No envy among equals, this principle
characterizes the welfare egalitarian allocation rule (WE). This rule and the weak lib-
ertarian allocation rule are the two extreme side of the set of allocation rules that meet
the no-envy criterion. While the latter proposes to reward the individuals with low com-
pensation requirements, the former sticks to the idea of compensating the individual who
performs the task for her effort but rejects any further reward. In particular, it gives the
stick to the same allocation in the situations S1, S2 and S4.
Finally, the strict egalitarian allocation rule (SE) always recommends to split the benefit
equally. A particularity of this allocation is that it does not satisfy the property of
individual rationality. In the situation S3 for instance, it leads to recommend to give to
the task performer an amount which is inferior to her actual compensation requirement.
It does not satisfy the property of No envy among equals either as in the situations S2
and S3, the task performer who rather not do the task for getting the same amount.
This discussion is summarized in Table 5.1. It singles out the four following allocations
rules.
• The strong libertarian (SL) allocation rule recommends giving the whole benefit
of the task to the individual who performs it.
• The weak libertarian (WL) allocation rule recommends giving half the difference
between the benefit and her own compensation requirement to the individual who
does not perform the task, and to give the rest to the participant who performs the
task.
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• The welfare egalitarian (WE) allocation rule recommends giving her own com-
pensation requirement to the individual who performs the task, and to share the
remaining benefit equally.
• The strict egalitarian (SE) allocation rule recommends sharing the total benefit
equally among the two participants.
The recommendations of each of these four allocation rules in the four situations previously
emphasized are presented in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. In the following experiment, a
questionnaire is designed on the basis of this reasoning. It presents the four allocation rules
introduced and asks for recommendations in the four particular cases that we identified
as likely to score the limits of each of these rules. The recommendations presented will
motivate the hypothesis.
SE WE WL SL
Properties
Pareto efficiency Yes1 Yes2 Yes3 Yes4
Individual rationality No Yes Yes Yes
No envy among equals No Yes Yes3 No
Accountability principle No No No Yes4
Reward principle Yes No Yes3 Yes
Weak Solidarity principle Yes Yes Yes3 No
Solidarity principle No Yes2 No No
Allocation to the task performer in particular situations
S1 = (6, 14) 10 13 17 20
S2 = (6, 6) 10 13 13 20
S3 = (14, 14) 10 17 17 20
S4 = (6, 20) 10 13 20 20
Table 5.1: Properties of the four allocation rules considered.
The general properties of the allocation rules on the class of situations at hand are presented
above and the allocations to the person who performs the task (underlined) as recommended by
each allocation rule in four particular situations are presented below.
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SE WL SL WE 
S1 = (6,14) 
S2= (6,6) 
 
10 13 17 20 
SE SL WE=WL 
SE WE=WL SL 
SE WL=SL WE 
S3= (14,14) 
S4= (6,20) 
 
Figure 5.1: Allocation to the task performer recommended by each allocation rule for each
particular case.
5.2 Experimental design
5.2.1 Organization
The experiment was programmed in PHP/SQL. A pilot session was conducted on Novem-
ber, 20th and eight sessions took place on November, 27th and 28th at the Toulouse School
of Economics. Each session hosted between 13 and 20 participants and the sessions gath-
ered 151 participants in total. Details about the experimental conditions are provided in
Appendix 5.B.
Participants were allowed to leave the room as soon as they finish. The time spent on
the experiment lasted from half an hour to an hour and a half. Payments were given in
a separate room by a person who did not know the experiment. They were composed of
a €5 show-up fee, an additional payment depending on their choices and the choices of
others. They ranged from €5 to €35, with an average of €15.9.
5.2.2 Proceeding of the experiment
The experiment protocol proceeds in four parts. Its proceeding is summarized in Fig-
ure 5.1. Details and screenshots are provided in Appendix 5.C.
In the first part of the experiment, the participants are invited to perform an elementary
task. This was intended to make them experience the final task that they may have to
perform. It consists in counting the number of occurrence of the letter A in a randomly
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Figure 5.1: Proceeding of the experiment.
generated table of dimension 25x25. This task was chosen as it requires a significant effort
while not requiring any particular skills. As all participants had to reach this stage before
the experiment could proceed, and in order to avoid too long a waiting time, a maximum
of 8 minutes was granted. After they finish or their time is exhausted, participants are
invited to proceed further. In the following screen, they are invited to declare their
willingness to accept to perform this task ten times at the end of the session, hereafter
called their compensation requirements. In order to make their statement credible, they
are explained the functioning of the Becker-De Groot-Marschak mechanism and told that
they may be involved in this mechanism.8 When all have finished this part, some are
directed to the BDM mechanism and others are matched into pairs and allocated into the
three different treatments. The matching process and the allocation into the treatments
are explained in Appendix 5.D.
The treatments differ according to the second part. This part consists of a questionnaire,
which is detailed in section 5.2.3. First, a third of the pairs is assigned to the “no reason-
ing” treatment. They do not take the questionnaire and are directed to the third part.
The two other groups answer a questionnaire. In order to compare judgments related
to individual moral norms and social norms, two treatments are designed. The question-
naire is the same for both groups. Only the instructions differ. In the “isolated reasoning”
treatment, the participants are simply asked to answer the questionnaire whereas, in the
“social reasoning” treatment, participants are paired and asked to coordinate in their
answers. Coordination is not incentivized. However, the participants are informed that
they will be shown how well they performed at the end of the session. We are interested
in the effect of answering this questionnaire on behaviors and beliefs as measured in the
next part.
8The BDM mechanism is the following: after the participant states her compensation requirement for
performing the task, a random payment is drawn between 0 and 20€. If the stated compensation
requirement is lower than this payment, the subject performs the task and gets this amount. If the
stated compensation requirement is greater than this payment, the participant does not perform the
task and gets no payment.
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In the third part, participants are informed of the situation: the task is worth €20 and
they are matched with another participant. The compensation requirements of both
participants are disclosed and they are informed that only the participant with the lowest
compensation requirement will be performing the task at the end of the session.9 In a
first screen, they declare the minimal offer they would find defendable from the other
participant. This amount will be called the stated normative expectation hereafter. On a
second screen, they chose an offer for the other participant. In each pair, one of the two
offers is randomly selected and implemented. Participants were informed of this process.
This amount will be called the offer. Finally, they were asked to guess the minimal offer
declared by another participant in another pair. Correct guesses were paid €10. This
amount will be called the guessed normative expectation. At this end of this part, the
participants were asked about their perception of the other’s compensation requirement,
what would be a fair allocation in the case S1 = (6, 14) and some individual characteristics
(gender, birth year, and political orientation).
Finally, the participants who were directed to the fourth part had to perform the task.
Participants could leave the room and get paid as soon as they had finished.
5.2.3 Normative reasoning
The second part consisted in a questionnaire performed on a single screen and structured in
two parts. Respondents first read a vignette describing the situation as the one presented
in section 5.1.1.
The two parts of the questionnaire are the following:
1. Judgments over allocation rules: A verbal description of the four allocation
rules introduced in section 5.1.2 is presented along with a justification for each
of them. Their implications are illustrated in the situation S1 = (6, 14). The
participants are asked, for each of them, whether they think they are “fair” or
“unfair” and which one is fairest. This part aims at trigering deductive reasoning
from allocation rules to particular allocations (Hurley et al, 2011).
2. Judgments in particular cases: the participants recommend a quantitative al-
location in the 4 particular cases introduced in section 5.1.2. This part aims at en-
couraging inductive reasoning from particular allocations to allocation rules (Hurley
et al, 2011).
The order of the two parts, of the elements within each part, and of choices was random-
ized. The participants are informed about this. The full questionnaire is presented in
Appendix 5.C.
9In the case in which their compensation requirements are the same, the task performer is randomly
chosen.
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5.2.4 Tests
On top of informing us about how participants use the compensation requirements in
forming their judgments, this experiment intends to test four points. First, whether the
four allocation rules motivated in the first section satisfactorily account for the actual
judgments observed. Second, we intend to test whether respondents actually judge ac-
cording to rules of judgments, or rather whether they follow their intuitions. Third, we
aim at testing whether moral and social judgments significantly differ. Finally, we test
for the effect of reasoning on the stated fairness ideals. .
5.2.4.1 Relevance of the four allocation rules
In the questionnaire, were all the participants following one of the four allocation rules
presented in section 5.1.2, we should expect the modes of the distribution to correspond
to the recommendations of the four rules presented on Figure 5.1. This motivates the
following assumptions.
Test 1. For the particular cases presented in the questionnaire,
1. In the situation S1, four modes are observed, that correspond to 10, 13, 17 and 20.
2. In the situation S2, three modes are observed, that correspond to 10, 13 and 20. The
mode at 13 is greater than in S1 and similar for the other values.
3. In the situation S3, three modes are observed, that correspond to 10, 17 and 20. The
mode at 17 is greater than in S1 and similar for the other values.
4. In the situation S4, three modes are observed, that correspond to 10, 13 and 20. The
mode at 20 is greater than in S1 and similar for the other values.
We may also be interested by the predicted effect of the compensation requirement of each
participant on statements and choices. Note that the welfare egalitarian allocation rule
is the only one that depends on the lower compensation requirement, c1. Similarly, the
weak libertarian allocation rule is the only one that depends on the greater compensation
requirement, c2. Assuming that a significant fraction of the participants follows these
rules while the others follow the two others leads to the following assumptions.
Test 2. For the particular cases presented in the questionnaire, on average, respondents
give more to the task performer
1. in S3 than in S1,
2. in S4 than in S2, and
3. in S2 than in S1.
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Test 3. The normative expectation
1. increases with c1 for the task performer and decreases with c1 for the other partici-
pant.
2. increases with c2 for the task performer and decreases with c2 for the other partici-
pant.
Test 4. The offer
1. decreases with c1 for the task performer and increases with c1 for the other partici-
pant.
2. decreases with c2 for the task performer and increases with c2 for the other partici-
pant.
We also expect this to be reflected in the guessed normative expectations.
Test 5. The normative expectations as guessed by the participants are consistent with
Tests 3.1 and 3.2.
5.2.4.2 Consistency of individual judgments
For the participants that took the questionnaire, we intend to test the consistency between
the judgments expressed in particular situations and the adhesion to one of the four
allocation rules introduced earlier.
Test 6. For each respondent, the Euclidian distance between the answers in particular
cases and the recommendations of the four allocation rules characterized is minimal for
the allocation rule deemed fairest.
We also check that respondents are consistent with their stated fairness ideals with the
following test:
Test 7. For each respondent, a fair allocation to the task performer as reflected in
normative expectations and offers is all the greatest as her stated fairness ideal is in order
the strict egalitarian, the welfare egalitarian, the weak libertarian and the strict libertarian
allocation rule.
5.2.4.3 Difference between isolated and social reasoning
Finally, we are also interested in testing the effect of reasoning and the difference between
judgments expressed in isolation or when trying to coordinate with another participant.
This leads us to the following predictions.
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Test 8. In the questionnaire,
1. judgments over allocation rules expressed in the isolated and social reasoning treat-
ments differ, and
2. the average allocation chosen for the task performer in the isolated and social rea-
soning treatments differ.
5.2.4.4 Effect of reasoning
We eventually test for the effect of reasoning on the average normative expectations and
offers
Test 9. The average normative expectation and the average offer differ between the "no
reasoning" treatment and the two others.
5.3 Results
We present the results in three sections. The first section presents the sample and pro-
vides some descriptive statistics. The following section focuses on the fairness judgments
expressed in the questionnaire. We compare the answers in the “isolated reasoning” and
“social reasoning” treatments, we present and discuss the answers to the particular cases
referring to the framework presented in Section 5.1.2. In the last part, we present the
answers and the choices made in the third part of experiment. We present the effects of
the reasoning treatments, and we analyze how choices and answers depend on the features
of the situation.
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics
The sample is composed of 151 students from Toulouse, mainly in Law, Management
and Economics. 43% (65) were male. The average age was 21.5 year old. For the 136
participants having informed their political preferences from left to right on a scale from
1 to 10, the average index is 5.3.
No significant difference is observed across them in terms of gender, age or political
preferences. It is however noticed that there are significantly fewer students in law,
management and political sciences and more students in economics in the “no reasoning”
treatment group than in the other two.10
The compensation requirements range from 0 to 19€, on average 9.3€. The participants
spent on average 4.3 minutes on the first trial and 26 minutes on the final task (from 11
10A precise description is provided in Appendix.
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to 46 min). Each pair consists in a participant with a lower compensation requirement,
hereafter called the task performer, and a participant with a higher compensation require-
ment, hereafter called the other participant. In the event both participants in a pair have
the same compensation requirement, the roles are allocated randomly.11 Table 5.1 shows
that a reasonable diversity of situations is achieved.
Mean (sd) min max
c1 6.3 (2.4) 0 10
c2 12.3 (2.3) 8 19
c2 − c1 6.1 (3.5) 0 13
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the compensation requirements in the pairs.
c1 denotes the lower compensation requirement in the pair, that is the compensation
requirement of the task performer, and c2 the compensation requirement of the other
participant. c2− c1 denotes the discrepancy between the two compensation requirements
in the pair.
5.3.2 Fairness judgments in the questionnaire
The questionnaire corresponds to the second part of the experiment on Figure 5.1. As
explained in subsection 5.2.3, it consists in two parts that were presented in a random
order to the respondents. In this section, we first present and discuss their answers to
each part separately. Then, we further discuss and relate them.
5.3.2.1 Judgments over allocation rules
In this part, the respondents were presented the four allocation rules motivated in Sec-
tion 5.1.2. The recommendations of each allocation rule were illustrated in the situation
(6, 14). Respondents were asked to declare whether each of the four allocation rules was
fair or unfair and which was the fairest. The order according to which the rules were
presented was random.
The judgments expressed concerning each allocation rule are presented in Figure 5.1.
It suggests that respondents reject the strict egalitarian allocation rule, are divided on
the strict libertarian allocation rule and generally tend to judge the two intermediate
allocation rules as fair.12 The welfare egalitarian allocation rule appears to be the most
favored rule overall.
As for Test 8.1, it seems that respondents judge the welfare egalitarian allocation rule as
fair and fairest more often in the social reasoning treatment. Still, these observations are
11This was the case for 3 pairs out of 66.
1272% of the participants deem more than a single allocation rule fair. The average number of allocation
rules deemed fair is 1.9.
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not statistically significant (respective 2-sided 2-sample test for equality of proportions,
p-value = 0.364 and 0.135).
5.3.2.2 Answers to the particular cases
In this part, the respondents were asked to recommend a fair allocation to the task
performer in the four particular situations introduced in section 5.1.2. The situations
were presented in a random order.
Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of answers in each of the four cases. Consistently
with Test 1, we observe the four modes corresponding to the four allocation rules in the
situation (6, 14) and, on each chart, the main mode corresponds to the recommendation
of one of the four allocation rules: the strict egalitarian allocation is the most chosen
alternative in the cases (6, 6) and (14, 14), the welfare egalitarian allocation in the case
(6, 14) and the libertarian allocations in the case (6, 20). Still, part of the test fails. The
mode on the strict egalitarian allocations is strikingly much greater in the situations (6, 6)
and (14, 14) than predicted. Besides, we observe an additional mode on the allocation
14 in the situation (14, 14) that is not predicted by any of the four allocation rules.
One possible account could be the reliance on a constrained egalitarian rule that split the
benefit equally under the constraint that the task performer gets at least her compensation
requirement. Another unexpected observation is the high support for the equal split
whenever the participants have the same compensation requirement, and the high support
for the libertarian allocations in situations in which the second participants feature so high
a compensation requirement that the task would have no value to her anyway.13
Figure 5.3 shows the average amount allocated to the task performer in each of these
situations. Consistently with Tests 2.2 and 2.3, the amount granted to the task performer
generally increases with the greater cost. It increases from the situation (6, 6) to (6, 14)
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value<0.001) and from (6, 14) to (6, 20) (Wilcoxon rank-sum
test, p-value<0.001). However, we do not observe that the average amount granted to the
task performer increases from the situation (6, 14) to (14, 14). This result is surprising
as this is what the welfare egalitarian allocation rule, the most chosen rule in the other
part, would recommend. While this contradicts Test 2.1, this may be due to the specific
treatment of case in which the participants feature the same compensation requirement.
Figure 5.3 further suggests that respondents tend to give more to the task performer in
the isolated reasoning treatment. This difference is statistically significant in the cases
(6, 6), (14, 14) and (6, 14) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respective p-value are 0.0703, 0.00986
and 0.09349) but not in the case (6, 20). While this seems to confirm Test 8., this may
13This is referred to as the no-dummy principle in axiomatic analyses.
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be interpreted with care as this may be due to a different distribution of types in the two
treatments that may not be significant given the size of the sample.
In summary, while part the previous observations are consistent with the tests intended,
some surprising facts question the idea that respondents have a clear preference for a
given rule among the four we consider. It rather suggests that the judgments observed
in each particular situation vary in a way that none of the four allocation rule is able to
account for.
In order to further assess the consistency of the individual answers with each of the
allocation rules, Test 6 proposes to classify participants according to the average distance
of their particular answers to the recommendations of each of the allocation rule presented
in Table 5.1. For instance, consider a participant who would have respectively answered
10, 10, 20 and 13 to the cases (6, 6), (14, 14), (6, 20), and (6, 14). The respective distances
to the recommendations of the four allocation rules SE, WE, WL and SL are 3.25, 4.25,
3.5 and 6.75. It is minimal for the strict egalitarian allocation rule so we would classify this
respondent as a strict egalitarian. The classification obtained is presented in Table 5.2.
Only 35 (40%) of the 88 respondents are classified consistently with the fairness ideal they
choose in the other part of the questionnaire with this procedure. This contradicts Test 6
and confirms that a significant part of the respondents does not consistently apply one of
the four allocation rules across all the cases. In order to get an idea of the proportion of
respondents which are influenced by the features of the situation, we add a fifth possibility
that consists in the choice of the most intuitive allocation in each of the situation, where
the most intuitive allocation is defined as the main mode observed. This leads to the
respectively recommend to allocate €10, €10, €20 and €13 to the task performer in the
cases (6, 6), (14, 14), (6, 20), and (6, 14). Adding this possibility leads to capture 25% of
the respondents that would have otherwise been classified as strict egalitarians or weak
libertarians.
In summary, the choices made in particular situations give us a different picture on fairness
judgments as the one suggested at the beginning. Consistently with the recommendation
of the libertarian allocation rules, a majority of respondents deem fair to give nothing to
someone who would not be willing to perform the task. Consistently with the strict egali-
tarian rule, a significant propotion of the respondents deem fair to split the benefit equally
when both participants feature the same compensation requirement. However, a signif-
icant proportion of the respondents does not seek to make consistent recommendations
across cases in the sense of the four allocation rules we proposed.
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Figure 5.1: Proportion of respondents judging each allocation rule as “fair” against “un-
fair” (on the left) and proportion of respondents judging each rule as the
“fairest” (on the right) in each treatment.
SE WE=WL SL 
Case (6,6) Case (14,14) 
Case (6,20) Case (6,14) 
SE WE=WL SL 
SE WE WL=SL SE WL SL WE 
Figure 5.2: Distribution of the allocation recommended for the task performer in each
case.
The recommendations associated with each allocation rule are indicated below.
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Figure 5.3: Average allocation to the task performer in each of the particular cases by
treatments.
SE WE WL SL Situation specific
Isolated reasoning 13 11 14 6 -
Social reasoning 17 11 14 2 -
Allocation rules first 12 13 14 6 -
Cases first 18 9 14 2 -
Total number 30 22 28 8 -
34% 25% 32% 9% -
Total number 18 22 18 8 22
20% 25% 20% 9% 25%
Table 5.2: Classification of respondents according to their answers to the particular cases.
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5.3.2.3 Further analysis and discussion
The reflective equilibrium procedure allows the judgments in particular cases and over
allocation rules to affect each other both ways until an equilibrium is reached. However, in
spite of the fact that participants were allowed to revise their answers, only 17 respondents
(19%) did revise some answers to one part after having started answering the next one.14
Besides, we observe in Figure 5.4 that the allocation recommended to the task performer in
the particular case is systematically higher when respondents are invited to express their
judgments on allocation rules first. This results is statistically significant for the cases
(6,6), (14,14) and (6,14) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, respective p-value are 0.03156, 0.0806
and 0.09064), but not for the case (6,20) (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.2341).
Figure 5.5 suggests that this difference could be driven by the different distribution of
fairness ideals in the two groups. Indeed we observe that the number of respondents
judging the strict egalitarian allocation rule (resp. the strict egalitarian rule) as the fairest
is higher (resp. lower) when rules are presented first. Even though, these differences are
not statistically significant (2-sample test for equality of proportions respective p-values
are 0.1237 and 0.1651), they could explain the higher average amount allocated to the
task performer when rules are presented first. This may be mitigated by the fact that
the weak libertarian allocation rule seems to be more chosen when cases are presented
first. However, this results is not statistically significant either (2-sample test for equality
of proportions, p-value=0.2677). This analysis suggests that judgments expressed in the
questionnaire are not in equilibrium. However, these effects would have to be confirmed
by a more focused and powered experiment.
5.3.3 Choices
After their situation is disclosed to them, the participants successively declared their
normative expectation regarding how the other should split the revenue from the task,
specified an offer to the other participant and guessed another participant’s normative
expectation. In this section, we present each of these measures and explore how they
depend on the treatments and the features of the situation.
5.3.3.1 Normative expectations
Normative expectations correspond to the answer to the question “Would the other par-
ticipant share the value of the task, what would be the minimal amount that he gives
14As observed in Amiel and Cowell (1999), participants seem reluctant to revise their answers even when
they are invited to do so.
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Figure 5.4: Average allocation to the task performer in each of the particular cases ac-
cording to the order of the two parts.
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Figure 5.5: Proportion of respondents judging each allocation rule as “fair” (against “un-
fair”) (on the left) and proportion of respondents choosing each allocation rule
as “the fairest” (on the right) according to the order of the two parts.
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you that you would find defendable?”. The participants are informed that their answer to
this question has no consequence on their final payment and that this amount will never
be disclosed to the other participant. In the last situation, they are asked to guess the
answer of another participant in the opposite role. Correct guesses are paid €10.
Figure 5.6 presents the average normative expectations by treatment and role. On aver-
age, the task performers declared to find defendable offers that are not lower than 12.9€
and the other participants, 7.9€. As for Test 9, the overall effect of the treatment is
to increase the amount expected by the task performers (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value=0.00407) and decrease the amount expected by the other participants (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p-value=0.04704). The average guessed normative expectations are shown
on Figure 5.7. They are on average of 12.6€ for the task performers and 8.5€ for the
others. Test 5 is partly confirmed. The treatment effect on normative expectations is
consistent with the effect observed on guesses: participants who will not perform the
task are expected to expect lower amounts (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value=0.04636).
However, the guessed amount expected by the task performers cannot be said to be sta-
tistically lower for the no reasoning treatment as compared to the two others (Wilcoxon
rank-sum test, p-value=0.153). The cumulative distribution of the stated normative ex-
pectations is presented on Figure 5.8 by treatment and role. The difference observed for
the task performers seems to be mainly driven by a departure from the equal split whereas
the origin of this difference is more diffuse for the other participants.
As suggested by the answers to the questionnaire, the situation influences the perceived
fair amount in two ways. First, while the strict egalitarian and the strict libertarian
position are insensitive to the costs, the welfare egalitarian allocation rule recommends a
higher payment to the task performer as her own cost grows while the weak libertarian
allocation rule recommends to give more to the task performer when as the other’s cost
grows. This motivates Test 3. Furthermore, the answers to the questionnaire suggest that
the salient features of a situation tend to favor the application of different allocation rules.
Therefore, we expect normative expectations to depend on the compensation requirements
of the participants in the pair. Results are presented in Table 5.3. We first observe that the
participants that will not perform the task do not expect significantly different payments
depending on their situation. Contrary to what our framework predicts, results rather
suggest that the higher their own cost, the more they expect. Task performers also feature
surprising expectations. Regression 1 suggests that their normative expectations would
increase with the other’s cost but also that they decrease with their own cost. This
last result cannot be explained by any of the allocation rules considered. It suggests
that a better model would account for their normative expectations on the basis of the
difference between the two compensation requirements of participants. This corresponds
to Regression 2.
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Task performers Others
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Figure 5.6: Average stated normative expectations by treatment and role.
Stated normative expectations correspond to the answer to the question “Would the other
participant be to split the value of the task, what would be the minimal amount that he
gives you that you would find defendable?”.
Task performers Others
No reasoning
Isolated reasoning
Social reasoning
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Figure 5.7: Average guess of the stated normative expectations of another participant in
the opposite role by treatment and role.
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Figure 5.8: Cumulative distribution functions of stated normative expectations for task
performers (on the left) and others (on the right).
Task performers Others
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
c1 −0.31∗ −0.04
(0.16) (0.20)
c2 0.30∗ 0.36∗
(0.16) (0.21)
c2-c1 0.30∗∗∗ 0.20
(0.11) (0.14)
No Reasoning −2.24∗∗∗ −2.24∗∗∗ 1.78∗ 1.67
(0.80) (0.79) (1.03) (1.02)
Male −0.46 −0.45 −0.25 −0.19
(0.80) (0.79) (1.00) (1.00)
Age 0.56∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.20 0.18
(0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
(Intercept) 0.19 0.10 −1.16 2.23
(5.58) (5.25) (6.24) (5.37)
R2 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.08
Adj. R2 0.16 0.17 0.03 0.02
Num. obs. 65 65 66 66
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.3: Effect of the compensation requirements on declared normative expectations.
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5.3.3.2 Offers
After having stated their normative expectations, the participants were invited to propose
an allocation of the €20. They were informed that the other participant was also choosing
one and that the offer that would eventually be implemented would be drawn randomly.
Figure 5.9 shows the average normative expectations by treatment and role. On average,
the task performers offered 6.7€ and others, 9.8€. Test ?? is not observed: no statis-
tically significant difference is observed between the “no reasoning” treatment and the
two others (Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value=0.1586). Test 4 is not observed either: the
compensation requirements in the pair are not found to significantly affect the offers. The
distribution of offers is presented in Figure 5.10.
As for Test 7, Table 5.4 presents regressions of the fair wage derived from the normative
expectations and the offer on the fairness ideals deduced from the questionnaire for par-
ticipants in the reasoning treatments. We observe that the answers that the fair wage
tend to be higher for individuals that are classified as strong libertarians according to
their answers to the particular cases. Still, the verbal statements fail to account for the
observed offers.
5.3.3.3 Stated fairness judgments in the final questionnaire
In the final questionnaire, participants were invited to recommend an allocation for the
task performer and justify it in the situation (6, 14). Figure 5.11 present their final
answers. This last question confirms the existence of a large diversity of views and the
potential for the four allocation rules proposed to focus the attention. The justifications
provided are presented in Appendix.
5.4 Discussion
Individual fairness judgments predict behavior. In some circumstances, we may expect
them to be primary motive. Still, they may result from spontaneous feelings, heuristics,
or customary association of ideas. They may also be sensitive to subtle cues. They may
also significantly differ depending on the context in which they are expressed. Facing this,
we propose to identify some patterns that are likely to be driven by the structure of this
problem. Few studies have studied individual fairness judgments in this structure.15
15As mentioned in the introduction, Schokkaert et al (2007) is another study that focus on a similar
structure.
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Figure 5.9: Average offer by treatment and role.
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Figure 5.10: Cumulative distribution function of offers from task performers (on the left)
and others (on the right).
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Stated fair wage Chosen wage
Constant 10.25∗∗∗ 7.63∗∗∗
(1.36) (2.06)
Consistent WE 0.49 1.53
(0.96) (1.45)
Consistent WL 2.87∗∗∗ 1.73
(1.01) (1.53)
Consistent SL 5.22∗∗∗ 4.96∗∗
(1.32) (1.99)
Consistent situation spec. 1.65 −1.35
(1.01) (1.52)
Stated ideal WE 1.24 1.52
(1.47) (2.23)
Stated ideal WL −0.04 1.03
(1.54) (2.33)
Stated ideal SL 1.96 0.23
(1.64) (2.48)
Task performer 0.44 4.07∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.98)
R2 0.34 0.27
Adj. R2 0.27 0.19
Num. obs. 88 88
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.1
Table 5.4: Determinants of the stated fair wage in the questionnaire and the chosen wage
for participants in the reasoning treatments.
For the task performer, the stated fair wage is defined as her normative expectations. For the
other, it corresponds to the difference between 20€ and the normative expectation of the other
participant. The chosen wage is the difference between 20€ and her offer for the task performer
and her offer for the other participant. The stated fairness ideals (above) corresponds to the
preference expressed over the allocation rule in the questionnaire. The derived fairness ideals
(below) correspond to the adhesion to the allocation rule inferred from the judgments expressed
in the particular cases as detailed in subsection 5.3.2.2.
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Figure 5.11: Allocation to the task performer in the situation (6, 14) recommended in the
final questionnaire.
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Our three main findings are the following. First, this experiment confirms that fairness
judgments are sensitive to reasoning. More precisely, we observed that answering the
questionnaire has the effect of increasing the normative expectations of the task performer
and decreasing the normative expectations of others. It is more pronounced for the task
performers themselves and seems to be mainly explained by a move away from the equal
split for the task performers. However, no significant effect is observed for the actual
allocation choices in the dictator phase, which may be due to a lack of power. Actually,
the effect of the treatment on the fraction of participants choosing the equal split is
significant both for the stated normative expectations and the offers of the task performers.
Second, we stress some apparently wide convergence on individual judgments. The first
observation is that a majority of respondents deem fair to give nothing to someone who
would not be willing to perform the task. This corresponds to the no-dummy principle
in axiomatic studies. A second observation is that respondents tend to split the benefit
equally when both participants feature the same compensation requirement. We suspect
that this is driven by a heuristic, which would need to be explored further. Third, we
observe that the normative expectations of the participants are sensitive to the differential
in costs in a pair.
Despite these observations, we note that none of the proposed allocation rules is able
to account for the variations of observed judgments across particular cases, nor for the
fact that normative expectation increase with the differential in compensation require-
ments in a pair. This could be accounted for in two directions. A first possibility is that
participants follow their first intuition and do not seek to be consistent across all these
cases. In other word, the judgments observed are not in reflective equilibrium (Rawls,
1951). It is true that normative reasoning requires a high cognitive involvement, even
in this stylized situation. Further experiment could question whether individuals value
being consistent across cases and how participants would react when made aware of their
“moral mistakes”, understood as the inconsistencies in their judgments or the potentially
undesirable consequences of their adopted principles. Social psychologists suggest that
reasoning would best be incentivized in social interactions (Mercier et Landemore, 2012).
It would be interesting to raise the question of whether individuals care about others be-
ing consistent when having to explicitly justify their choice to others. Another question is
about whether individuals tend to accept a single or several allocations. In their final jus-
tification, many participants expressed a mere desire to give more to the task performer,
while being very lax in justifying how much this difference should be.16 The effect of
reasoning on tolerance rather than on fairness ideals may actually be an interesting route
to pursue for consensus building. There exists a second way to deal with the apparent
inconsistencies observed in this experiment. It relies on the possibility that different allo-
16In the questionnaire, 72% of the respondents deemed several allocation rules as fair (against unfair)
(on average 1.9).
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cation rules than the one we considered may be consistent with the choices and judgments
observed, while still meeting desirable principles. In the context at hand, this raises the
question of whether allocation rules that would be sensitive to the differential between
costs could be grounded in principles.
In the end, none of the four allocation rules proposed stands out. However, at least
three of them have some attractive features that make them more relevant in different
settings. First the strict egalitarian allocation rule seems to be spontaneously chosen by
participants. This is consistent with the idea that the equal split is a widespread heuristic.
It is also the allocation that attracted most answers to the guess. Therefore, it could be
proposed in settings in which little time for reflection is available or when participants
have to coordinate on their expectations with limited communication. However, we also
observe that reasoning leads to a general departure from it and that it attracts little
support as a general allocation rule in the questionnaire. In contrast, it is the welfare
egalitarian allocation rule which seems to attract most support in the questionnaire, both
as a general allocation rule and in the particular case (6, 14). It would constitute a good
candidate in the context of a deliberation about a specific situation. However, few actual
choices seem to be consistent with this allocation rule in specific situations. In particular,
we find no evidence that participants are willing to pay the task performer more, nor that
the task performer expects to get more when his compensation requirement gets higher.
Besides, this allocation rule fails to capture the judgments expressed in the situation
(6, 20). Finally, the weak libertarian solution seems to best conciliate the tendencies
observed in particular cases. In all the four particular cases considered, it is the allocation
rule that seems to constitute an attractive middle ground between the idea that one should
get the outcome of her own work as soon as no one is deprived from an opportunity and
redistribute to some extent. However, it does not account for the particular judgments
expressed in the symmetric cases (6, 6) and (14, 14).
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Conclusion
This experiment constitutes a preliminary investigation into the formation of individual
fairness judgments for the allocation of an indivisible task and its benefit. This situation
is particularly interesting as it requires some degree of normative reasoning and allows
us to bring together the theory of fair allocations and the empirical methods for the
observation of individual fairness judgments. Furthermore, this situation features the
basic structure of many problems of current interest, such as the allocation of property
rights over pollution (emission rights) or the extraction of natural resources (water or
fishing quotas). Another policy context could be the allocation of locally undesirable
land uses among communities.
The results presented confirm that judgments hold on two widely shared but conflicting
norms. On the one hand, we find that many respondents deem the task performer entitled
to the benefit of the task. In particular, we observe a wide adhesion to the no-dummy
principle, which requires giving nothing to someone who would not be willing to perform
the task. On the other hand, we also observe strong egalitarian motives, which manifest in
different and sometimes contradictory ways. For instance, we observe that a vast majority
of the respondents favor the welfare egalitarian allocation rule but that most of them would
choose to split the benefit of the task equally when both participants feature the same
compensation requirement. As such, the observation may call for the characterization of
alternative allocation rules or question the internal consistency of individual judgments. In
any case, the ways in which the respondents account for their judgments and adjust their
beliefs would constitute a further step toward a characterization of reasoned judgments
in this context.
Overall, and despite a relatively uniform sample in terms of age and background, a sig-
nificant diversity of fairness views is observed. This lead us to suggest that this setting
could be useful to address more fundamental questions about normative reasoning, the
individual sense of justice and the possibility of an overlapping consensus (Rawls, 1993)
in the presence of contrasted moral intuitions. Furthermore, we observe that self-declared
political preferences did correlate with some answers. For instance, right-wing oriented
participants tended to judge the welfare egalitarian allocation as the fairest less often. As
one’s political ideology may conflict with one’s self interest in the context of this experi-
ment, this situation may also prove interesting to study the relative role of deliberation,
ideology and self-interest in shaping the judgments of actual stakeholders. In the end,
we hope that the results presented here and the question raised by this analysis would
motivate further inquiries in this specific setting.
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5.A Sample
Table 5.A.1 presents individual and situational characteristics in the three treatments.
All (132) NR (44) IR (44) SR (44)
Individual characteristics
Male 59 20 19 20
Age 21.6 21.8 21.4 21.5
Political preference 5.3 5.2 5.5 5.2
Law, Management and Political science 72 19 27 26
Economics 34 16 7 11
Other 26 9 10 7
Situational characteristics
c1 6.3 6.0 6.5 6.5
c2 12.3 12.2 12.5 12.3
c2 − c1 6.1 6.2 6.1 5.9
Table 5.A.1: Descriptive statistics of individual and situational characteristics across the
treatments.
NR, IR and SR respectively denote the “No reasoning”, “Isolated reasoning” and “So-
cial reasoning” treatments. The significant differences are reported in bold. There are
significantly less student in law (NR-IR 2-sample test for equality of proportions, p-
value=0.06759 and NR-SR 2-sample test for equality of proportions, p-value=0.10759)
and more students in economics in the “no reasoning” treatment than in the other two.
5.B Experimental conditions
The experiment used TSE’s mobile lab. Pictures of the stations are provided by Figure
5.B.1.
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Figure 5.B.1: Experimental room and an individual station.
5.C Detailed screens
5.C.1 Proceedings
The experiment proceeds as follows :
• Introduction
Screen 1: Welcome message, general instructions, and consent form
• Part 1: Elicitation of the compensation requirement
Screen 2: (Introduction Part 1)
Screen 3: (Elementary task) Participants perform a first elementary task: they count
the number of occurrence of a letter in a square of randomly generated letters.
Screen 4: (Elicitation) Participants are asked their compensation requirements to per-
form the elementary task 10 times. Truthful revelation is incentivized by some
possibility to play a Becker-De Groot-Marschak mechanism.17
Screen 5: (Waiting screen) Participants wait for all the others in their session to reach
this stage. When it is the case, they are matched into pairs, pairs are allocated
into treatments18 and they are directed to the next page.
17The mechanism is the following: a random number is drawn in [0,20]. If the stated compensation
requirement is lower than this number, the subject is offered to perform the task and paid this
amount. If the stated compensation requirement is lower than this amount, the subject does not get
the opportunity to perform the task. We do not want the revelation to be truthful but want this
information to be credible.
18The matching process in described in Appendix.
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• Part 2: Normative reasoning (treatments “isolated reasoning” and “social reason-
ing” only)
Screen 6: (Introduction Part 2)
Screen 7: (Normative reasoning) Participants fill in a questionnaire that depends on
their treatment. This is the only screen which varies across treatments. In the
treatments with normative reasoning, they are presented a vignette which is
said to reflect the situation they will be involved in. Details are provided in a
next subsection.
• Part 3: Elicitation of moral preferences and normative expectations
Screen 8: (Introduction Part 3) Participants are revealed the two compensation re-
quirements in their pair, that the individual with the lower compensation re-
quirement will be asked to perform the task.
Screen 9: (Stated normative expectations) Participants state the minimal offer they
would find appropriate from the other participants. They are told that this
statement would in no way influence they final payoff and not be observed by
the other participant, nor the experimenter.
Screen10: (Dictator game) All participants specify an offer, knowing that one of the
two offers in their pair will be randomly implemented.
Screen11: (Elicitation of normative expectations) Subjects are asked to guess the
minimal offer another participant, in a different situation, deemed appropriate.
Correct guess is incentivized.
• Part 4: Task (for the relevant subjects only)
Screen12: (Introduction Part 4)
Screen13: (Task) The subjects with the lower compensation requirements in their pair
perform the task. The other subjects skip this stage.
Screen14: (Waiting screen)
• Concluding screens
Screen15: (Final questionnaire) Questionnaire about socio-demographic characteris-
tics.
Screen16: (Results) Final screen.
5.C.2 Screenshots
The following screenshots correspond to the “Social reasoning” treatment. Some comments
are provided below each screen. For screens 7 and 15, all information is not visible on a single
screen. The detailed text is added below.
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Screen 1
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Screen 2
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Screen 3
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Screen 4
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Screen 6
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The detailed text of the screen is the following:
Partie 2
Vous êtes associé à un autre participant. Il faut que deviniez ce que l’autre partic-
ipant va répondre au questionnaire suivant sachant que lui aussi essaye de deviner
ce que vous allez répondre. Votre objectif commun est donc de fournir des réponses
aussi similaires que possibles. Vous serez informé de votre performance à la fin de
l’expérience.
Le questionnaire est structuré en deux parties. L’ordre des parties et des éléments au
sein des parties est aléatoire. Il n’est sans doute pas le même pour vous et lui.
Deux personnes, A et B, expriment séparément les montants minimaux pour lesquels
ils sont prêts à accomplir dix fois la tâche proposée précédemment. La personne A
déclare que cette tâche a un coût de 6€ pour elle et la personne B, un coût de 14€
pour elle. Cette tâche apporte un paiement de 20€ qui peut être partagé. Cependant,
elle ne peut être réalisée qu’une fois. Elle sera réalisée par l’un de ceux qui ont déclaré
le montant le plus bas. La personne A est donc retenue pour réaliser cette tâche.
Cas particuliers
Chacun des cas suivants est identique à la situation décrite au départ, sauf que les
coûts déclarés par les participants ne sont pas les mêmes. Dans chacun de ces cas,
nous vous demandons de recommander un partage juste du paiement de 20€. Avec
un autre participant, votre objectif commun est de fournir les mêmes réponses.
Cas 1 : la personne A déclare que la tâche représente pour elle un coût de 6€ et B,
un coût de 14€. La personne A est retenue pour réaliser la tâche.
• Part de A : € (veuillez entrer un montant compris entre 0 et 20€)
• Part de B :
Cas 2 : la personne A déclare que la tâche représente pour elle un coût de 6€ et B,
un coût de 20€. La personne A est retenue pour réaliser la tâche.
• Part de A : € (veuillez entrer un montant compris entre 0 et 20€)
• Part de B :
Cas 3 : la personne A déclare que la tâche représente pour elle un coût de 14€ et B,
un coût de 14€. La personne A est retenue pour réaliser la tâche.
• Part de A : € (veuillez entrer un montant compris entre 0 et 20€)
• Part de B :
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Cas 4 : la personne A déclare que la tâche représente pour elle un coût de 6€ et B,
un coût de 6€. La personne A est retenue pour réaliser la tâche.
• Part de A : € (veuillez entrer un montant compris entre 0 et 20€)
• Part de B :
Propositions
Vous êtes invité à considérer quatre propositions de partage du paiement de 20€.
Ces propositions sont illustrées dans la situation présentée en début de page. Les
propositions de partage suivantes peuvent-elles être considérées comme justes ? Avec
un autre participant, votre objectif commun est de fournir les mêmes réponses.
Proposition 1 : "Les deux participants devraient recevoir la même somme après avoir
compensé la personne qui réalise la tâche pour son effort. La personne qui réalise la
tâche devrait donc être compensée à hauteur de son propre coût, ici 6€, et le reste,
ici 20€- 6€=14€, devrait être partagé en parts égales. Dans le cas présenté, A devrait
donc recevoir 13€ et B, 7€."
• Juste
• Injuste
Proposition 2 : "Le paiement de la tâche devrait revenir à la personne qui la réalise.
Dans le cas présenté, A devrait donc recevoir 20€ et B, 0€. "
• Juste
• Injuste
Proposition 3 : "Les deux participants devraient recevoir la même somme. Dans le
cas présenté, A devrait donc recevoir 10€ et B, 10€. "
• Juste
• Injuste
Proposition 4 : "Le paiement de la tâche devrait revenir à la personne qui la réalise
après avoir compensé la personne qui ne la réalise pas pour le fait d’être privé de
cette opportunité. Cette dernière devrait recevoir la moitié de la différence entre le
paiement de 20€ et son propre coût, ici (20€-14€)/2=3€, et la personne qui réalise la
tâche devrait recevoir le reste, ici 20€-3€=17€. Dans le cas présenté, A devrait donc
recevoir 17€ et B, 3€."
• Juste
• Injuste
Laquelle de ces propositions peut être considérée comme la plus juste ?
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• La proposition 1
• La proposition 2
• La proposition 3
• La proposition 4
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Screen 8
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The detailed questionnaire is the following:
Questionnaire final
Vos réponses aux 6 questions suivantes sont anonymes et confidentielles. Merci de
bien vouloir y répondre avec attention. Il vous sera ensuite demandé de réaliser la
tâche. Suite à cela, l’expérience sera terminée.
Question 1
L’autre participant a déclaré que le coût que représente pour lui le fait de réaliser
dix fois la tâche précédente à la fin de la session est de 16€. Que pensez-vous de ce
montant ?
• Il est sans doute involontairement sous-évalué
• Il est sans doute volontairement sur-évalué
• Il est sans doute involontairement sur-évalué
• Il est sans doute volontairement sous-évalué
• Il reflète de manière crédible le coût de faire la tâche pour cette personne
• Aucune de ces propositions
Pouvez-vous nous préciser les raisons de votre réponse à cette question ?
Question 2
Nous vous invitons à considérer la situation suivante. La tâche consiste à réaliser
dix fois la tâche que vous avez réalisée au début de la session. Imaginez que deux
personnes, A et B, expriment séparément les montants pour lesquels ils sont prêts à
accomplir cette tâche. La personne A déclare que la tâche a un coût de 6€ pour elle et
la personne B, un coût de 14€ pour elle. Cette tâche apporte un paiement de 20€ qui
peut être partagé. Cependant, elle ne peut être réalisée qu’une fois. Il est demandé à
la personne pour qui le coût de la tâche est le plus bas, c’est-à-dire A, de la réaliser.
Dans cette situation, quel partage du paiement de 20€ vous semble le plus juste ?
• € pour la personne A, qui réalisera cette tâche
• - € pour la personne B, qui ne réalisera pas cette tâche
Pouvez-vous nous préciser les raisons de votre réponse à cette question ?
Question 3
Vous êtes :
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• un homme
• une femme
Question 4
Quelle est votre année de naissance ?
Question 5
Quel est votre domaine d’études ?
• Santé et Sport
• Sciences (Physiques, Chimie, etc.)
• Ingénieurie
• Art, Littérature et Sciences Humaines
• Droit, Sciences de Gestion et Sciences Politiques
• Economie
• Autres
Question 6
En politique, les gens parlent parfois de droite et de gauche. Où vous situriez-vous
sur une échelle de 1 à 10, où 1 signifierait la gauche et 10 la droite ?
Gauche 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Droite
• Ne souhaite pas répondre
Si vous avez des commentaires à ajouter concernant l’expérience, vous pouvez le faire
dans l’espace ci-dessous.
Vous pouvez cliquer sur le bouton suivant pour poursuivre.
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Screen 13
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5.D Matching process
We run 6 sessions in which pairs are formed and allocated into 3 treatments. Our aim is
to obtain a fair diversity of pairs within each treatment but a similar distribution of the
pairs between the treatments. Given the small size of the sample, a random process can be
improved by directing allocation of pairs into treatments in order to keep the distribution
of pairs comparable between the 3 treatments.
The problem is the following, for each session s ∈ {1, ..., 6}, we get a list of compensation
requirements c = (c1, ..., cks), where ks is the number of subjects in session s (an even
number below 18). We have to form ks
2
pairs and allocate them into the 3 treatments
sequentially. We intend to form a reasonable diversity of pairs and achieve a comparable
distribution of the pairs within each treatment in a reasonable execution time.
Protocol
The matching protocol will consist in two stages, performed for each session:
• A protocol to allocate participants in the BDM mechanism
• A protocol to form pairs
• A protocol to allocate pairs into the treatments
For a pair of pairs t = {{c11, c
1
2}, {c
2
1, c
2
2}} the spread S(t) between the pairs is defined as
follows:
S(t) = max(|c21 − c
1
1|, |c
2
2 − c
1
2|, ||c
1
2 − c
1
1| − |c
2
2 − c
2
1||)
The spread of a triplet is defined as the maximal spread over all pairs of its elements.
The scheme of the algorithm is the following: for each session rank the compensation
requirements in increasing order and randomly match participants in the lower half with
a participant in the upper half. Then compose triplets of all existing pairs in order to
minimize the average spread of the triplets. Within each triplet, randomly allocate pairs
into the treatments that are not already allocated. The minimization of the average spread
over triplets is a NP-hard problem. It cannot be optimized to be performed in polynomial
time. Even with a dozen of pairs the exploration of all possible matchings into treatments
could potentially require intensive computation. Given that the matching is performed
during the sessions, we want it to be executed fast. Then, we propose a greedy algorithm,
less computationally intensive. This approach does not lead to the global optimum but
would still reach satisfactory solutions.
• Pair formation: at each stage,
1. Rank the compensation requirements in increasing order
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2. Randomly match a subject in the lower half with a subject in the upper half
• Allocations of pairs into treatments: at each stage,
1. Find a matching among the newly generated pairs that minimizes the average
spread (full optimization).
2. Sequentially explore and implement permutations between the new pairs and
pairs in existing triplets that strictly reduces the average spread until no such
opportunity exists.
3. Allocate treatment randomly with the constraint not to repeat already existing
treatments within each matching
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Abstract
We consider the decentralised provision of a global public good with local externalities in
a spatially explicit model. Communities decide on the location of a facility that benefits
everyone but exhibits costs to the host and its neighbors. They share the costs through
transfers. We examine cooperative games associated with this so-called NIMBY (“Not In
My Back-Yard") problem. We derive and discuss conditions for core solutions to exist.
These conditions are driven by the temptation to exclude groups of neighbors at any
potential location. We illustrate the results in different spatial settings. These results
clarify how property rights can affect cooperation and shed further light on a limitation
of the Coase theorem.
Keywords: NIMBY, externality, Coase theorem, pollution, waste, core, cooperative
game, spatial model.
JEL codes: C71, D62, Q53, R53.
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Introduction
The production of activities that are harmful to society is the source of a famous contro-
versy between Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase. In such a context, Pigou recommended
that the producers pay the harmful damages inflicted on third parties. Using the example
of the sparks from railway engines that set fire to woods surrounding the tracks, Pigou
(1920) argued that the railways should be forced to compensate those whose woods are
burnt. In the same example, Coase (1960) challenged the Pigouvian solution. He argued
that the parties involved could resolve the problem themselves in the absence of transac-
tion costs, provided the property rights on harmful externalities (or liability rules) were
assigned to one of them. Such Coasean bargaining would lead to efficiency, regardless of
the allocation of property rights. This is known as the “Coase Theorem”.
The Coase theorem was subsequently invalidated in cooperative settings involving more
than two players. A famous instance is a version of the Shapley and Shubik garbage game
(1969), in which three neighbors decide on where to dump their garbage. For instance,
let the disutility of having waste in one’s backyard be −1 for one bag of garbage and −2
both for 2 and 3 bags of garbage. When utility is transferable, the efficient outcome is for
the three agents to cooperate and to locate the garbage in the backyard of one of them.
The total disutility so achieved is −2. Coasean bargaining predicts that, in the absence of
transaction costs, they will exchange garbage and money to reach such a socially optimal
outcome. Yet, if a player has the right to dispose of garbage as she or he likes, every group
of two players will prefer to dump their garbage into the third player’s garden without
compensating her or him. In the previous example, one can easily check that whatever
way they share the total cost, there will always be a couple of players willing to withdraw
and coordinate their dumping on the third player: this game has an empty “core”’.2
More generally, Starrett (1973) pointed out that economies with nonconvexities can have
an empty core. Aivazian and Callen (1981) make a similar argument: they provide an
example with a polluting facility for which the core in the cooperative game representing
Coasean bargaining with a specific liability rule is empty.3 Although the above examples
do show that the Coase theorem cannot always be demonstrated, they do not tell us in
which circumstances the Coase theorem is likely to hold. This paper fills that gap. Using
quite a general model of production activities with negative externalities, we investigate
what the driving economic parameters are that determine whether the core is empty.
2The total disutility that such a two-player coalition can guarantee to itself is at least -1: both members
drop their garbage on the third player but may still get his or her garbage. Additionally, the disutility
of the third agent, is -2, hence the total disutility is -3: social efficiency is not achieved. Hence, players
may not be able to reach an efficient outcome.
3The argument is reproduced by Stearns (1993) with voting instead of bargaining as a collective decision
process. In his example, a Condorcet cycle arises in a situation where three communities have to
collectively decide where to site a nuclear waste repository.
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To do so, we deal with a spatial model with externalities. It represents the problem of
providing a locally undesirable but globally desirable facility. In Pigou’s story on sparks
from railway engines, all citizens connected to the railways benefit from it, but those who
own woods along the track might suffer from the external cost. This is the well-known Not
In My Backyard (NIMBY) problem. Examples include waste treatment plants, nuclear
or coal power utilities, windmills, airports, or prisons.4 Such facilities may sometimes
be acknowledged to be socially beneficial in the sense of the Hicks-Kaldor criterion: the
social benefits more than offset the social costs. Yet their provision could still face strong
opposition from neighboring citizens who suffer from negative externalities such as air or
water pollution, noise, or amenity losses.5 This is why the localization of the facility is
a sensitive issue. Some form of compensation may be offered to make it acceptable to
the neighboring victims of external costs. In this paper we examine the feasibility of the
decentralized provision of such facilities.
The NIMBY problem is first studied in its general form. Several communities plan to
build a facility. The benefits from using the facility are excludable and non-rival. The
costs are incurred by the host and its neighbors. The communities both agree on location
and transfers: they decide on who is going to host the facility and how much the host and
its neighbors must be compensated. Coalitions of communities block the agreement if they
are better-off building and sharing their own facility (or not building at all). The outside
option of coalitions defines a cooperative game associated with the NIMBY problem.
Interestingly, the cooperative game exhibits specific properties. It is a cooperative game
with externalities in the sense that the welfare that a group of communities can enjoy
depends on the cooperative behavior of communities outside the group as well as the
localization of the facility they build on their own. Yet externalities in the associated
cooperative game can be negative or positive: a group of communities can benefit or
suffer from the cooperation of others. Nevertheless, the best that can happen for a
coalition of communities is that the other communities are not cooperating. We first
define the value function of our cooperative game accordingly: a group of communities do
not expect that the others will build their own facility when they oppose an agreement.
We thus give maximal incentives for coalitions to deviate and block an agreement. Under
some assumptions, we show that only two forces constrain the core: individual rationality
and the exclusion of individual communities and communities in the neighborhood of
any potential host of the facility. Individual rationality makes sure that all communities
benefit from the facility. The motive for exclusion is similar to that in Shapley and
Shubik’s garbage game: communities are tempted to exclude those who suffer from the
4Some of these projects feature non-excludability of the benefits at the origin of free-riding behaviors;
others not. We will emphasize here the garbage game dimension of such problems, which is common
to all.
5Richman and Boerner (2006) define a NIMBY as follows “a socially desirable land use that broadly
distributes benefits, yet is difficult or impossible to implement because of local opposition”.
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negative externality, to avoid compensating them. This restricts considerably the set of
inequalities defining the core.
We next propose an original index for testing whether the core is empty or not. The core
is non-empty if and only if this index is lower than one. We discuss some comparative
statics. We show that the core is less likely to be empty when the costs which cannot be
externalized increase for some communities, or when costs increase somewhere but at an
optimal location. In particular, this means that the more harmful would the project be
when located elsewhere than at the optimal location, the easier it is for the communities
to reach an agreement. We also show that the problem is exacerbated when the number of
communities increases in the linear case. However, the effect of the number of communities
is ambiguous in general. Next, we generalize our results for other notions of the core. We
finally provide illustrations on different spatial structures, first in the linear case and on
simple graphs. Lastly, we compute the index for a French administrative unit to illustrate
its potential applicability to real-world NIMBY problems.
Related litterature
Most of the theoretical papers in economics on the NIMBY problem rely on a mecha-
nism design approach. A central planner designs a mechanism such as an auction to
locate the undesirable facility optimally and to share its cost (O’Sullivan, 1993, Minehart
and Neeman, 2002, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux,
2011). The central planner can impose the mechanism on the communities but does not
know their costs. The implemented solution does not guarantee that some communities
could not do better by providing the facility by themselves. In contrast, we assume that
the costs associated with the facility are common knowledge and adopt a cooperative
approach. Decisions are decentralized to communities that collectively negotiate and can
make binding agreements about localization and compensations.
In a cooperative framework, Laurent-Lucchetti and Leroux (2010), Sakai (2012) and De-
hez (2013) have analyzed core solutions of cooperative games associated with NIMBY
problems.6 They all implicitly rely on the assumption that externalities are concentrated
within a jurisdiction. In practice, pollution (e.g. air or water pollution, risk of radioactive
contamination) spreads out quite widely compared to the size of the communities (e.g.
municipalities, countries). To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to explic-
itly introduce spatial externalities in a cooperative framework representing the NIMBY
problem. It emphasizes the difficulties that arise when the costs are spread over more
than a single community.
6Lejano and Davos (2001) also consider coalition formation in the NIMBY problem. In a numerical
example, they argue that a compensation scheme that leaves the host indifferent may fail to be a core
allocation.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on public good provision which emphasizes
the free-riding problem: users can benefit from public goods without contributing to
their cost (Bergstrom and al., 1986). Free-riding arises when people cannot be excluded
from consuming the good. We avoid free-riding by assuming that communities can be
excluded from accessing the facility at no cost. However, the potential exclusion of the
neighbors of any potential host can still compromise cooperation. Both the NIMBY
and public good provision cooperative games are games with externalities. This raises
interesting conceptual issues for the definition of the core and the representation of the
game in partition form (Bloch and van den Nouweland, 2014). Such issues are discussed
in Section 6.2.2.
Finally, our approach is also related to a literature on the core of cooperative facility
location games. In Goemans and Skutella (2004), consumers have heterogeneous costs
of being connected to the facility and differ on the benefit they enjoy using the facility,
depending on its location. They provide conditions for the core to be non-empty. In
Le Breton and Weber (2003), both the users and the facility are located along a line.
The benefit of using the facility is proportional to the distance between the user and the
facility called “transportation” cost. In this model, preferences are single-peaked, in the
sense that the closer the facility, the better for the user. This hypothesis plays a crucial
role for the existence of core allocations. In contrast, preferences can be single-dipped in
the linear representation of our model. As a consequence, non-emptiness of the core is no
longer guaranteed.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 6.1 introduces the general NIMBY
problem with excludable benefits. Section 6.2 presents the main results. We first deal with
a case without cooperative externalities in Subsection 6.2.1 and we discuss the robustness
of the results presented when cooperative externalities are considered in Subsection 6.2.2.
Finally, Section 6.3 provides illustrations of the main results on explicit spatial structures.
6.1 The NIMBY problem
A set N = {1, ..., n} (n > 1) of communities or agents (land owners, municipalities, cities,
regions, countries, etc.) might decide to launch a facility such as a waste treatment plant,
a utility (nuclear or coal power plant) or a polluting factory. Each community i ∈ N
7Barberà et al. (2012) and Manjunath (2014) have examined single-dipped preferences for the location
of an indivisible bad. They deal with non-transferable utility (no money involved) whereas we assume
transferable utility: players can transfer part of their welfare through side-payments. Their focus is on
the localization of the public bad with strategy-proof rules. In contrast, we abstract for information
problems so that the public bad can easily be efficiently located. In our setting, localization impacts
the value that a deviating coalition can achieve. It thus determines the distribution of the welfare
through side-payments.
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enjoys an individual benefit bi ≥ 0 from using the facility. Benefits are non-rival and non-
cumulative: once a community has access to a facility, it does not enjoy any additional
benefit from accessing a second one. Yet the communities that launch a facility can
exclude the others from using it. A facility also generates local nuisances to the host
and its immediate neighbors (pollution, risk of accident or contamination, etc.). This is
summarized by the cost matrix C = (cij)(i,j)∈N2 where cij ≥ 0 denotes the cost incurred
by community j from a facility located at i. In summary, a facility features non-rival
and excludable benefits and rival costs: it is both a club good and a private bad. For
every i ∈ N , cii will be called the host cost and cij (i 6= j) an external cost. Community
j is a neighbor of community i if and only if cij > 0. The matrix C provides a spatial
representation of the problem. A NIMBY problem is defined as a triplet (N, b,C).
We will use some further notations. We denote by h ∈ argmini∈N
∑
j∈N cij an optimal
location in N . There may be several optimal locations or hosts h for a given problem.
Let H denote the set of optimal locations
H = argmin
i∈N
∑
j∈N
cij
We denote by N¯ (i) = {j ∈ N |cij > 0} the neighborhood of i including i. Similarly,
◦
N (i) = {j ∈ N\{i}|cij > 0} denotes the strict neighborhood of i. The set of the subsets
of all strict neighborhoods
◦
N is defined by
◦
N = {S ⊆ N |∃i ∈ N,S ⊆
◦
N (i)}
Finally, we define
N¯ =
◦
N ∪ {{i}|i ∈ N}
Note that N¯ does not denote the set of the subsets of all neighborhoods but the set of
the subsets of all strict neighborhoods plus the singletons. In the case, all communities
pertain to a strict neighborhood, it coincides with
◦
N . This is the case in the example
that follows.
Example. Uniform linear NIMBY problems
Throughout the article, we will consider a particular illustrative NIMBY problem: the
uniform linear case. A NIMBY is linear if it can be represented by a line in which a link
between communities represents an external cost cij. In a line, each community has two
neighbors, except the ones at the two ends. If we order communities according to their
location from 1 to n, it means that the external costs are cjj+1 > 0 for j = 1 to n− 1. A
uniform NIMBY problem is characterized by uniform benefits and costs. The benefit per
community is denoted by b so that b = be where e = (1, ..., 1). The host cost is c and the
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external cost is δc for the neighbors of the host, where δ is a positive parameter reflecting
the proportion of the host’s cost that spreads to the neighboring communities with 0 ≤ δ.8
Uniform linear NIMBY problems are fully characterized by parameters (n, b, c, δ).
1 2 3 n-1
c dc 0 0 0
n
Figure 6.1: Distribution of the costs at an optimal location in the uniform linear case.
The cost matrix of a linear uniform NIMBY problem is:
C =


c δc 0 · · · · · · · · · 0
δc
. . . . . . . . .
...
0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0
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
The strict neighborhoods are
◦
N (1) = {2},
◦
N (i) = {i − 1, i + 1} for i = 2, ..., n − 1 and
◦
N (n) = {n − 1}. In the uniform linear setting, it is efficient to build the facility at one
end of the line. The total welfare so achieved is nb− (1 + δ)c. Figure 1 provides a spatial
representation of a linear uniform problem when the facility is optimally located at one
end of the line.
For any set of communities S ⊆ N , let b(S) =
∑
S bi be the total benefit enjoyed by S from
running a facility. While the total benefit does not depend on the location of the facility in
S, total costs do. Let us denote by c(S) the lowest total cost that the members of S incur
by building and running a facility. We have c(S) = mini∈S
∑
j∈S cij. A facility should be
8We insist on the interpretation of δ as the proportion of a neighbor’s pollution cost as compared
to the host’s total cost. Formally, the latter may be the sum of a technical cost ct (construction,
management, etc.) and a pollution cost cp. If α denotes the multiplicative change in the pollution
cost for the immediate neighbors, the additional cost for each of them is αcp. We then get δ = α
cp
ct+cp
.
So δ captures the change of pollution costs with distance, as well as the share of pollution costs in
the host’s total costs.
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built if the total benefit exceeds the total cost when located optimally. We assume that
b(N) > c(N): it is efficient to build a facility in the grand coalition. Obviously, since
a facility is non-rival and benefits are non-cumulative, it is efficient to build only one
facility used by all communities in N . The total benefit from building a facility optimally
located is thus b(N) − c(N). In addition, we assume bi < cii for every i ∈ N (in the
uniform linear case, this means b < c): it is never efficient for a community to launch a
facility alone. Therefore the cooperation of at least two communities is required to make
a facility advantageous. A coalition S ⊂ N is called a building coalition if b(S) ≥ c(S)
and a non-building coalition otherwise.
The communities agree on a location of the facility h and a way to share the net ben-
efit from using it. An efficient allocation is a vector x = (xi)i=1,...,n where xi denotes
community i’s benefit with:
∑
i∈N
xi = b(N)− c(N) = v(N).
An efficient allocation of the total net benefit v(N) is induced by budget-balanced transfers
t = (ti)i=1,...,n with
∑n
i=1 ti = 0. The host h enjoys a welfare of xh = bh−chh+th where th is
the compensation received from hosting the facility. Its neighbors j obtain xj = bj−chj+tj.
They are thus paid tj for the nuisances. Other communities i ∈ N\N¯ (h) get xi = bi + ti,
thereby paying −ti to finance the compensations th +
∑
j∈
◦
N (h)
tj.
An allocation is in the core of the NIMBY problem if it is not blocked by any coalition.
We say a coalition S ⊂ N blocks a distribution of the welfare if its members can achieve
a higher welfare by themselves. We need to figure out what a coalition S can achieve by
building and running its own facility. It depends on its own behavior and on the behavior
of the communities in N\S. Indeed, by agreeing to build a facility close to some members
of S, the communities outside S can exert a negative externality on S, hence reducing
its value. Technically, the cooperative game induced by the NIMBY problem exhibits
cooperative externalities: the worth or value of a coalition S depends on the behavior of
outside communities. For instance, if the communities outside S cooperate to build a
facility, a member of S who adjoins the facility might suffer from a negative externality
and S would experience a welfare loss. In the next section, we assume that if a coalition
S builds a facility, communities outside S do not build any. Such an assumption is in line
with the notion of γ-core whereby communities outside a coalition S play their individual
best reply strategies (Chander and Tulkens, 1997). We show that the problem can be
reduced under some assumptions. We propose a simple formula for an index related to
the non-emptiness of the core.
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6.2 Existence of core allocations
6.2.1 The NIMBY game without cooperative externalities
In first approach, we assume that if a coalition S builds a facility, remaining communities
do not cooperate. Here, since it is too costly for a single community to build its own
facility, its best individual strategy is not to build. This gives higher incentives for a
coalition S to block a global agreement since, when doing so, it does not anticipate
the potential negative externalities resulting from the cooperative behavior of remaining
communities. We relax this assumption and extend our result in Section 6.2.2.
Under such an assumption, the value or worth of coalition S ⊂ N is:
v(S) = max{0, b(S)− c(S)}
The NIMBY game without cooperative externalities thus defined belongs to the set of
TU-games. It may not be superadditive.9 Besides, not all TU-games can be represented
as a NIMBY game without cooperative externalities, i.e. by picking benefits b and costsC
to obtain its characteristic function: the NIMBY games without cooperative externalities
form a strict subset of the set of TU-games.10
A core allocation is defined as follows:
Definition 6.1. An allocation x is in the core C if it satisfies
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and the
following core lower bounds:
∀S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S).
The core is defined by a large number of inequality constraints. Some are binding, others
are not. We introduce several assumptions which aim at simplifying the problem. The
first one is related to the benefit achieved by a coalition formed by excluding a single
community or members of a common neighborhood.
9For instance, the NIMBY problem with three players defined by b1 = b2 = b3 = 2, c11 = c22 = c33 = 1,
c12 = c23 = c31 = 1, and c21 = c32 = c13 = 3 does not lead to a superadditive TU-game. Indeed, we
have v({1, 2, 3}) = 1 < v({1, 2}) + v({3}) = 2 + 1 = 3.
10For instance, in the case of TU-games with three players, the cooperative game induced by a NIMBY
problem with three communities, benefit b, and cost matrixC has the following characteristic function:
v({i}) = max(0, bi − cii), i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
v({i, j}) = max(0, bi + bj −min(cii + cij , cjj + cji)), i 6= j
v({1, 2, 3}) = b1 + b2 + b3 −min(c11 + c12 + c13, c21 + c22 + c23, c31 + c32 + c33)
Consider the TU-game represented by v({i}) = 1, v({i, j}) = 0 (i 6= j), v({1, 2, 3}) = 2. It is easy
to check that no vector of benefits b and cost structure C can make the two characteristic functions
coincide.
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Assumption 1. ∀S ∈ N¯ , b(N\S) ≥ c(N\S)
Assumption 1 implies that coalitions formed by excluding some neighbors of the same
community would always build a facility. It holds for local externalities, i.e. when few
municipalities are negatively impacted in relation to the number of beneficiaries. In
the uniform linear case, it holds when excluding the neighbors of communities at the
extremities of the line (1 and n), or the two neighbors of a middle-community i (with
1 < i < n), would not prevent the remaining communities from building a facility. The
first requirement is met when (n−1)b ≥ c while the second holds true when (n−2)b ≥ c.11
The last inequality provides a condition on the parameters n, b and c such that Assumption
1 holds in the uniform linear case.
Assumption 2. The optimal host is not unique: |H| > 1.
Assumption 2 might appear quite restrictive. Yet it holds in the linear case and can be
replaced by a different one for the main result, as discussed in Appendix 6.D.
Relying on the above assumptions, we can significantly reduce the set of lower bounds
defining the core.
Proposition 6.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, an allocation x is in the core C if and
only if
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) (6.1)
∀i ∈ N,xi ≥ 0 (6.2)
∀i ∈ N,xi ≤ bi (6.3)
∀S ∈
◦
N ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)). (6.4)
Proposition 6.1 clarifies what constrains core allocations. Condition (6.1) is the efficiency
condition. Condition (6.2) captures individual rationality: as we assume any single com-
munity anticipates no external cost from its withdrawing, it should be guaranteed 0 in
core allocations. In regard to this lower bound on individual allocations, Condition (6.3)
imposes a higher bound on individual allocations: the rationality of the coalitions of size
11In the first case, excluding a community at the extremity of the line allows a cost δc to be saved so
that the total cost incurred by the coalition which excludes 1 or n is (1 + δ)c. Yet the coalition loses
the benefit $b$ from the excluded community so that the total benefit is (n − 1)b. In the second
case, by excluding two communities that are neighbors of a middle-community i, the coalition can
save the two external costs 2δc by locating the facility at i, although they loose the benefit of the two
neighbors from using the facility so that the total benefit is (n− 2)b.
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n−1 ensures that no agent can be subsidized in the grand coalition. From Assumption 2,
this requirement also holds for the host. Finally, Condition (6.4) reflects the possible ex-
clusion of the host’s neighbors: by excluding some neighbors of a potential host, a coalition
disregards part of the external costs of the facility. Note that, even though it is not taken
into account by the remaining coalition, the excluded communities could still suffer from
the external costs. Due to such possibility of costless exclusion, the welfare of the host’s
neighbors is bounded from above. The point is that the upper bounds should not only
hold for the actual host’s neighbors, but also for all potential host’s neighbors. Therefore,
a coalition S of neighbors of a same community should contribute to the project at least
to the extent of the cost saved by excluding them, that is, c(N)− c(N\S). We need this
condition to hold for every coalition of neighbors of a same community, that is for all
coalitions in
◦
N .
We note that these constraints can be stringent enough to undermine the existence of
core allocations: when exclusion is profitable enough, the allocation of the full value of
the facility could be impossible in the grand coalition as such constraints would require
the collection of more than the total cost of the project. The understanding we get from
Proposition 6.1 leads us to a general statement about the existence of the core in NIMBY
games. The following condition will be imposed.
Assumption 3. ∀i ∈ N, bi ≥ maxj∈N\{i}cji
Assumption 3 states that the cost borne by a community when the facility is located
at one of its neighbor’s never surpasses its own benefit. In the uniform linear case, this
means that b ≥ δc: the external cost is bounded by the benefit of using the facility. In
this specific case, we note that b ≥ δc is a necessary condition for the core not to be
empty as we know that community 2 would have a maximum welfare of b− δc, which is
negative when the condition is not met. This assumption is made in order to focus on
cases for which individual rationality is not a source of emptiness of the core. We will see
in Section 6.2.2 that it can be relaxed when considering more general notions of the core.
The following Proposition provides a simple test for non-emptiness of the core, involving
an original index I(C).
Proposition 6.2. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, the core is non-empty if and only if I(C) ≤
1 where
I(C) = max
χ


∑
S∈N¯
χS
(
1−
c(N\S)
c(N)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


The proof of Proposition 6.2 is provided in Appendix 6.H. A similar result can be obtained
with a different assumption than Assumption 2. This is stated and proved in Appendix
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6.D. The general scheme of the proof is the following: starting from the result of Propo-
sition 6.1, we show that individual rationality constraints are never binding in a linear
program related to non-emptiness of the core using Assumption 3. The expression of the
dual of the resulting linear program then leads to Proposition 6.2.
Literally, the index I(C) considers the savings induced by the exclusions of single agents
and subsets of strict neighborhoods. It consists in the computation of the extent of the
savings induced by such exclusion on all balanced collections of subsets of neighbors.12
This is a combinatorial problem which is difficult to solve in general. Yet the computa-
tional complexity of I(C) is greatly reduced as compared to the general problem of the
existence of the core. As we will see in the uniform linear case and in Section 6.3, it can
be computed for specific spatial structures.
It is well known that the core of a TU-game is non-empty if and only if it is balanced.
Proposition 6.2 reformulates the balancedness condition for NIMBY games without co-
operative externalities.13 It emphasizes the role of the cost structure C in the difficulty
of reaching an unanimously accepted solution to the NIMBY problem.
Note that the index I(C) is invariant by the multiplication of C by a same positive
number: what matter are the relative proportions of the different costs. The two following
Corollaries clarify what features of the cost structure matter.
Corollary 6.1. Let t ∈ R+ and define C
′ = C + tIn the cost matrix obtained from the
addition of t to all the costs cii, i ∈ N . If Assumptions 1 to 3 remain satisfied, we have
I(C ′) ≤ I(C).
More precisely, defining τ = t
c(N)
, we have :
I(C ′) =
I(C)
1 + τ
The proof of Corollary 6.1 is presented in Appendix 6.E. It turns out that the index I(C)
can be interpreted as a measure of the proportion of the external costs as compared to
the host costs. More precisely, it quantifies the minimal increase in the host costs at all
locations that is required for core allocations to exist. An index of 0.8 indicates that at
most 20% of the total cost c(N) could be withdrawn to the host cost at any location and
the core would remain non-empty. An index of 1.2 indicates that at least 20% of the total
cost c(N) should be added to the host cost at any location for the core to be non-empty.14
12A collection B of coalitions is said to be balanced if and only if there exist strictly positive weights
χB = (χBS)S∈B such that, for any i ∈ N ,
∑
S∈N :i∈S χ
B
S = 1.
13As not all TU-games can be represented as NIMBY cooperative games without outside cooperation,
this condition cannot be expressed for any TU-game.
14Other meaningful quantities could be defined in this context. For instance, Le Breton et al (2013)
focus on the least core-value in problems of local public-project provision and financing. This value
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Corollary 6.2. Consider a decrease in C while the minimal cost in the grand coalition
c(N) is unchanged. If Assumptions 1 to 3 remain satisfied, the resulting index I(C) weakly
increases.
The proof of Corollary 6.2 is presented in Appendix 6.F. It may appear surprising at
first sight: when costs decrease everywhere but at an optimal location, the core shrinks.
The reason is that a decrease in the costs which leaves the cost unchanged at an optimal
location, weakly increases the profitability of the deviation for all coalitions. As a result,
the core is more likely to be empty and I(C) weakly increases. An illustration will be
provided in Section 6.3.1 for the case of graphs.
Example.
An illustration of Proposition 6.2 can be provided in the uniform linear case. In such
problems, an explicit computation of I(C) (detailed in Appendix 6.G) leads to a higher
bound on the parameter δ which depends only on the parameter n, as stated in the
following Corollary.15
Corollary 6.3. Under Assumptions 1 and 3, the core of the uniform linear NIMBY
problem (n, b, c, δ) is non-empty if and only if
δ ≤ δ¯(n) =


2
n−2
if n = 4k, k ∈ N
2
n−1
if n = 4k + 1, k ∈ N
2
n
if n = 4k + 2, k ∈ N
2
n−1
if n = 4k + 3, k ∈ N
In the linear case, a higher number of communities n causes the index I(C) to increase.
Hence, for any number of communities there exists a critical level of δ above which the
core is empty or, for any δ there exists a critical number of communities above which the
core is empty. This result does not generalize to all NIMBY problems. A counterexample
will be provided in Section 6.3.1.
Remark.
The Shapley value is an attractive solution to define compensations when the core is non-
empty. Unfortunately, the Shapley value might not belong to the core. It can indeed be
quantifies the minimal tax required on deviating coalitions for stabilizing the grand coalition. In this
line, the cost of stability (Bachrach et al, 2009), quantifies the minimal subsidy to the grand coalition
required to stabilize it. However, neither of them has a clear explicit form in the NIMBY cooperative
game.
15Note that Assumption 2 is always satisfied in the uniform linear case.
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the case as shown by Dehez (2013) in a slightly different problem without externalities.
We reproduce this result in our framework with n = 3 players. Assume that benefits are
uniform (∀i ∈ N, bi = b) and that the cost of hosting the facility are c11 = c22 < c33 < b
while cij = 0 for i 6= j (no cost externality). Assumptions 1 to 3 trivially hold, communities
1 or 2 should host the facility and all coalitions would build a facility. The core is not
empty: for instance the equal sharing solution xi = b− c113 for i ∈ {1, 2, 3} belongs to the
core. The Shapley value φ assigns:
φ1 = b−
c11
2
+
c33
6
= φ2
φ3 = b−
c33
3
Since v(1, 3) = 2b − c11, φ1 + φ3 < v(1, 3) if 3c11 < c33: the coalition {1, 3} can be made
better-off if it builds its own facility rather than share the total welfare according to the
Shapley value. The same applies for the coalition {2, 3}. The reason why the Shapley
value does not always belong to the core is that it may recommend a positive transfer
to the community 1 or 2 when it does not host the project. In these cases, remaining
communities are better off leaving this community aside.
6.2.2 The NIMBY game with cooperative externalities
The results of the previous section stand for a notion of the core which relies on a coalition’s
anticipation that outside members will not build any project. In some cases, it may be
unrealistic to assume such behaviors. For instance, a single community or a small coalition
would more likely expect outside members to cooperate and build a facility. In this
section, we examine alternative and plausible expectations on the behavior of outsiders
that a coalition might form. In doing so, we generalize the result to other notions of the
core.
As discussed above, this game features cooperative externalities: the value of a coalition S
depends on the cooperative behavior of communities outside S and their related facility-
building decisions. We now formalize the problem in partition form (Thrall and Lucas,
1963). Let P(N) be the set of all partitions ofN . The cooperative behavior of communities
is summarized by an element P of P(N) where each element S of P is a coalition. The
members of S jointly decide on whether to build a facility and on its location. Let
us denote S’s building decision by its location choice l ∈ S ∪ {0} where l = 0 if no
facility is built. In a partition P = {S1, ..., Sm}, each coalition of communities Si ∈ P
picks one of its best location decisions li. A rational location vector in partition P is a
vector l = (l1, ..., lm) where each decision li minimizes the cost of the facility (the cost
of hosting the facility and the external costs within Si). Let us denote by L(P) the set
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of rational location decision vectors in the partition P .16 They can be multiple due to
potential indifference. For instance, in the linear homogeneous NIMBY problem with
n = 5 communities and 2b < c ≤ 3b, the partition {{1, 2}, {3, 4, 5}} might implement two
different location vectors (0, 3) and (0, 5). They are both rational. However, as coalitions
do not internalize the effect of their decisions on outside communities, some rational
location will not be efficient. In this case, (0, 5) is preferred to (0, 3) by coalition {1, 2}
since in the first case one of its members, namely community 2, will incur the negative
external cost δc.
In a standard approach, the value function of a game with externalities depends on the
coalition S and the partition in which the coalition is embedded. In the NIMBY game,
it also depends on the rational location vector. Hence, we define the value in partition
function form v as a function that assigns to every coalition S, partition P of N such that
S ∈ P, and rational location vector l ∈ L(P), a real number v(S,P , l). It is the welfare
achieved by coalition S embedded in the partition P with the rational location vector l
on P . The value is then defined for any potential configuration in terms of partition and
rational location decisions.Yet some of those configurations might still appear irrelevant.
We account for this by introducing exogenous expectation formation rules. An expectation
formation rule R is a mapping which assigns to each coalition S a pair R(S) of a partition
P of N including S with a rational location vector l for P . Such a function represents
the expectations of a deviating coalition regarding the cooperative behavior of outside
members and the non-cooperative behavior of the resulting coalitions. The value of S
under the rule R is denoted vR(S) = v(S,R(S)). Note that expectations are taken as
exogenous here. They could be endogenized following the literature on dynamic coalition
formation (Bloch and van den Nouweland, 2014).
We now define the core based on exogenous expectation formation rules. A coalition S
in a partition P blocks a global agreement x under the rule R if it can achieve a higher
welfare under such a rule. An allocation belongs to the R-core of the NIMBY game with
cooperative externalities, denoted CR, if it is not blocked by any coalition of N . Formally:
Definition 6.2. Let R be an exogenous expectation formation rule. An agreement x is
in the R-core CR if it satisfies
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and the following core lower bounds:
∀S ⊂ N,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v
R(S)
16Two comments are called for here. First, our restricting the attention to the set of rational decisions is
in contrast with the standard approach of the α-core and β-core which respectively consider what a
coalition can achieve regardless of the behavior of outside members or when having the possibility to
adjust to others actions. Consistently with a remark by Laffont (1977) in the context of the garbage
game, the α-core would never be empty in our context. Second, in our case, location decisions are
independent. Yet, in the case of non-excludable benefits, strategic interactions would arise among
coalitions for the provision of facilities.
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As an illustration, we propose to discuss two specific rules relying on polar assumptions
on the behavior of outside members.17
We call the first expectation formation rule Collapse In Outside Cooperation (CIOC).
When deviating from a global agreement by blocking an allocation, a coalition S expects
that the remaining communities will not cooperate to build facilities. It is formally defined
by: ∀S ⊂ N , R(S) = ({S, {i}i∈N\S}, l). Note that since communities outside S are
singletons and that we assume that no community would build on its own, they never
build. The location decision vector l boils down either to no-building at all, or to a single
facility located inside S. If S builds a facility, there might be multiple optimal localizations
of the facility in S. Yet, all these localizations lead to a single value vc(S) = b(S)− c(S).
This leads us to the following definition:
Definition 6.3. The CIOC value function is defined as
vc(S) = max(0, b(S)− c(S))
The CIOC-core Cc is the R-core associated with the CIOC expectation formation rule.
This is the notion of the core that we have examined in the previous section. It corresponds
to the notion of the γ-core introduced in the context of public good games (see e.g.
Chander and Tulkens, 1997).
The second expectation formation rule we consider corresponds to the case of full coop-
eration. We call this second rule Rational Hostile Outside Cooperation (RHOC). It is
formally defined by ∀S ⊂ N,R(S) = ({S,N\S}, l). The expectations of a coalition S
when considering blocking an allocation is that the remaining communities will cooperate
and (potentially) build a facility. Moreover, the coalition S expects that if the coalition
N\S is indifferent between different locations, it will locate it at the worst place from S’s
point of view. This leads us to the following definition:
Definition 6.4. The RHOC value function for a coalition S is defined as
vr(S) = minl∈L({S,N\S})v(S, {S,N\S}, l)
The RHOC-core Cr is the R-core associated with the RHOC expectation formation rule.
We first investigate the cooperative externalities in the NIMBY problem. A cooperative
game exhibits positive (resp. negative) externalities if coalitions benefit (resp. suffer)
from the cooperative behavior of players outside (De Clippel and Serrano, 2008). It turns
17On the cooperative aspects, these rules respectively correspond to the N -exogenous and the N¯ -
exogenous rules in Bloch and van den Nouweland (2014).
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out that externalities in the cooperative game induced by the NIMBY problem can be
either positive or negative. The following proposition links the value functions of the
game in partition form, and the CIOC and the RHOC rules.
Proposition 6.3. For any S ⊂ N , P ∋ S and l ∈ L(P),
1. vc(S) ≥ v(S,P , l)
2. We might have vr(S) > v(S,P , l) or vr(S) < v(S,P , l) depending on P
3. We might have v(S,P , l) > v(S,P ′, l) or v(S,P , l) < v(S,P ′, l) when P ′ is a finer
partition of N including S.
First, the CIOC value is the highest possible value that a coalition can obtain by deviating
from the global agreement. This is because a coalition can only be bothered by nuisances
generated by the facilities built by outsiders. So the best that can happen for a coalition
is that the outsiders do not build any facility which holds under CIOC. Therefore, the
CIOC rule can also be seen as the optimistic expectation formation rule in this context
(Shenoy, 1979).
Second, the RHOC value can be lower or higher than the value with other partitions.
This can be shown in the 5-player uniform linear NIMBY problem. For 2b ≥ c the lowest
value for coalition S = {2} would be achieved with P = {{2}; {1, 4}; {3, 5}} and location
decisions (0, 1, 3) because S would undergo the externalities linked to 2 facilities instead
of a single one in the case P = {{2}; {1, 4, 3, 5}}. This remark emphasizes the fact that
full cooperation of outsiders is not the worst that can happen to a coalition.
Third, a coalition does not necessarily benefit from the merger of other coalitions. For
instance, S could experience a negative externality when two former non-building coali-
tions merge and build next to it. This would be the case in the homogeneous linear
case with 5 communities when c ≤ 4b < 2c and P = {{2}; {1, 4}; {3, 5}}. The merger
to P = {{2}; {1, 4, 3, 5}} would induce the construction of a facility at 1 and make the
worth of {2} decrease. Therefore, the RHOC rule does not correspond to the pessimistic
expectation formation rule that leads to the notion of the α-core (Aumann, 1967).
As a consequence of Proposition 6.3, we know that for any exogenous expectation for-
mation rule R, Cc ⊆ CR. The CIOC-core is the most restrictive notion of a core as it
amounts to considering that coalitions do not take into account the negative externality
that outside members could exert on them. Hence, the emptiness of the CIOC-core does
not imply the emptiness of any core. This leads us to question the generality of Proposi-
tion 6.2, and more especially to doubt whether the necessary character of the identified
condition would extend to any core. We actually show that this condition carries forward
to any exogenous expectation formation rule, provided we additionally assume that neigh-
borhoods are small enough so that they never build when excluded. This is the sense of
Assumption 4.
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Assumption 4. ∀S ∈ N¯ , b(S) < c(S)
Assumption 4 suffices for any coalition of neighbors of a same community not to build
a facility on their own.18 It holds when the number of direct neighbors is limited as
compared to the minimal number of communities for which building a facility is efficient.
For instance, it does hold in the uniform linear case when at least three communities are
needed to build a facility, because each community has at most two neighbors. Formally,
it requires that 2b < c, so that no neighborhood of a community would build on its own.19
Assumption 3 will also be needed. Yet, it can be weakened to the following assumption.
Assumption 5. ∀S ∈ N¯ , b(S) ≥
∑
i∈S maxj∈N\{i} cji + v
R(S)
Unfortunately, Assumption 5 has no direct interpretation. Along with Assumptions 1, 2
and 4, it generalizes Proposition 6.2 to any R-core.
Proposition 6.4. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 4 and 5, for any exogenous expectation for-
mation rule R, the R-core is non-empty if and only if I(C) ≤ 1.
Proposition 6.2 is generalized in games with externalities for two reasons. First, if a
coalition excludes some communities in a common neighborhood, then, due to Assumption
4, it is not rational for the excluded communities to build their own facility. The value
of the former coalition is therefore independent from the expectation formation rule.
Thus, we end up with the same core lower bounds as in the game without cooperative
externalities when it comes to the exclusion of communities in a common neighborhood.
Second, we show that, under Assumption 5, the core lower bounds of other non-building
coalitions are never binding in a linear program related to the non-emptiness of the core
as in Proposition 6.2.
Note that Proposition 4 can be extended to more general representations of expectation
formation rules. More generally, communities could form non-deterministic expectations
about the cooperative behavior of others defined as a coalition structure (in which the
coalition is embedded) and the rational location vector for the facilities. We could then
build the expectation of a coalition S as a probability distribution over partitions P ∋ S
and location vectors l ∈ L(P). The worth of S would be its expected value. Proposition
4 would remain valid with such rules.20
Before moving to the illustrative examples, we briefly discuss the case of non-excludable
benefits. It includes for instance NIMBY problems such as shale gas wells or nuclear waste
18Along with Assumption 1, it emphasizes a crucial feature for our results to hold: neighborhoods should
be sufficiently smaller than their complementary to induce different building decisions. For this reason,
our results apply to local pollution at the scale of N .
19If two communities neighboring a community i with 1 < i < n share a facility, they incur the hosting
cost but no external cost for a benefit of 2b.
20We thank a referee for suggesting this point.
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repositories. When benefits are non-excludable, coalitions of communities are tempted
to block a global agreement because they can benefit from the facility without paying its
cost. Both free-riding and the exclusion of potential neighbors compromise the existence
of core allocations. However, free-riding is mitigated by two forces. First, large coalitions
would not rationally expect remaining communities to build a project by themselves.
Hence, free-riding would only increase the core lower bounds for small coalitions. Second,
small deviating coalitions may expect the project to be located at their borders when
withdrawing from the grand coalition as their interests would no longer be taken into
account. At first sight, this would mitigate free-riding incentives. The RHOC-core can
offer interesting insights on this problem as it presupposes cooperation among remaining
communities and the associated credible threat. We again focus on the linear case in the
following example.
Example
Let us consider the uniform linear case with n ≥ 6. Under Assumptions 1 and 4, the
RHOC-core of a uniform linear NIMBY problem with at least six communities and non-
excludable benefits is empty. Indeed, for any RHOC-core allocation x, the core lower
bound of the coalition N\{2} (respectively N\{n − 1}) requires x2 ≤ b2 − δc (resp.
xn−1 ≤ bn−1 − δc). On the other hand, we know that the coalition N\{2, n − 1} is a
building coalition due to Assumption 4. Hence the coalition {2, n− 1} can free-ride and
its core lower bound is written x1 + xn−1 ≥ b1 + bn−1 − δc. The latter condition is not
compatible with the other two conditions identified. Hence the RHOC-core is empty.
We conclude this part by insisting that the emptiness of the core in the non-excludable
case is likely to stem from the interplay between free-riding incentives and the garbage-
game dimension of the problem. The latter dimension puts a higher bound on the welfare
of the neighborhoods. When benefits are excludable, these small coalitions will often not
get more in a core allocation than what they would achieve if they withdrew, even if
they have to bear the threat imposed by the remaining communities. Therefore, even
if credible threats exist, they would often fail to stabilize the grand coalition. In the
following section we redirect the focus to the CIOC-core in explicit spatial structures
with excludable benefits.
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6.3 Illustrations on explicit spatial structures
6.3.1 Uniform NIMBY problems on graphs
The linear example developed previously put the emphasis on the effect of the number
of individuals on the core. We propose here a natural extension of the linear case which
allows us to investigate the effect of the spatial structure on the core. For a given NIMBY
problem (N, b,C), we restrict our attention to NIMBY problems on graphs. As in the
linear case, the cost of building the project at a community i is the same for all. However,
it entails an identical additional cost δc on each of i’s neighbors. Hence, the matrix of
costs can be written C = cIn+δcG where In is the identity matrix and G is the adjacency
matrix of a simple graph (with values 0 on the diagonal). A NIMBY problem on a graph
is fully characterized by parameters (N, b, c, δ, G).
Example
Figure 6.1 below represents the graph associated with the following cost matrix for n = 6:
C =


c δc δc 0 0 0
δc c δc 0 0 0
δc δc c δc 0 0
0 0 δc c δc δc
0 0 0 δc c δc
0 0 0 δc δc c


On this graph, a facility built at 1 would yield an external cost δc at 2 and 3. The minimal
cost in the grand coalition is c(N) = c+ 2δc. The efficient locations are 1, 2, 5 and 6.
1
2
3 4
5
6
Figure 6.1: A graph with 6 communities
As in the linear case, the condition for non-emptiness can be stated as an upper bound
on the parameter δ.
Corollary 6.4. Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, the core of a NIMBY problem on a graph
(N, b, c, δ,G) is non-empty if and only if δ ≤ δ¯(G) where δ¯(G) > 0.
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The proof and an explicit expression for the critical value δ¯(G) are provided in Appendix
6.I, which is directly related to I(C): for a given δ, the more I(C), the less δ¯(G). The
expression of the critical value δ¯(G) involves the value of a linear program that can be
computed for specific examples.
Figure 6.2 provides an example of the ambiguous effect of the number of communities.
Indeed, from the linear graph A with 5 communities, the addition of a community on the
extremity of the line to form graph B implies a decrease in δ¯(G). For a given δ, this
is associated with a decrease in I(C). However, the further addition of a community to
form graph C implies an increase in δ¯(G).
Graph G n d(G) 
A 5 1/2 
B 6 1/3 
C 7 1/2 
Figure 6.2: Critical value of δ for different graphs with different number of communities.
These values are obtained from the explicit computation of δ¯(G) according to the expres-
sion derived in Appendix 6.I. The code used is provided in Appendix 6.J.1.
Figure 6.3 presents the critical value δ¯(G) associated with different graphs, all involving
6 communities. Corollary 6.2 is illustrated on graphs D to K and P to S: we observe
that, when a link is added while keeping the minimum degree constant, requirements
on δ can only be relaxed. In particular, the lax condition obtained for the complete
graph X can easily be extended to all complete graphs. This further emphasizes that
our argument mainly stands for local pollutions. Yet, in this case, since neighborhoods
and their complements are no longer asymmetric, Assumptions 1 and 4 cannot be met
at the same time. Finally, this assessment shows that the spatial structure is in itself an
important source of variability for the set of core agreements. We propose to carry further
the exercise on a real administrative unit.
6.3.2 A tentative assessment on real geographies
We now introduce a hypothetical problem in a real administrative geographical division
and compute the associated index I(C). The main purpose of this exercise is to illustrate
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Graph G d(N) d(G) 
D 1 1/3 
E 1 1/2 
F 2 1/4 
H 2 1/3 
J 2 1/2 
K 2 1 
L 1 1 
M 1 1/2 
N 1 1 
O 1 1 
Graph G d(N) d(G) 
P 2 1/4 
Q 2 1/4 
R 2 1/3 
S 2 1/2 
T 3 1/3 
U 3 1/2 
V 3 1 
W 4 1/2 
X 5 1 
Figure 6.3: Critical values for different graphs with 6 communities.
d(N) denotes the minimal degree of the graph. These values are obtained from the explicit
computation of δ¯(G) according to the expression derived in Appendix 6.I. The code used
is provided in Appendix 6.J.1.
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how the previous analysis could motivate further empirical analyses.
More precisely, let us consider a hypothetical negotiation among municipalities for lo-
cating and funding a facility in the French département of Haute-Garonne. This project
would yield a potentially heterogeneous benefit to each municipality. As Proposition 6.2
emphasizes, we do not need precise knowledge of the benefits, provided that Assumptions
1 and 3 are met. However, Assumption 2 does not hold in this environment. Hence, we
rely on the modification of Proposition 6.2 established in Appendix 6.D. It allows us to
drop this assumption at the cost of a different, more realistic one and a slight modification
of the expression of I(C). What matters most is the structure of costs. Assume that a
facility could only be located at the centroid of each municipality.21 Assume additionally
that, wherever it is built, a facility yields a uniform pollution cost within a fixed radius
from the site. For instance, Figure 6.4 shows, in red, an impacted area of 3 km around a
facility located at the centroid of a given municipality i. Given our assumption of unifor-
mity within the impacted area, the total pollution cost is directly proportional to the red
area. Moreover, as Proposition 6.2 emphasizes, we do not need to specify absolute values
to compute the index: only relative values matter. Hence, cii can be normalized to the
area of the intersection of the red plain circle and i’s territory, and cij, to the area of the
intersection between the red plain circle and j’s territory. The matrix C is obtained by
computing all such areas. Neighborhood sets and the optimal location are derived from
the matrix C.
We compute the index I(C) for different radii. The code used to perform this computation
is provided in Appendix 6.J.2. It yields the following results.
Radius (in km) 1 2 3
I(C) 4.46 34.2 50.2
We note that the index I(C) is always higher than 1, so the core is empty in all these
cases. This illustrative exercise can be improved by including a better estimate of the
costs of such a facility. The main difficulty here lies in the use of plausible values for the
perceived pollution costs. Any step in this direction would rely on a good understanding
of the monetary as well as the non-monetary costs of such facilities. The resulting index
would in particular be sensitive to the cost at the optimal site, which, in this illustration,
was to be at some indentation of the boundary.
21This exercise emphasizes a limitation in the model: in order to compute the cost matrix C, a hypothesis
has to be made on where the facility would be located within a given municipality regardless of the
coalition it belongs to. In this example, we chose the centroids of the municipalities. In a more general
framework, we could expect coalitions to have some flexibility in the location choice. By increasing
the value of all coalitions, such flexibility would strengthen requirements for non-emptiness. It would
yield complications but, in our view, few more insights.
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Figure 6.4: Municipalities composing Haute-Garonne.
Area A corresponds to the impacted area when located at an arbitrary municipality for a
radius of 3 km. Area B corresponds to the impacted area at the optimal location for the
same radius.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed the cooperative provision of economic activities that are glob-
ally beneficial but locally harmful in an explicit spatial model. Examples include facilities
such as landfills, waste treatment plants or polluting utilities. When communities can be
excluded from using the facilities, free-riding is not a problem like in standard localized
public-good provision problems. Yet, this may not suffice to warrant cooperation. We
show that the exclusion of the neighboring communities of potential hosts can be a sig-
nificant obstacle to cooperation. It sets upper bounds on compensations, which together
with the participation constraints, determine whether a global cooperative solution exists.
That is, if the core of the cooperative game is non-empty. An index is computed to test
the existence of a core solution. Its definition is robust to several assumptions on the
value function of induced cooperative games. It can be estimated in practice.
As mentioned in the introduction, our investigation of the NIMBY problem using coop-
erative game theory formalizes Coasian bargaining in economies with externalities. If,
when the core is empty, the parties involved fail to implement the project, the “Coase
theorem” does not hold. In this work, property rights were implicitly assigned to the
polluters because a facility could be built without the consent of the neighboring com-
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munities. Under other assignments of property rights, the core might be non-empty. In
particular, it is easy to show that the core is never empty under the polluter-pays prin-
ciple: if the communities building the facility are forced to compensate all neighboring
communities for the damages, a global and efficient cooperative agreement can always be
reached. Therefore, in contradiction with another interpretation of the Coase theorem,
the assignment of property rights could matter for achieving efficient outcomes, even in
the absence of transaction costs.
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6.A Notations
N Set of communities
b Vector of individual benefits bi derived from using the facility
C ∈Mn(R+) Cost matrix
cij ∈ R+ Cost for community j of a facility located at i
H ⊆ N Set of optimal locations
◦
N (i) Strict neighborhood of i (without i)
◦
N Set of subsets of all strict neighborhoods
N¯ (i) Neighborhood of i, including i
N¯ Set of subset of all strict neighborhoods plus the singletons
x An allocation of the net benefit
t Transfers between communities
S ⊆ N A coalition
v(S) Worth of a coalition, assuming no outside cooperation
b(S) Benefit of a facility for a coalition
c(S) Optimal cost of a facility for a coalition
P A partition of N
l A rational location vector
R An exogeneous expectation formation rule
CR Set of core allocations, given the exogeneous expectation formation rule R
C = Cc Set of core allocations, assuming no outside cooperation
Cr Set of core allocation, assuming rational hostile outside cooperation
6.B Proof of Proposition 6.1
Let x be an allocation which meets the conditions stated in Proposition 6.1, that is, the
efficiency condition (6.1), individual rationality conditions (6.2), and the following lower
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bounds for every S ∈ Y = {N\S|S ∈
◦
N} ∪ {N\{i}|i ∈ N},
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) (6.5)
We first show that it satisfies the core lower bounds (6.5) for any arbitrary coalition. Let
T ⊆ N .
• If T is a non-building coalition, we have v(T ) = 0. ∀i ∈ T , x meets the individual
rationality constraint xi ≥ 0. The sum of these constaints yields Condition (6.5) for
T . \item If T is a building coalition, we have v(T ) = b(T )− c(T ). Let us consider
j∗ ∈ argminj∈T
∑
i∈T cij an optimal site in T and S
∗ =
◦
N (j∗)\T , the set of strict
neighbors of j∗ that are not in T and T¯ = N\S∗. Since T¯ = N\S∗ ∈ Y,
∑
i∈T¯
xi ≥ b(T¯ )− c(T¯ )
Besides, c(T¯ ) ≤ c(T ) so: ∑
i∈T¯
xi ≥ b(T¯ )− c(T ) (6.6)
As for every i ∈ N , N\{i} ∈ Y, we have
∑
j∈N\{i} xj ≥ v(N\{i}). This inequality
can be rewritten, using the efficiency condition (6.1), as xi ≤ v(N) − v(N\{i}).
We have ∀i ∈ N\H, v(N) − v(N\{i}) ≤ bi and Assumption 2 additionally implies
∀h ∈ H, v(N)− v(N\{h}) ≤ bh. Thus, ∀i ∈ N,−xi ≥ −bi. From the summation of
the latter inequalities for all agents in T¯\T to inequality (6.6), we obtain
∑
i∈T xi ≥
b(T )− c(T ) = v(T ). Hence condition (6.5) holds for T .
We have shown that the core lower bounds can be restricted to coalitions in Y . From
Assumption 1, coalitions in {N\S|S ∈
◦
N} are all building coalitions so the constraints
associated with them are:
∑
i∈N\S xi ≥ b(N\S) − c(N\S). Combining them with the
efficiency constraints yields conditions (6.4) in Proposition 6.1.
6.C Proof of Proposition 6.2
From Proposition 1, the core can be defined as:
{
x ∈ Rn+
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
N
xi = v(N) and ∀S ∈ N¯ ,
∑
S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)) and ∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ 0
}
(6.7)
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A necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of this set involves the linear
program (LP1):
max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ N¯ ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)),∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ 0
}
≥ v(N) (6.8)
To show this equivalence, first note that if the set involved in condition (6.7) is non-empty.
Therefore any element of it constitutes a feasible solution in the linear program defined
in condition (6.8). A fortiori, its optimal solution also satisfies the condition. Therefore
(6.7)⇒ (6.8). For the converse, consider a solution x∗ to the linear program and assume
it satisfies condition (6.8). Consider the allocation xǫ defined by xǫi = max(0, x
∗
i − ǫ),
for all i ∈ N and some ǫ > 0. For any ǫ, the resulting allocation still pertains to the
feasible set of the linear program and, by a continuity argument, we can always find ǫ
such that
∑
N x
ǫ
i = v(N). This allocation pertains to the set defined in condition (6.7),
which, therefore, is non-empty.
Assumption 3 implies that the saving induced by the withdrawal of a community will never
exceed its benefit so for any S ⊆ T ⊆ N , we have v(S) ≤ v(T ) ≤ v(N). In particular, for
every S ∈ N¯ , v(N\S) ≤ v(N) which implies b(S) − (c(N) − c(N\S)) ≥ 0. Hence, this
linear program is feasible when Assumption 3 is met (take, for all i ∈ N, xi = 0). Besides,
it is bounded (by
∑
N bi for instance) so it admits a finite value.
We now show that the individual rationality constraints xi ≥ 0 are non-binding in (LP1).
We start to show that, for any optimal solution, no community, i0 ∈ N , pays more than
maxj∈N\{i0} cji0 , the highest external cost it can bear. Let x
∗ be an optimal solution to
(LP1) and i0 ∈ N . Assume that:
x∗i0 < bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} (6.9)
We can then increase x∗i0 by some ǫ > 0 such that:
x∗i0 + ǫ < bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} (6.10)
Such an increase improves the objective. We shall show that it also leads to a feasible
solution. Let S ∈ N¯ such that i0 ∈ S. Because S ∈ N¯ , S\{i0} also pertains to N¯ (except
for the case S = {i0}, in which the result is direct). By feasibility of x∗, we have:
∑
i∈S\{i0}
x∗i ≤ b(S\{i0})− (c(N)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0})) (6.11)
Summing inequalities (6.10) and (6.11), we get:
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∑
i∈S
x∗i + ǫ < b(S)− (c(N)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0})) + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})}
Since minT∈N¯ :i0∈T {c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} ≤ c(N\S)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0}), we have:
∑
i∈S
x∗i + ǫ < b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S))
All the constraints involving xi0 are met. This contradicts the optimality of x
∗. Hence,
inequality (6.9) cannot hold by contradiction. We have:
x∗i0 ≥ bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} (6.12)
Besides, for any T ∈ N¯ such that i0 ∈ T ,
c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})− c(N\T ) = min
j∈(N\T )∪{i0}
∑
k∈(N\T )∪{i0}
cjk − min
j∈N\T
∑
k∈N\T
cjk
Let us denote by j∗ an optimal host in N\T . Since minj∈(N\T )∪{i0}
∑
k∈(N\T )∪{i0} cjk ≤∑
k∈(N\T )∪{i0} cj∗k , by definition of the minimum, we have:
c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})− c(N\T ) ≤
∑
k∈(N\T )∪{i0}
cj∗k −
∑
k∈N\T
cj∗k = cj∗i0
Hence:
c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})− c(N\T ) ≥ − max
j∈N\{i0}
cji0 (6.13)
From conditions (6.12) and (6.13), we get x∗i0 ≥ bi0 −maxj∈N\{i0} cji0 and, from Assump-
tion 3, x∗i0 ≥ 0. Thus, individual rationality constraints can be discarded from (LP1)
without altering the value of the objective. This leads us to consider the linear program
(LP2):
max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ N¯ ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S))
}
Again, this linear program is bounded and feasible. Therefore, it admits a finite value
and so its dual (LP2∗):
min
x


∑
S∈N¯
χS(b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


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Which can be further simplified to:
min
x

b(N)−
∑
S∈N¯
χS(c(N)− c(N\S))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


A necessary and sufficient condition for non-emptiness of the core is that the value of
(LP2∗) is lower than v(N) = b(N)− c(N). This leads to the following condition:
max
χ


∑
S∈N¯
χS(1−
c(N\S)
c(N)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0

 ≤ 1
6.D Discarding Assumption 2 in Proposition 6.2
If |H| > 1, the proof of Proposition 6.2 holds. Here we assume |H| = 1 and show that
a similar result to Proposition 6.2 can still be obtained. The difference lies in the fact
that the host can get more than bh in core allocations, which prevents an immediate focus
on neighborhoods. However, we show that, as soon as an additional assumption is met,
requiring that xh ≤ bh does not alter the value of the linear program. This allows a focus
on neighborhoods. The proof proceeds as the proof of Propositions 6.1 and 6.2: we first
discard redundant constraints and simplify non-binding constraints in a linear program
related to the emptiness of the core.
Let us denote by h the unique optimal host in N and let x be an allocation which meets
the efficiency condition (6.1), individual rationality constraints (6.2) and the following
core lower bounds for every S ∈ Y ′ = E ∪ Eh ∪ {N\{i}|i ∈ N},
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) (6.14)
Where E = {N\S|S ∈
◦
N and c(N\S) ≤ c(N)} and Eh = {S ⊂ N |h 6∈ S}.
We first show that it satisfies the core lower bounds (6.14) for any arbitrary coalition. Let
T ⊆ N .
• If T is a non-building coalition, we have v(T ) = 0. ∀i ∈ T , x meets the individual
rationality constraint xi ≥ 0. The sum of these constraints yields Condition (6.14)
for T .
• If T is a building coalition, we have v(T ) = b(T ) − c(T ). Let us consider j∗ ∈
argminj∈T
∑
i∈T cij an optimal site in T and S
∗ =
◦
N (j∗)\T , the set of strict neigh-
bors of j∗ that are not in T . We define T¯ = N\S∗. If c(N\S∗) ≤ c(N), then
T¯ ∈ E ⊂ Y ′. If c(N\S∗) > c(N), then it must be that h is not in N\S∗ hence
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T¯ ∈ Eh ⊂ Y
′. Therefore: ∑
i∈T¯
xi ≥ b(T¯ )− c(T¯ )
Besides, c(T¯ ) = minj∈T¯
∑
k∈T¯ cjk ≤
∑
k∈T¯ cj∗k =
∑
k∈T cj∗k = c(T ), where the third
equality comes from the fact that communities in T¯\T do not belong to the neigh-
borhood of j∗ by construction. Hence:
∑
i∈T¯
xi ≥ b(T¯ )− c(T ) (6.15)
The rationality of coalitions N\{i} yields ∀i ∈ N\{h},−xi ≥ −bi. From the sum-
mation of the latter inequalities for all agents in T¯\T to inequality (6.15), we obtain∑
i∈T xi ≥ b(T )− c(T ) = v(T ). Hence condition (6.14) holds for T .
We have shown that the core lower bounds can be restricted to coalitions in Y ′. Combining
them with the efficiency constraints and defining E¯ = {T |T ∈
◦
N and c(N\T ) ≤ c(N)}
and E¯h = {T |h ∈ T}, the respective complementary of E and Eh, the core is non-empty if
and only if:
max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ E¯ ∪ E¯h ∪ {i|i ∈ N},
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)),∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ 0
}
≥ v(N)
We now eliminate constraints in E¯h. Let us denote by (LP3) the former linear program.
Let us consider x∗ as an optimal solution to (LP3) and let us assume x∗h > bh so that we
can write x∗h = bh + ǫ, ǫ > 0. At this stage, an additional assumption is required:
Assumption 6. ∃S ∈
◦
N such that h 6∈ S and c(N\S) ≤ c(N)
This assumption implies that it is always possible to exclude some agents different from
h and save on the cost of the project. We will show there always exists another optimal
solution, x′, such that x′h ≤ bh. From Assumption 6, there exists S ∈
◦
N such that h 6∈ S
and c(N\S) ≤ c(N). Let us consider S ∪ {h} ∈ E¯h. We have, by feasibility of x∗ in
(LP3):
∑
i∈S
x∗i + x
∗
h ≤
∑
i∈S
bi + bh
Hence,
∑
i∈S
x∗i ≤
∑
i∈S
bi − ǫ
Besides the rationality of coalitions N\{i} requires ∀i ∈ S, x∗i ≤ bi. Hence, there exists
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(ǫi)i∈S ∈ R
|S|
+ such that,
∑
i∈S ǫi = ǫ and, for all i ∈ S, x
∗
i ≤ bi − ǫi. Let us define x
′ as
follows:
x′h = x
∗
h − ǫ = bh
x′j = x
∗
j + ǫifor all j ∈ S
x′i = x
∗
i for all i 6∈ S ∪ {h}
By construction this solution yields the same objective. We want to show it is feasible as
well. Let TS be such that TS ∩ S 6= ∅ and TS ∈ E¯ ∪ E¯h ∪ {i|i ∈ N}, an arbitrary coalition
of E¯ ∪ E¯h ∪ {i|i ∈ N} containing elements of S. Three cases arise:
• If TS ∈ {i|i ∈ N}, then the associated constraint xi ≤ bi is met by construction.
• If TS ∈ E¯h, we have, where the first inequality comes from the fact that
∑
i∈TS∩S ǫi−
ǫ ≤ 0 and the second is the feasibility of x∗ in (LP4):
∑
i∈TS
x′i ≤
∑
i∈TS
x∗i ≤ b(TS)− (c(N)− c(N\TS))
• If TS ∈ E¯ , TS ∪ {h} ∈ E¯h and by feasibility of x∗ in (LP4):
∑
i∈TS
x∗i + x
∗
h ≤ b(TS) + bh − (c(N)− c(N\(TS ∪ {h})))
Simplifying bh and because
∑
i∈TS∩S ǫi ≤ ǫ,
∑
i∈TS
x′i ≤
∑
i∈TS
x∗i + ǫ ≤ b(TS)− (c(N)− c(N\(TS ∪ {h})))
Because c(N\TS) ≤ c(N), the optimal location in N\TS cannot be h. Hence, the
withdrawal of h can only lead to a decrease in cost, so that c(N\(TS ∪ {h})) ≤
c(N\TS). Finally, we have, for any constraint TS involving elements of S:
∑
i∈TS
x′i ≤ b(TS)− (c(N)− c(N\TS))
This establishes that x′ is feasible. Hence it is an optimal solution as well. Finally, we
can require that xh ≤ bh without altering the value of the linear program. This defines
the linear program (LP4):
max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ E¯ ∪ E¯h,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)),∀i ∈ N, xi ≤ bi and xi ≥ 0
}
It is straightforward to show that, following the introduction of the additional constraint
xh ≤ bh, all constraints in E¯h are redundant in (LP4). Hence (LP4) can be rewritten:
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max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ E¯ ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)), xh ≤ bh,∀i ∈ N, xi ≥ 0
}
And, adding some redundant constraints to simplify the notations:
I(C) = max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ N¯ ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)),∀i ∈ N, xi ≤ bi and xi ≥ 0
}
We eventually get an expression similar to the one introduced in Proposition 6.2: As-
sumption 2 can be replaced by Assumption 6 provided we impose the additional condition
xh ≤ bh in the former linear program. Hence, an expression of I(C) can be obtained by
defining the function c′ such that c′(N\{h}) = min{c(N\{h}), c(N)} and, for all S ⊂ N
different from N\{h}, c′(S) = c(S). Then:
I(C) = max
χ


∑
S∈N¯
χS(1−
c′(N\S)
c′(N)
)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


6.E Proof of Corollary 6.1
Consider the NIMBY problem σ = (N, b,C) and let t ∈ R+. Define σ′ = (N, b,C ′),
where C ′ = C + tIn and In denotes the identity matrix. For any building coalition in σ′,
we have c′(S) = c(S) + t where c(S) and c′(S) denote the cost of the project for coalition
S in σ and σ′ respectively.
The linear programs defining I(C ′) writes:
I(C ′) = max
χ


∑
S∈N¯
χS
(
1−
c(N\S) + t
c(N) + t
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


Defining τ = t
c(N)
and substituting t, we get:
I(C ′) =
1
1 + τ
max
χ


∑
S∈N¯
χS
(
1−
c(N\S)
c(N)
)∣∣∣∣∣∣ ∀i ∈ N,
∑
S∈N¯ :i∈S
χS = 1, χS ≥ 0


Therefore
I(C ′) =
I(C)
1 + τ
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6.F Proof of Corollary 6.2
Let σ = (N, b,C) and σ′ = (N, b,C ′) be two NIMBY problems meeting Assumptions 1
to 4. Define c and c′ the cost function in the problem σ and σ′ respectively, and assume
1. c(N) = c′(N);
2. C ≥ C ′.
Let (LP ) and (LP ′) be the linear programs defining respectively I(C) and I(C ′) and let
χ be an optimal solution to (LP ). In case, some additional coalitions appears in the set
N¯ in σ, extend χ by assigning a weight of 0 to them. This defines a feasible solution χ¯ in
(LP ′). Because C ≥ C ′ and c(N) = c′(N), we have ∀S ∈ N¯ , 1− c(N\S)
c(N)
≤ 1− c
′(N\S)
c′(N)
, so
the objective of (LP ′) at χ¯ is not lower than I(C). Therefore, the value of (LP ′), I(C ′),
cannot be lower than I(C).
6.G Proof of Corollary 6.3
In the linear case, Assumption 2 holds, and we explicitly compute the value of I(C). In
this section we will use the notion of balanced collections. A collection B of subsets of N
is said to be balanced if and only if there exist strictly positive weights χB = (χBS)S∈B such
that, for any i ∈ N ,
∑
S∈B:i∈S χ
B
S = 1. Denoting by B(N¯ ) the set of balanced collections
over N composed of elements of N¯ only, we can write:
I(C) =
1
c(N)
max
B∈B(N¯ )
{∑
S∈B
χBS(c(N)− c(N\S))
}
We compute the costs saved by excluding a set of neighboring communities from the grand
coalition c(N)− c(N/S) for every S ∈ N¯ . In the linear case, S is of size 1 or 2.
• Case |S| = 1. Some cost is saved by excluding a single community only if the
community excluded is neighbor of one of the optimal hosts: 1 or n. The external
cost δc is then saved: c(N)− c(N\S) = δc for S ∈ {{2}, {n− 2}}.
• Case |S| = 2. Let S be a coalition of two communities S = {j, j + 2} neighbor of a
community not located at the extreme of the line j + 1 ∈ {1, ..., n − 2}. The cost
saved by excluding S is δc because the optimal host becomes j+1 with c(N\S) = c
while it is 1 or n in the grand coalition with c(N) = c+ δc. For all other coalitions
of size 2 neighbor of the same community, no cost is saved: c(N)− c(N\S) = 0.
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Therefore, for any S ∈ N¯ , we have the corresponding values:
c(N)− c(N\S) =


δc if S ∈ {2, n− 1}
δc if S ∈ {{j, j + 2}|j ∈ {1, ..., n− 2}}
0 otherwise
N¯ is a set of coalitions of no more than two players. Hence, for any balanced collection B of
elements of N¯ , there exists a partition of N into pairwise disjoint sets N1, ..., Nl, l = 0...L
where each Nl with l > 0 is a coalition of at least three communities such that B consists
of full cycles on each Nl and a partition of N0 (Balinski, 1970, as stated in Le Breton and
Weber, 1995: 316). Because no cycle can be formed out of elements of N¯ in the linear case,
all balanced collections over N¯ are partitions. In summary, we are interested in finding
partitions P of N , composed with elements of N¯ which maximize
∑
S∈P(c(N)− c(N\S)).
We now explain how to find such optimal partitions.
First, for any partition involving coalitions in which 2 or n − 1 belongs to a two-agent
coalition, we weakly improve on the objective by splitting such coalitions into singletons.
Hence, we can restrict our attention to coalitions in which such communities appear as
singletons. The construction of an optimal partition then consists in maximizing the
number of coalitions of the form {{j, j+2}|j ∈ {1, ..., n−2}}. In the case n ∈ {4, 5, 6, 7},
such optimal partitions are trivial as soon as communities 2 and n−1 appear as singletons.
Figure 6.G.1 presents optimal partitions and the corresponding value of
∑
S∈P(c(N) −
c(N\S)).
For any n > 7, we know that n can be decomposed as n = 4k+ i, k ∈ N and i ∈ 0, 1, 2, 3.
According to this decomposition, an optimal partition can be found by combining the
initial patterns above and the iterative pattern presented in Figure 6.G.2 which maximizes
the value that can be obtained by adding 4 communities to the initial pattern.
We eventually find the following optimal partitions:
• If n = 4k, k ∈ N, P = {{1}, {2}, {n− 1}, {n}} ∪k−1j=1 {{4j − 1, 4j + 1}, {4j, 4j + 2}}
• If n = 4k+1, k ∈ N, P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {n−1}, {n}}∪k−1j=1{{4j, 4j+2}, {4j+1, 4j+3}}
• If n = 4k+ 2, k ∈ N, P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {n− 1}, {n− 2, n}} ∪k−1j=1 {{4j, 4j + 2}, {4j +
1, 4j + 3}}
• If n = 4k + 3, k ∈ N, P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, {n− 1}, {n− 2, n}} ∪k−1j=1 {{4j + 1, 4j +
3}, {4j + 2, 4j + 4}}
And the associated values are:
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Case Optimal partition Value 
n=4 2dc 
n=5 3dc 
n=6 4dc 
n=7 4dc 
1 2 3 4 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Figure 6.G.1: Initial patterns.
The reasoning adopted for finding the optimal partitions consists in considering all possible
cases. We detail the case n = 7. First, we know that there is always an optimal partition
containing {2} and {6} as singletons. The value associated with each is δc. The value
associated with any other single individual is 0 whereas the value associated with any pair
of N¯ is δc. An optimal partition thus contains as many pairs of N¯ as possible. This is
achieved with the partition P = {{1, 3}, {2}, {4}, {6}, {5, 7}}.
Figure 6.G.2: Iterative pattern.
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I(C) =


n
2
δ
1+δ
if n = 4k, k ∈ N
n+1
2
δ
1+δ
if n = 4k + 1, k ∈ N
n+2
2
δ
1+δ
if n = 4k + 2, k ∈ N
n+1
2
δ
1+δ
if n = 4k + 3, k ∈ N
The condition on δ expressed in Corollary 6.3 directly follows from the comparison of
I(C) with 1.
6.H Proof of Proposition 6.4
Let R be an exogenous expectation formation rule and vR its associated characteristic
function. We want to show that under Assumptions 1, 2, 4 and 5, the R-core is non-
empty if and only if I(C) ≥ 1. We extend the proof of Propositions 6.1 and 6.2.
First, we eliminate redundant constraints in the system defining the core. We distinguish
between building and non-building coalitions. NB = {T ⊂ N |b(T ) < c(T )} is the set
of non-building coalitions. Replicating the proof of Proposition 6.1, the constraints for
building coalitions can be restricted to {N\S|S ∈ N¯}. However, the constraints for non-
building coalitions cannot be reduced to individual rationality: an allocation x is in the
R-core CR if and only if
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N) (6.16)
∀S ∈ NB,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v
R(S) (6.17)
∀i ∈ N,xi ≤ bi (6.18)
∀S ∈
◦
N ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)) (6.19)
where the constraints (6.17) contain the individual rationality constraints. We consider
the linear program (LP5):
max
x
{∑
i∈N
xi
∣∣∣∣∣ ∀S ∈ N¯ ,
∑
i∈S
xi ≤ b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S)) and ∀S ∈ NB,
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v
R(S)
}
The R-core CR is non-empty if and only if (LP5) is feasible and reaches a value higher than
v(N). We first note that such a program would always be feasible under Assumption 5.
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Second, as in the proof of Proposition 6.2, we can show that the constraints (6.17) are
never binding under Assumption 5.
Let x∗ be an optimal solution to the above linear program and assume there exists i0 ∈ N
such that:
x∗i0 < bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} (6.20)
Then we can increase x∗i0 by some ǫ > 0 such that:
x∗i0 + ǫ < bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})} (6.21)
Such an increase improves on the objective. We shall show that it also leads to a feasible
solution. First, it is straightforward to see that the constraints (6.17) are met. We
concentrate on the remaining constraints.
Let S ∈ N¯ with at least two communities, such that i0 ∈ S. Because S ∈ N¯ , S\{i0} also
pertains to N¯ . By feasibility of x∗, we have:
∑
i∈S\{i0}
x∗i ≤ b(S\{i0})− (c(N)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0})) (6.22)
Summing inequalities (6.21) and (6.22), we get:
∑
i∈S
x∗i + ǫ < b(S)− (c(N)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0})) + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})}
Therefore, ∑
i∈S
x∗i + ǫ < b(S)− (c(N)− c(N\S))
Therefore, all the constraints involving xi0 are met. This contradicts the optimality of x
∗.
Hence, inequality (6.20) cannot hold by contradiction. We have:
x∗i0 ≥ bi0 + min
T∈N¯ :i0∈T
{c(N\T )− c((N\T ) ∪ {i0})}
Besides, as established in the proof of Proposition 6.2:
∀S ∈ N¯ : i0 ∈ S, c(N\S)− c((N\S) ∪ {i0}) ≥ − max
j∈N\{i0}
cji0
so x∗i0 ≥ bi0 − maxj∈N\{i0} cji0 and ∀S ∈ {T ⊂ N |b(T ) < c(T )},
∑
i∈T x
∗
i ≥ b(T ) −∑
i∈T maxj∈N\{i} cji. Hence, using Assumption 5,
∑
i∈T x
∗
i ≥ v
R(T ).
The constraints (6.17) can then be removed from the linear program (LP5) without chang-
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ing its value. This leads us back to the linear program (LP2) and the proof of Proposi-
tion 6.2 applies.
6.I Proof of Corollary 6.4
The cost of the project on a graph depends on the minimal degree of this graph. For any
S ⊆ N , we denote by d(S) the minimal degree of the graph induced by S on G. Rewriting
the condition I(C) ≥ 1, we get the following condition on δ:
δ ≤ δ¯(G) =
1
maxχ {
∑
S∈N¯ χS(d(N)− d(N\S))|∀i ∈ N,
∑
S:i∈S χS = 1, χS ≥ 0} − d(N)
We want to show δ¯(G) > 0. Let h ∈ H be an optimal host in N and j ∈
◦
N (h).22
Consider the following partition: {
◦
N (h), Sj, N\(
◦
N (h) ∪ Sj)}, where Sj =
◦
N (j)\
◦
N (h) is
the strict neighborhood j from which we withdraw members of
◦
N (h). A feasible solution
χ′ associated with this partition is defined as follows:
• χ′◦
N (h)
= 1;
• χ′Sj = 1;
• χ′
N\(
◦
N (h)∪Sj)
= 1;
• χ′S = 0 for all other coalitions
We compute the value of this linear program at this feasible solution. First, we know
that |
◦
N (h)| = d(N). Hence community j has at most d(N) − 1 neighbors in
◦
N (h).
The withdrawal of its neighbors in Sj therefore leads to a graph with a degree of at
least d(N) − 1. Hence, d(N) − 1 ≥ d(N\Sh), which implies that d(N) − d(N\Sh) ≥ 1.
Second, we have d(N\
◦
N (h)) = 0; hence, d(N) − d(N\
◦
N (h)) = d(N). Finally, as we
have h ∈ Sj by construction, the minimal degree of
◦
N (h) ∪ Sh is at most d(N); hence
d(N)− d(
◦
N (h)∪ Sh) ≥ 0. The value associated with the feasible solution χ′ is d(N) + 1,
hence the optimal value of the linear program defining δ¯(G) can only be higher than it.
Therefore, δ¯(G) > 0.
6.J Codes
These are the codes used with the software R.
22We assume here that |
◦
N (h)| > 0. If it is not, the core is always non-empty (δ¯(G) = +∞).
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6.J.1 NIMBY problems of graphs
#######################################################
# Finding the critical value of delta on a graph #
#######################################################
rm(list=ls())
library(linprog)
#This function returns the critical value deltac
#Input: Adjacency matrix
#Output: deltac
deltac<-function(M){
n<-dim(M)[1]
A<-NULL
b<-NULL
for(i in 1:dim(M)[1]){
neighbors<-which(M[i,]>0,arr.ind=TRUE)
di<-length(neighbors)
for(k in 0:(min(rowSums(M))-1)){
ExcludableCoalitions<-matrix(neighbors[combn(1:di,di-k)],ncol=choose(di,di-k))
for(l in 1:choose(di,di-k)){
constraint<-rep(0,dim(M)[1])
constraint[ExcludableCoalitions[,l]]<-1
A<-rbind(A,constraint)
b<-cbind(b,min(rowSums(M))-k)
}
}
}
rownames(A)<-NULL
A<-rbind(A,diag(1,n))
b<-c(t(b),rep(0,n))
chi<-solveLP(b,rep(1,2*n),rbind(t(A),t(A)),maximum = TRUE, const.dir =
c(rep("<=",n),rep(">=",n)),lpSolve=FALSE,solve.dual = FALSE)$solution
1/(chi%*%b-min(rowSums(M)))
}
#Case A of Figure 6.3
MA<-matrix(c(
0,1,0,0,0,0,
1,0,1,0,0,0,
0,1,0,1,0,0,
0,0,1,0,1,0,
0,0,0,1,0,1,
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0,0,0,0,1,0), nrow = 6, ncol = 6)
deltac(MA)
6.J.2 NIMBY problem on a French administrative unit
The GIS data used is the GEOFLA® Communes database. It is publicly available at
http://professionnels.ign.fr/geofla.
######################################
# Computation of I(C) #
######################################
rm(list=ls())
memory.size(8000)
require("rgdal")
require("rgeos")
require("spdep")
require("linprog")
# Importation of the GIS data
mun <- readOGR(dsn="COMMUNES", layer="COMMUNE")
numdep<-"31"
dref<-1000
mundep<-mun[as.character(mun@data$CODE_DEPT)==numdep,]
dep<-gUnaryUnion(mundep)
centroids<-SpatialPoints(cbind(mundep@data$X_CENTROID*100,mundep@data$Y_CENTROID*100),
mundep@proj4string)
impactArea<-gBuffer(centroids,width=dref,byid=TRUE,id=rep(" ",length(centroids)))
#Derivation of the matrix C
M<-rep(0,length(mundep))%*%t(rep(0,length(mundep)))
colnames(M)<-(mundep@data[,1]-1)
for(i in 1:length(mundep)){
neighbors<-gArea(gIntersection(impactArea[i],mundep,byid=TRUE),byid=TRUE)
M[i,as.character(as.numeric(names(neighbors)))]<-as.numeric(neighbors)
}
cN<-min(rowSums(M))
#Computation of I(C)
storage.mode(M) <- "integer"
A<-rep(0L,800000)%*%t(rep(0L,dim(M)[1]))
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b<-rep(0L,800000)
compteur<-1
for(i in 1:dim(M)[1]){
neighbors<-which(M[i,]>0, arr.ind=TRUE)
neighbors<-neighbors[neighbors!=i]
di<-length(neighbors)
ci<-sum(M[i,])
if(di>0){
for(k in 1:di){
ExcludedAgents<-matrix(neighbors[combn(1:di,k)],,ncol=choose(di,k))
for(l in 1:dim(ExcludedAgents)[2]){
if(ci-sum(M[i,ExcludedAgents[,l]])<=cN){
A[compteur,ExcludedAgents[,l]]<-1
b[compteur]<-cN-ci+sum(M[i,ExcludedAgents[,l]])
compteur<-compteur+1 } } } } }
A<-A[1:compteur-1,]
b<-b[1:compteur-1]
A<-rbind(A,diag(1,dim(M)[1]))
b<-c(b,rep(0,dim(M)[1]))
I(C)<-solveLP(b,rep(1,dim(M)[1]),t(A),maximum = TRUE,const.dir = rep("=",dim(M)[1])
,maxiter=300000,lpSolve=TRUE,solve.dual = FALSE,verbose=1)$opt/cN
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Conclusion
Main results
Let us recall our original and overarching questioning which regards the assessment of the
fair character of public policies whose distributive impacts are well understood. I first ar-
gued that a relevant assessment cannot avoid paying attention to the political community
concerned. To illustrate this, I proposed three broad perspectives on the democratic po-
litical community and argued that a relevant approach would significantly differ in these
perspectives. In particular, it appeared that the degree of ethical reasoning involved, the
underlying empirical material and the formulation of the assessment would differ signifi-
cantly depending on the perspective taken. I next focused on the deliberative perspective
and discussed how two particular branches of the social choice literature are susceptible
of bringing insights and proposals that could be relevant to public deliberations: the em-
pirical social choice literature and the theory of fair allocations. In a nutshell, the latter
provides a theory of the formation of reasoned judgments in the course of deliberations,
while the former can be used to assess the relevance of the theories proposed.
The rest of the thesis is intended to illustrate this approach in the context of the NIMBY
problem. The results presented in Chapter 4 further suggest a some fair mechanisms
along with a justification for them. A selection among these may be justified based on
considerations of compensation or reward. Observing the judgments expressed or revealed
on these problems and others with a similar structure in Chapters 4 and 5, I conclude that
the welfare egalitarian allocation rules is the rule that attracts most support, despite some
clues that these judgments may still rely on heuristics and then be suceptible of change.
The main conclusion that I may propose out of these results is that, absent externalities,
mechanisms such as the first or second-price auctions may be considered as reasonably fair
policy options, in the sense that can be justified on the basis of widely shared principles,
but they are not the only ones. However, I insisted on two main limits. First the analysis
did not consider the possibility of externalities, which brings additional complications as
suggested in Chapter 6. Second, observation suggests that the judgments reported are not
in reflective equilibrium, which limits their relevance for motivating a social judgment.
227
Conclusion
Applied and interdisciplinary perspectives
In the end, an application of the proposed framework to actual policymaking would have to
tackle two challenges. The first is a need for structuring the existing information in a way
that is useful to the fairness assessment of actual public policies. In Chapter 2, I claimed
that the theory of fair allocations can assist the formation of reasoned judgments over
actual policies and I proposed to organize the results of these theories in a comprehensive
framework that encompasses reflections on the ethical relevance of different features of a
problem. While necessary, this also requires the consideration of many possible problems
and a lot of information. The best way to structure and present such information remains
open.
The second challenge relates to the need for designing protocols for the observation of
judgments that are relevant to the deliberative perspective. In Chapter 1, I argued that
judgments may vary according to several dimensions. More knowledge is required re-
garding the dimensions along which judgments are most dependent. This also requires a
discussion of the conditions which are most relevant in a given perspective. In the delibera-
tive perspective, I proposed that reasoned judgments shall be preferred over spontaneous
judgments. In practice, however, protocols for the observation of reasoned judgments
would have to conciliate the complexity of axiomatic analyses with the limited willingness
of individuals to perform complicated reasoning. In the attempts presented, I proposed to
simplify the phrasing of the axioms, which eventually hardened the interpretation of the
results. Bridging the gap between the actual judgments and the theories of fairness repre-
sents a significant challenge. As individual motivations for justification may be strongest
in social interactions, I stressed the potential interest to consider the results and methods
in other disciplines.
Beyond the many possible perspectives on the political community and from a pragmatic
viewpoint, I eventually put forward how this approach can contribute to policy making
in practice. A first possibility is to contribute to the design of robust justification for
policies. In a given context, contemplating the many possible arguments and their logi-
cal relationship allows to clearly identify the normative underpinnings of a given policy
choice. In particular, I argued that these results may ease the argumentation through the
identification of appropriate particular cases or principles for counterarguments.
A second possibility is to contribute to the design of innovative justification schemes
which, in turn allows for the considerations of broader options in policy making. This
approach may actually correspond to what has been achieved on some particular problems
such as school choice or organ donation. But the potential application of these approaches
may extend far beyond these problems. Referring to environmental policies, Amartya Sen
(1995) emphasized that “the threats that we face call for organized international action
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as well as changes in national policies, particularly for better reflecting social costs in
prices and incentives. But they are also dependent on value formation, related to public
discussions, both for their influence on individual behavior and for bringing about policy
changes through the political process.” As such, the approach proposed can contribute to
identify significant policy changes from the status quo, and bring a justification for them
and evidence of its ability to convince.
A third possibility that is related to the implementation of these relates to the design of
communication strategies. In particular, the potential of the empirical observation of the
judgments in conditions of impartiality to contribute to value change could be hypothe-
sized from the intuition that knowledge of other’s view may constitute an important input
in shaping individuals’ judgments. This remains to investigate.
In all these case, the potential contributions presented mainly lie in increasing the ac-
ceptance of public policies and reducing conflicts in society. Despite the widespread
skepticism toward the possibility and interest of knowledge on normative matters, I hope
to have convinced the reader that a joint understanding of the logics of norms and the
judgments held in society is a relevant knowledge basis for policymaking. This being
said, I wish to conclude by recollecting what the resulting assessments do not seek to
replace. At an individual level, a full-fledged moral inquiry and at the collective level, the
constitution of a political consensus, both will remain required regardless of the level of
understanding achieved on a particular problem, through this approach or any other.
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